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Abstract 
 
My thesis defends a natural law understanding of Marx against the view that Marxist social science 
theory is a value-free project incompatible with justice and morality. This defense has two aspects. 
The first aspect regards the substantive contents of Marx’s notion of justice. The second aspect 
regards the methodology of social science. My arguments of both of the above two aspects are 
grounded in the natural law tradition, especially in the light of John Finnis’s natural law theory of 
law.  
 
In terms of the methodology of social science, Finnis endorses a the method of first person ideal-
type description in descripting legal phenomenon. Such a method distinguishes the focal cases of 
law from the marginal cases of law according to whether they embody or deviate from the ideal-
type of law. The ideal-type of law, on the one hand, is defined by a set of first principles of natural 
law, which refer to a list of seven basic goods and nine requirements of the practical reasonableness. 
On the other hand, the description of legal phenomenon presumes that the human beings are 
practical agents who not only aim at the good, but have a self-understanding of themselves as 
practical agents as such.  
 
In terms of the substantive aspect, Finnis identifies the rational foundation of law with the nature 
of human beings as persons in community. As persons in community, all individuals’ well-being 
is inherently  dependent on the thriving of the community; yet the thriving of the community is 
also dependent on free development of personality of all individuals. Persons and the community 
are two essential and integrated parts of the common good, which itself is a constituent part of the 
 vi 
well-being of an individual. Law and justice are understood by Finnis as the requirements of the 
common good in specific social and historical conditions. My work aims to show that both the 
Finnisian methodology of social science and his natural law understanding of justice is shared by 
Marx. Eventually, a liberal egalitarian theory of justice can be plausibly established.  
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1 
 
There have been a number of works arguing for a Marxian conception of justice based on the 
comparative studies on Marx and Rawls. For example, it is claimed that Marx’s ideas of 
alienation and exploitation can be construed as various forms of social injustice in the light of the 
two principles of justice argued by Rawls. It is also claimed that Marx’s needs principle 
proposed in the Critique of Gotha Programme is an egalitarian distributive principle compatible 
with Rawls’s difference principle1. Moreover, when Rawls discusses Marx’s criticisms of 
capitalism, he contends that his two principles of justice, and especially his distinction between 
liberty and the worth of liberty, meet socialist criticisms satisfactorily2. As some have pointed 
out, “the lines drawn between contemporary analytical Marxism and contemporary left-liberal 
political philosophy are fuzzy”, and there is a common core there yet to be elucidated3. To a 
great extent, my present work is to facilitate an understanding of such a common core. 
 
Yet two types of objections have been raised to question the legitimacy of having such a 
comparative study of Rawls and Marx. The first type questions whether Marx’s dismissive remarks 
about justice shows the mistake of treating Marx as a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian thinker. This 
question has divided analytic Marxists into two camps. One believes such a controversy is largely 
misguided in the beginning, for it is so obvious that Marx, like many other mainstream nineteenth 
century liberal thinkers strongly believes in the social ideal of “equal talent, equal opportunities”, 
                                               
1  See Daniel Brudney, “Young Marx and Mature Rawls”, in Jan Mandle and David Reidy, eds., A 
Companion to Rawls (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), Chapter 6.  
2 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University, 2001), pp. 177-8, 139. 
3 See Rodney Peffer G., Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice, (Princeton University Press,1990), p. 28. 
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and thus understands the need for creating proper social conditions to meet such an ideal 4. But the 
other holds that Marx treats notions like justice, equality, distribution and etc., as ideological 
notions to be fully abandoned or surpassed in communism5.  
 
The second type of objection is nonetheless a deeper methodological one. It is argued that Marx is 
a social scientist who seeks to describe the course of human history in a causal, explanatory way. 
Social scientists predict future tendencies without judging whether the predicted future events are 
good or not. Such an evaluation is not a scientific work. While Rawls, as a normative thinker, 
proposes a theory of justice to provide practical guidance for citizens to establish and maintain a 
just society, Marx, as a social scientist, does not think communism is a moral “ideal to which 
reality [will] have to adjust itself”, but rather a “real movement which abolishes the present state 
of things”6.  
 
Previous scholars who are sympathetic with the moral dimension of Marxism have already been 
done a great work to handle the above two types of objections. My work, therefore, is based on an 
sincere acknowledgement of their important contributions to the construction of the Marxian 
theory of justice. However, I believe there is one shortcoming of the previous works, i.e., thy lack  
a unified and systematic philosophical framework to be tied together. When I realize that Finnis’s 
natural law theory of law is intended as a social science theory of law, and covers both a substantive 
understanding of justice and a methodological defense for involving justice in the social science 
                                               
4 See Brudney (2014), Chapter 6.  
5 See Peffer (1990), p. 10. 
6 See Karl Marx (1932), German Ideology. Marx claims that “communism is for us not a state of 
affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism 
the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.” Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm 
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description of law, the idea of handling Marx’ relation to justice in the light of the Finnisian 
framework just occurred to me.  With deeper understanding of Finnis’s natural law theory, I grow 
more convinced in the possibility to remedy the shortcoming by appealing to the natural law 
tradition to shed a light on our understanding of the relation between Marxism and justice.  
 
 
2 
 
According to Finnis, law and justice are two indispensable, constitutive means for the well-being 
of human beings. To explain, first of all, the well-being of human beings is understood as the free 
development of individuals, and individuals are understood as persons in community. By “persons” 
Finnis means all individuals have their own unique personalities. They are nonfungible beings 
whose worth as persons are not commensurable, exchangeable or maximizable according to some 
common benchmark. Yet to say that individuals are distinct persons does not mean that they are 
selfish egoists or isolated atoms. Rather, individuals can only flourish in a community through 
cooperation with one another. This not only means that persons must cooperate with each other to 
survive, or must interact with each other so as to make use of each other to suit their own purposes. 
Cooperation is necessary also in the sense that the well-being of one’s own person is inherently 
linked to other persons’ well-being, and without other persons’ well-being, one’s own well-being 
would be substantively incomplete.  
 
However, secondly, the well-being of all persons is impossible without a good maintenance of an 
ensemble of material and social conditions. The ensemble of conditions refer to the cooperative 
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modes, social and cultural resources that are necessarily required by the individuals who want to 
realize the free and authentic development of their personalities. Among these conditions one 
important condition is a stable and fair social coordination among all citizens. The principles we 
appeal to regulate forms of social coordination, therefore, are law and justice. They are understood 
as the concrete principles demanded in specific historical and social conditions for the purpose of 
the well-being of all individuals. In a word, law and justice should be regarded as necessary means 
for a further end.  
 
The above understanding of human beings as persons in community, next, is included by Finnis in 
his description of legal phenomenon as a practical presumption, which provides the rational 
foundation for our understanding of law. To explain, there is a dual feature of his natural law theory 
of law. On the one hand, Finnis emphasizes that jurisprudence, which is intended as a social 
science theory of law, is a causal explanatory theory. It seeks to describe the “phenomenon of law” 
by using causal explanatory terms, rather than prescribe what kind of laws or legal phenomenon 
there should be. However, on the other hand, his description of law also involves a normative 
dimension by making moral evaluation of law an intrinsic part of the theory. The reason why a 
descriptive theory can also have a normative aspect lies in the method of ideal-type description 
used to describe the social phenomenon. In his description of legal phenomenon, Finnis identifies 
the ideal-type of law with laws aiming at the common good. The focal cases of law are those cases 
embodying the ideal type, and the marginal cases are those deviating from it. Thus by describing 
the marginal cases he is not only describing the cases as they are, but making a criticism of them 
as failing to satisfy the ideal type.  
 
 6 
Besides the endorsement of ideal-type description, Finnis’s theory of law also adopts a first person, 
participant point of view, rather than a third person, external one. By defining the focal cases of 
law as being conducted by human agents who presumed to be practically reasonable persons 
aiming at the good, its moral evaluation of law is given from within the theory of law and made 
from an internal participant point of view, rather than from an outside observer’s point of view.   
 
Such a Finnisian natural law theory of law can help us debunk both the substantive and the 
methodological objections to the interpretation of Marx from a liberal egalitarian point of view. In 
terms of substantive objection, the aspiration to go beyond justice has been long witnessed in 
Marxism. Different arguments have been raised to show that ideas like the common good, law and 
justice, and the political community are not needed in communism. Yet Finnis’s understanding of 
justice as a constitutive means for the end of the realization of one’s distinct personality would  
convincingly show that the idea of going beyond justice is neither humanly possible nor humanly 
desirable.  
 
Specifically, I will distinguish five kinds of anti-justice arguments proposed by some Marxists so 
far, and then respond each of them in the light of the notion of persons in community. To enumerate, 
first, the Threat to Individuality Argument says that one could be deprived of one’s individual 
freedom to live one’s own life as one pleases in the name of the common good. Secondly, the 
Oppression Argument says that law and justice are mainly social rules and powers manipulated by 
class ambitions and group biases, whereas in a future ideal society without those biases they would 
be overcome and disappear. Thirdly, the Coercion Argument says that law and justice are tools of 
social control for punishing bad people and recalcitrant behaviors, and they would be no longer 
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needed if they don’t happen in future societies. Fourthly, the Regulation Argument says that law 
and justice, as regulative and distributive principles, are needed only in certain unfavorable social 
and human conditions. If the scarcity of material resources and egoistic psychology were overcome, 
there would be no need to have law and justice. Lastly, the charge of ideology says that law and 
justice are formal, juristic notions that do not guarantee the substantive justice and fairness. Hence 
even if they are necessarily needed, they lack intrinsic value. Yet I will argue why from a Finnisian 
point of view none of the five arguments against justice are strong enough to show law and justice 
in general should be abandoned. In fact, quite contrary, it is both a requirement of the common 
good and a rational necessity based in practical reason that law and justice should be regarded as 
necessary social conditions for the well-being of human beings.  
 
Next, in terms of the methodological objection, there is a long-standing positivist stance that social 
science should not be mixed with moral evaluation of its subject matter. Consider the example of 
jurisprudence. One reason behind such a contention lies in the worry that by mixing the descriptive 
and the evaluative one would be mistakenly conflating what law is and what law ought to be. Such 
a conflation would further result in a problematic understanding of the notion of legal duty. If 
unjust law should not be regarded as real law because it does not fit the ideal of what law ought to 
be, then it seems to lack legal validity for the citizens. Yet in most existing legal systems unjust 
laws impose the same type of legal obligation on citizens and provide genuine legal reasons for 
them to obey.  A third reason is nonetheless a metaphysical one. It is argued that the natural law 
presumption of human beings as aiming at the good is a teleological theory of human nature that 
is metaphysically suspicious for a modern mind. While Finnis claims that his list of the basic goods 
is just self-evidently true and universally objective, it is impossible to justify from a scientific, 
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empirical point of view. Lastly, there is a pragmatic worry related to such a metaphysical one. 
Since the natural law presumptions of human nature and the basic goods cannot be sufficiently 
justified to all, an assertion of these principles could unjustly impose certain life styles by legal 
rules on some social members without respecting their freedom to live a life as they see fit.  
 
Yet none of these worries are sufficient for disproving the natural law explanation of law. The first 
two challenges about the conflation between is and ought can be met by the method of the ideal-
type description. Unjust laws are defective and marginal cases of laws. While they impose at least 
prima facia legal obligations on citizens, whether one has an all-things-considered reason to obey 
them is a concrete practical question subject to secondary principles of practical reasonableness. 
Next, as to the metaphysical worry, the presumptions of the practical agency of human beings and 
the list of the basic good are made in a de-metaphysical fashion in the sense that their truth needs 
not be justified by any deep metaphysical or religious groundings, such as the order of the universe 
and ultimate creator. Although philosophers have been answering those deep metaphysical 
questions in various ways, such as explaining human nature by the existence of a divine being, or 
human essence, or some form or idea, or some other descriptions of ultimate reality, Finnis 
contends that such a metaphysical quest should be regarded as a theoretical question rather than a 
practical one. Hence those metaphysical questions should not concern us from the point of view 
of practical reason, and it should be sufficient for us to “stipulate” the truth of the first principles 
without asking for further proof in any deep metaphysical sense. Lastly, Finnis emphasizes that 
natural law tradition has long recognized the open-endedness of social life. Given the reasonable 
diversity of the ways of combining different basic goods, and the limitless ways of participations 
into the basic goods, social life allows for a limitless possibilities of reasonable personal choices . 
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The purpose of forming community should not be regarded as determining the final ends for 
persons, but rather providing necessary material and social means for the effective exercise of 
persons’ capacities and realization of their life goals irrespective of the contents of them. One most 
important aspect of the requirement justice, therefore, is to help people to self-help, which is called 
by Finnis the principle of subsidiarity.  
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I will show how Finnis’s natural law theory of law can be used to shed some light on our 
understanding of the relation between Marxism and justice. Consider, first, the first substantive 
type of anti-moralist arguments. Marx can be regarded as sharing Finnis’s understanding of 
individuals as distinct persons in community, and his social ideal can be understood as a collective 
creation of a social world by all for the end of the free development of the distinct personalities of 
all. Therefore, like Finnis, Marx should also be regarded as understanding our social cooperation 
as a constitutive condition for that end in virtue of its providing the necessary material and social 
resources for all. Moreover, these two similarities between Marx and Finnis constitute the 
grounding for my defense for the Rawlsian liberal egalitarian interpretation of Marx. I will show 
why the majority of the contemporary Marxists who attack the Rawlsian approach to Marxism 
have badly misunderstood Rawls. They wrongly accuse Rawls of being an egoistic or 
individualistic liberal thinker, and thereby failing to appropriately appreciate the value of 
constructing a Marxian theory of justice according to the benchmark of the Rawlsian principles of 
justice. As a matter of fact, the two principles of justice proposed by Rawls can help us recognize 
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Marx’s insightful criticisms of the formalistic feature of equality and the claims on human rights 
in the existing capitalist system.  
 
Although I will not argue for the specific principles of justice for Marx, I will stand along the same 
line with other main contemporary Rawlsian scholars in arguing that there are more agreements 
between the two than their disagreements. One most important and basic common ground between 
Rawls and Marx, for instance, lies in their natural law understanding of citizens persons in 
community. Precisely speaking, citizens as persons are both rational and reasonable, with the 
former being subject to the latter. The capacity for rationality means human beings are distinct 
persons who seek to realize their own individuality by living a determinate form of life according 
to their own conception of the good. The capacity for reasonableness means they are persons in 
community and by nature social beings, who cannot realize such a social nature without subjecting 
their individuality to the requirements of the common good of the political community. The well-
being of individuals and the well-being of the political community are harmoniously integrated. 
On the other hand, although there might be some difference between Marx and Rawls on whether 
the difference principle constitutes the best principle of handling socioeconomic inequalities, Marx 
can nonetheless be regarded as endorsing Rawls’s first principle and the first half of the second 
principle. It is therefore important to acknowledge that both theorists reject the idea of promoting 
economic equalities for its own sake without taking into account the equal standing of citizens in 
terms of other important rights such as constitutional rights and important political rights. Finally, 
although Marx seems to emphasizes the abolition of the private ownership of the means of 
production, which is taken by many as the most important evidence for proving the incompatibility 
between Marxism and Rawlsian liberalism, there is explicit textual evidence showing that Rawls 
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is open to liberal socialist regime by allowing for the public ownership of the means of production 
according to the concrete empirical and historical contexts.  
 
Next, in terms of the methodological objection to the construction of a Marxian theory of justice, 
Finnis’s natural law theory can also convincingly show that Marx’s social science explanations of 
human economic production and general history do not have to be understood as value-free or 
incompatible with justice and morality. According to Finnis, social science descriptions of social 
phenomenon are not only made for the sake of making causal explanations of empirical events, 
but also for the sake of understanding the point of our own social world and our own practical 
activities. Such an understanding is a practical self-understanding in the sense that as participants 
we take a critical view on our own behaviors with the purpose of improving them for the common 
good for all participants cooperating with each other in a community. By describing the focal cases 
and identifying the deviating marginal cases, theorists are also making moral criticisms and 
pointing toward the direction of social practice, or the end of changing status quo. This makes 
social science theory intrinsically liberating and revolutionary, which is core to Marxist 
methodology of social science. In criticizing the previous philosophers as only interested in 
“interpreting” the world and advocating the liberating project of “changing the world”, Marx can 
also be viewed as sharing with Finnis on the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason. 
 
Last but not least, both Marx and Finnis are hopeful writers who believe in the possibility of the 
creation of a desirable form of social cooperation that fits with the needs of human beings. In fact, 
so dis Rawls. Their hopeful doctrines presume that human beings do not have an incorrigibly sinful 
or crooked nature no matter how material and social conditions are. Rather, human beings and 
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their interactions in the social world would best express, or best realize, their human nature as 
social beings aiming at the good under favorable material and social conditions, and they would 
be naturally motivated to collectively create such social conditions once they are able to do so. Not 
only the generation of favorable social conditions is well recognized by the practical reason by 
human beings as a rational necessity, but the historical generation of those conditions is 
realistically within the capacity of human beings.  
 
Hence although Marx occasionally makes utopian remarks about the future social conditions, his 
advocacy for the needs principle, which demands proper distributive principles to regulate the use 
of the common and personal stocks, shows Marx holds on to the belief that a more desirable future 
human society is feasible. In fact in most cases Marx shows strong convictions in the necessary 
coming of such a future society. Yet irrespective of how optimistic he is, one message is clear: 
Marx believes some important changes of existing social conditions are needed to turn the existing 
exploitive social conditions into a better one. In that future society, there will be a more desirable 
mode of production,  a more fair and just mode of distribution of the material and cultural resources, 
and thus a breakdown of the existing oppressive economic and power relations between citizens. 
The goal of such changes is also clear: following a natural law understanding, the change of social 
conditions into a better one is to make the social ideal realistic and feasible. That is, the necessary 
social conditions are provided to ensure that all individuals are equal beings, and their chances of 
free development of personality are all well provided by collective activities by all.  
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Although I defend the construction of a Marxian theory of justice on the basis of Finnis’s natural 
law methodology of social science, there is nonetheless an independent question regarding what 
constitutes the most reasonable social science method. Answer to this question would affect how 
one should evaluate my use of Finnisian methodology from an independent and objective point of 
view. So in the last part of my work, I am going to provide a general picture of methodology of 
social science by discussing three different views in the broad spectrum from the Positivist 
Methodology, the Finnisian Natural Law First Person Methodology, and the Realist First Person 
methodology.  
 
First of all, positivist methodology adopts a third person perspective without offering any internal 
evaluation of a social phenomenon from within the social science theory itself. It only describes 
the patterns of behaviors and provides causal explanations of the empirical events observed by the 
social scientist. But positivist social scientists do not necessarily deny the normative evaluation of 
the empirical phenomenon described in their theories. It is only that they try to separate the 
descriptive from the evaluative, leaving the latter to other disciplines such as moral philosophy 
and political philosophy. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, a positivist might emphasize 
the importance to do moral philosophy as a necessary supplement to the social science description 
of our social world, for the scientific prediction of human history and social tendency does not 
exhaust our self-understanding of ourselves. This would distinguishes a positivist standpoint from 
a reductivist one. To explain, to think human self-understanding can be reduced to non-normative, 
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or nonmoral factual description would be a robust reductivist approach to social science, which 
amounts to an impoverished understanding of our social world.  
 
In contrast to the third person positivist view, the rest two methodologies both take a first person 
and internal point of view by presupposing a certain theory of human agency that understand 
human beings as moral agents. They both include a moral point of view in the social science theory 
so that in criticizing the social phenomenon as described in the social science theory one does not 
have to take a look outside of it. Social scientists offer a critical diagnosis of human activities from 
within their theories by regarding the human actors as practical agents with reasonable and rational 
capacities and acting for the sake of realizing their nature as such. They do that just like doctors 
who offer pathological diagnosis by using medical terms, which are normative terms, and provide 
medical advices to patients. Doctors naturally presume that patients care about health and tend to 
be motived to cure their diseases as long as they are reasonable persons.  
 
Yet in terms of the substantive contents of the theories of human agency endorsed by these two 
methodologies, there can be a large variety of them. On the one hand, it might be highly abstract, 
only asserting a type of human nature in a formal way, for instance, by presupposing the social 
and historical nature of human beings. Or, it can be very abstract and formal by appealing to some 
vague ideas of self-realization, self-liberation, without using any substantive contents such as 
aiming at some specific forms of the goods. On the other hand, those theories might endorse either 
a positive form or a negative form. Some might positively regard human beings as hopeful agents 
capable of realizing the good and working for the well-being of both oneself and other fellow 
human beings. Yet others might understand human agents negatively by treating them as creatures 
 15 
only having lower desires like survival and mutual exploitation. Even worse, human beings might 
be imagined by some as agents who are necessarily controlled by special psychologies like 
jealousy and desires to dominate and manipulate other fellow humans. Indeed, there would be a 
large variety of different theories of human agency, and correspondingly different versions of 
moral and political theories and finally different versions of first personal descriptions of social 
phenomenon. My work follows the Rawlsian and Finnisian tradition and endorses a hopeful 
understanding of human beings. Human beings are persons in community, and they are naturally 
motivated to express and realize such a nature. While this presumption might be objected by others 
who prefer a more Hobbesian understanding of human being, I will not address this issue in my 
work due to the limited space.  
 
Yet there is nonetheless another important issue relevant to my project. That is, some who are 
sympathetic with Finnis would find his approach not metaphysical enough. The question about 
how metaphysical social science methodology should be would affect which of the two 
methodologies should be understood as the most plausible one, i.e., a Finnisian one, or a realist 
one. These two candidates disagree over what should be the proper relation between the moral 
dimension of social science and the metaphysical foundation for it. I would defend the Finnisian 
methodology against the realist one. People who contend for a complete systematic understanding 
of human agency as a necessary part of our understanding of social science might find the realist 
methodology more appealing. But from a Finnisian point of view, realism in a strong metaphysical 
sense should not be a necessary part of our understanding of a good social science theory. From 
the view point of practical reason, metaphysical questions regarding the ultimate creator, the order 
of the nature, and the justification for the truth of the first principles of natural law are not 
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necessarily needed for describing human social practice. I believe this is a better understanding of 
the metaphysical, or “de-metaphysical” aspect of social science, and its fits better with the practical 
spirit of Marxism, especially with the practical emphasis in Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.  
 
Last but not least, the scope of my work is limited in three aspects. First, the primary goal of my 
work is to establish the natural law approach to Marxist social science theories and to defend its 
moral dimension, so I would not offer a careful analysis of the textual details in Marx, either his 
early humanistic thesis on alienation and his later theory of political economy. By focusing on the 
structural defense of my natural law approach to Marxism, I will only offer argue that Marx’s 
historical description of human economic activities presumes a theory of justice, and that theory 
can be understood in the light of the natural law understanding of individuals as persons in 
community. More detailed works on textual analysis have to be offered in future works. Secondly, 
in terms of Marx’s utopian comments on future communist society, I am going to take a critical 
look at it by standing along the Rawlsian and Finnisian lines to treat political philosophy as a 
realistic utopia subject to the feasibility restraints set by our human conditions. A critical look 
would be endorsed, and thus constructive discussions would be absent in my work about Marx’s 
utopian imaginations of the future human and social conditions. Related to the second limitation, 
the third one is that I am not mainly interested in defending Marx per se, but developing what I 
consider to be the most attractive reading of Marx based on an overall evaluation of his social 
science theory, or his capitalism criticism as an empirical social scientific project. I don’t deny that 
there are other plausible readings of Marx. For example, while it is probably most harmful to 
endorse a reductivist style of positivism in our reading of Marx, it might nonetheless be plausible 
to endorse the more sober, Hartian positivist methodology to interpret Marx. But for the sake of 
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my project, I am not going to explore the room for sufficient textual support for and theoretical 
consistency in either the positivist or the realist methodologies. While other readers might be able 
to give some plausible and attractive alternative interpretations, I will only try to reveal the merits 
of reading Marxism in the light of Finnisian natural law approach to social science.  
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Part II 
Natural Law Theory of Justice 
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Chapter 1. The First Principles of Natural Law 
 
According to Finnis, the principles of natural law reflect the “deep structure” of practical 
thinking”7. Although this structure is “not to be found on the surface of every piece of moral 
discourse of ordinary people, it nonetheless constitutes the foundation of any normative attitude 
we have, irrespective of whether we realize or admit it or not. They are “the practical principles 
which enjoin one to participate in [the] basic forms of good, through the practically intelligent 
decisions and free actions that constitute the person one is and is to be”8.  
 
Specifically, there are two parts of the first principles of natural law. The first part refers to a list 
of basic goods: (1) life, (2) knowledge, (3) play, (4) aesthetic experience, (5) friendship (social 
relation), (6) practical reasonableness and (7) religion. However, this list does not really resolve 
our problem of action but rather raises the question. Since there are limitless ways of realizing 
each of the basic goods, and there are limitless ways of combining these goods, when one chooses 
his way of living, life plans and personal commitments, one would still raise the question of choice 
in a sharper way: what should I do, given such a highly diversified “horizon of attractive 
possibilities”9? This urgent practical question then leads to the second part of concrete principles 
of practical reasonableness, without which we have no practical guidance to make intelligible life 
decisions in concrete circumstances. Following the following nine concrete principles constitutes 
a basic good of practical reasonableness mentioned above: (1) have a coherent life plan, (2) no 
arbitrary preference among the goods, (3) no arbitrary preference among the persons, (4) 
                                               
7 See John Finnis: Natural law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 103. 
8 Finnis (2011), p. 97. 
9 Finnis (2011), p. 100. 
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commitment, (5) detachment, (6) consideration of efficiency within reason, (7) respect every basic 
good in every action, (8) the promotion of the common good, (9) the principle of conscience as 
the ultimate principle. 
 
Knowing that there are forms of basic goods and basic requirements of practical reasonableness is 
inadequate. We also need to know more about our relation to those basic goods. What is action? 
How should we understand the idea of realization of the basic goods as ends of our action? 
Moreover, we might also want to know the relation of our own pursuit of basic goods and other 
agents’ pursuits. Will our own pursuits be in conflict with each other’s pursuits? Are we by nature 
driven by self-interests and egoism, an thereby our concern about other people’s well-being must 
be based on a well-balanced calculation? To those questions regarding the nature of human actions 
and its relation to our human agency, Finnis provides three explanations.  
 
First, the relation between our action and the basic good should be understood as a kind of 
“participation”, or “participating”, which is a dynamic activity of “self-constitution” or “self-
constituting” of oneself rather than an end-state condition. We are presumed to be agents who have 
the capacities for self-development and self-constitution10. It is only by exercising our capacities 
that we are participating in human goods11. He uses Robert Nozick’s thought experiment of 
“experience machine” to emphasize that “we want to do certain things (not just have the experience 
of doing them); one wants to be a certain sort of person, through one’s own authentic, free self-
determination and self-realization; one wants to live (in the active sense) oneself, making a real 
                                               
10 ibid. 
11 Finnis (2011), p. 147. 
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world through that real pursuit of values that inevitably involves making one’s personality in and 
through one’s free commitment to those values”12. Self-constituting, therefore, is not mainly about 
achieving some successful result or finishing up a task, but rather the dynamic process or the 
enjoyment of the acting or doing of it. It points toward a less usual sense of the word “happiness”, 
a special and deeper sense of “fullness of life, a certain development as a person, a meaningfulness 
of one’s existence”13.  
 
Secondly, our participation in the basic goods constitutes a unique sense of personality for 
ourselves. One as a person has a distinct individuality, which can also be properly named as a 
“nonfungible personality”. Although this idea of nonfungibility is not directly used by Finnis, it 
can be reasonably implied from his work. The first textual evidence lies in his criticism of the 
utilitarian calculation of overall happiness. The fact that two persons are doing the same things 
and sharing the some kind of situations does not make them identical or commensurable. What are 
subject to an interpersonal comparison are at most the objective situations, such as people’s 
abilities, wealth, social positions, reputations, social and economic resources and etc., but the 
persons who have those comparable resources are not subject to a set of determinate objective 
rules of comparison. Secondly, it is more important to acknowledge that the reasons why a person 
should be regarded as having a unique personality does not consists in any particular ways of life 
she chooses to live; in contrast, it is her unique personality that constitutes the reason why any 
particular ways of life can be effectively practiced and why the relevant basic goods embodied by 
those ways of life can be meaningfully conceived of. Our ways of life and personal commitments 
can differ vastly due to our different temperaments, talents, interests and cultural and historical 
                                               
12 Finnis (2011), p. 96. 
13 Finnis (2011), p. 97. 
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circumstances. One might be committed to doing philosophy, or emulating Mother Teresa, or 
being a narcissist, or choose to change one’s life project every ten years, but one would still remain 
a unique person in virtue of one’s own arrangement of the final ends and ways of life for oneself. 
It is one’s doing a project, working on a commitment, or living a life that makes one a person. Our 
own personality not only provides the meaning of our living in the social world but constitutes the 
basis for our love for ourselves. In a nutshell, we are nonfungible persons, not reducible to or 
commensurable with other persons,  no matter how similar our actions, psychological status and 
self-understandings are.  
 
However, thirdly, it would be unfortunate if self-love means a rejection of equal respect for other 
persons. We all know what it is when self-interest is “sliding away from the dignity of ‘self-
constitution’ towards the moral indignity of ‘self-centeredness’ and ‘selfishness’”14. It is a pity for 
one to have no friends but to only love oneself. Therefore, “self-love (the desire to participate fully, 
oneself, in the basic aspects of human flourishing) requires that one go beyond self-love (self-
interest, self-preference, the imperfect rationality of egoism…)”15 . Finnis emphasizes that a 
complete understanding of the nature of human beings must involve the level of otherness. A 
complete self-constitution of oneself needs to be connected with the self-constitution of other 
people. There should be a mutual self-constitution between individuals, and each individual should 
both pursue their own well-being and contribute to the well-being of others. In other words, the 
self-constituting of individuals would only be fully realized in community and by subjecting one’s 
own self-constitution to other demands of practical reasonableness such as the promotion of the 
common good, a non-arbitrary and equal respect for every person. Community is important not 
                                               
14 Finnis (2011), p. 134. 
15 Finnis (2011), p. 143. 
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merely because some important interests of individuals can only be realized through social 
cooperation, but also because one essential part of the basic goods for human beings is the good 
of friendship, as a social good, which refers to a care for the well-being of friends for the sake of 
friends. So far so good.  
 
Besides the matter of the relation between the basic goods and our self-understanding of our 
distinct personality, we also need to know what is our relation to community.  Two questions can 
be raised, one concerning the inner quality of community and the other external scope. In terms of 
quality, there are three types of relationships in community. First, people sometimes develop a 
business relation, or friendship of utility. Some common interests can exist between two persons, 
for example, if one is a student to the other. While the teacher receives payment from the student 
and the student acquires knowledge, they need to coordinate with each other and maintain the class 
in a good order so as to make sure both parties attain their own objectives. Yet they might be 
indifferent to each other’s objective and only care about their own ones, each treating the other’s 
realization of the goal as an instrument to her own goal.  
 
The second kind of friendship, i.e., the relationship for fun, or friendship of play, is different from 
the first one in the sense that the success and enjoyable experience in the activity of coordination 
becomes an integral component of a person’s success. Not only do the teacher and the student care 
about each other due to the utility brought about in the cooperation, they are also concerned about 
the pleasure of the cooperation for its own sake. The central feature of the relationship, therefore, 
is the good play of cooperation itself. The pleasure of teaching and learning is valued by both the 
teacher and the student as an intrinsically valuable experience and a source of their satisfaction. 
 24 
Her partner’s lack of pleasure in the activity would make her own pleasure lost16, and the lack of 
the good play of the cooperation would make the cooperation less valued by both of the two 
persons. 
 
The last kind of relationship is friendship in its full sense. In that relationship, A and B have 
genuine love for the nonfungible personality of each other unconditionally, “not in devotion to 
some principle according to which the other (as a member of a class picked out by that principle) 
is entitled to concern, but in regard or affection for that individual person as such”17. The grounding 
for such a mutual love does not lie in a specific condition under which a friend’s worth is assessed, 
such as a special type of character or a unique talent. Rather, it is one’s nonfungible personality 
that constitutes such a basis for the unconditional love between A and B. With that love, they (i) 
act for each other’s well-being for the sake of each other, and (ii) take each other’s well-being as 
a constituent component of one’s own well-being. Moreover, since self-constituting should be 
understood as a dynamic process of action, the full sense of friendship between A and B should 
also be viewed as an activity of doing things together, rather than an end-state. In other words, A 
and B’s friendship is (iii) a “sharing of life or of action or of interests, an associating or coming-
together … a matter of relationship and interaction”18. Lastly, the reciprocal enjoyment or mutual 
pleasure gained by both friends in their active development of the friendship is “the source of the 
deep satisfaction”, and “manifests the intrinsic value of the state of affairs [of friendship]”19. Such 
an ideal of friendship, i.e., the mutual self-constitution of both oneself and one’s friend, shows an 
understanding of persons as beings in community. While most would agree it is much harder to 
                                               
16 Finnis (2011), pp. 139-40. 
17 Finiis (2011), p. 142. 
18 Finnis (2011), p. 135. 
19 Finnis (2011), p. 142. 
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achieve the last type of friendship than the first two kinds, it would be hard to dispute the value of 
it.  
 
Next, in terms of the scope of a community, we need to know how large it should be to be a 
complete community. Should the size of a community defined by landscape, linguistic, ethnic or 
cultural difference? According to Finnis, a most inclusive sense of community should go beyond 
all kinds of territorial, economic and cultural differences. The best title to call such a community 
is the title of “body politic”. While family is an indispensable local community for human beings, 
it is exceedingly insufficient. As Finnis points out,  as a thoroughgoing form of association “that 
breeds within itself”, family “is headed for physical self-destruction”20. Family members, if they 
want to foster an all-round personal development, must go out of family to have a wider access to 
material and culture resources so as to acquire more opportunities and bigger room for diverse 
ways of self-direction and rich forms of self-constitution of their personality. We must go to society 
to initiate richer forms of interactions with people outside of family, such forming clubs, parties 
and other associations. But no matter how many types of associations there are in a society, it 
would follow that we must find ourselves in a most inclusive community that includes all members 
and all local communities from small scale families to a large variety of different kinds of 
associations. That community, which can also be called the political community, is most inclusive 
because there would be no aspect of human affairs outside of it21. The notion of the political 
community, therefore, is not a geographical, linguistic, economic or cultural notion, but rather a 
notion that covers and regulates all forms of human interaction and all aspects of human life.  
 
                                               
20 Finnis (2011), p. 148. 
21  ibid. 
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But such an all-inclusive political community would naturally give rise to the problem of 
coordination. Our different upbringings, temperaments, interests and talents would make our ways 
of self-development highly diversified, and the limitless ways of combining the basic goods and 
limitless of ways of participating into the basic goods would necessarily bring about rich diversity 
and reasonable pluralism in human society. This would lead to the result that our personal 
commitments and life plans can be highly different and even in conflict with others’. One might 
object that no matter how diversified human values are, there would still be important unanimity 
on a wide range of issues. Finnis rejects this judgment as unrealistically oversimplified. Although 
it is right to acknowledge that there are some universal features of human pursuits that can 
legitimately exclude some forms of pursuits as indisputably unreasonable, we must also recognize 
the possibility of having deep disagreements among individuals on what constitutes the best form 
of life plans for themselves. Even in a family there can be reasonable disagreements on what is the 
best form of plan for each family member, let alone a large scale modern society that is composed 
of a large variety of people from different cultural and upbringing backgrounds. As a matter of 
fact, in the natural law tradition, there is a long-standing awareness of the reasonable diversity of 
human pursuits22.  
 
While the fact of pluralistic forms of self-constitution is to be explained by the pluralistic 
combinations of the basic goods and forms of participation into them, there is yet another more 
important reason for us to be alerted to the risk of having an too optimistic conviction in unanimity 
as an easy resolution to the conflicts of interests. One basic aspect of the requirement of practical 
reasonableness is that one’s well-being consists in her active, free and authentic practice of the 
                                               
22 Finnis(2011), pp. 29, 81, and 127. 
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capacities for self-constituting by participating the basic goods, rather than her having a particular 
kind of life as an end-state as a result of being forced to do so by people with superior authority. 
Consider family. An assignment of a determinate end to a child without caring about her own 
interests or encouraging her to figure out her own personal commitment would be an oppressive 
demand. Finnis contends that “one who treats his or her spouse as a sheer possession, or who, 
when his or her children have been nurtured to the threshold of maturity, seeks to make those 
children’s basic commitments for them, robs that spouse or those children of a basic good”23. One 
significant point of self-constitution lies in the freedom of one person to effectively use her own 
reason and knowledge to make free and authentic decisions. Without such a practice of one’s 
capacity to choose and reason, we cannot makes sense of a number of moral notions such as 
freedom,  authenticity, responsibility. All of these moral notions represent the constitutive aspects 
of the end of human flourishing24. To sum up, for a political community that is modern, large-
scaled, and highly diversified, there must be the problem of coordination among social members 
who are equal persons of distinct personalities. Unanimity is not sufficient to resolve the 
complicated problem of coordination due to the rich diversity of the life plans allowed by the first 
principles of natural law. So far so good about both the explanation of the internal quality and the 
external scope of the notion of the political community.  
 
To conclude the whole discussion in this part, I want to claim that in Finnis’s natural law theory 
such a notion of human beings as nonfungible persons in community provides the rational 
foundation for our understanding of law and justice. Law and justice should be understood as 
constitutive means needed for the realization of the goal of the well-being of all persons in 
                                               
23 Finnis (2011), p. 146. 
24 Finnis (2011), p. 147. 
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community. It is out of a rational necessity that human beings must create the necessary material 
and social conditions to make the self-constitution and mutual self-constitution historically and 
realistically possible. The relation between human flourishing and the material conditions is a 
relation between an end and a means. In order for human beings to think, some biological and 
psychological conditions should be met, such as our having a properly functioning brain. In order 
for us and our society to flourish, we also need a provision of an ensemble of conditions, such as 
clean natural resources, languages, institutions like laws and property, and distribution of common 
stocks among social groups. However, these necessary and constitutive means should not be 
understood as forms of basic goods, but rather indispensable instruments we would need for 
participating in the basic goods25. The final end is the realization of ourselves as  nonfungible 
persons in community. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 Finnis (2011), p. 82. 
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Chapter 2. Threat to Individuality Argument and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
To Finnis’s views on law and justice as necessary means for the end of human flourishing, one 
might raise three objections. First, one might worry about the irreconcilable conflict between the 
private interests of an individual and the public interests of a community. It seems to be easy for 
the public regulations imposed by a community to jeopardize the free self-constitution of an 
individual, and thereby unfairly restricting and harming the distinctiveness of an individual’s 
personality. Call this worry the “Threat to Individuality Argument”.  
 
Second, others might contend that law and justice should be, and could be, transcended in an ideal 
world. There can be two reasons for some to believe so. First, we might have observed that many 
political authorities have manipulative control of a majority of people who lack economic and 
political power, and their control is not for the sake of the benefits of those people, but for the sake 
of facilitating social stability by mitigating against class conflicts and potential social strife. The 
second reason for one to believe in the hope of transcending law and justice is rooted in one’s hope 
of transcending unfavorable human and social conditions. In an ideal world, all individuals can 
freely decide what to do without being concerned with conflicts of interests. There should be no 
need to impose mutual interference on one’s life plans and no need to distribute limited social and 
material resources among different people. Both two reasons, therefore, treat the need for a 
political community as a necessary evil. While the first reason states that in a better society without 
the oppressive control of some disadvantaged social groups there would be no need for public rules 
to regulate the social coordination, the second reason adds that in a more ideal society without lack 
of sufficient natural and cultural resources there would be no need for redistributive and 
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adjudicative principles to maintain an efficient and peaceful mode of coordination. These two 
reasons constitute two distinct forms of the “Beyond Justice Argument”. 
 
Yet neither of the above two types of objection to the rational necessity of forming a political 
community that is ruled by law and justice are plausible. Finnis uses the analogy of ship-state to 
argue that there is an important value to be realized in the political community, which is called the 
common good, and such a good will neither threaten the distinct personalities of citizens not be 
easily transcended as an unfortunate human need. Here is the analogy:  
 
“The classical analogy of the ‘ship of state’, i.e. between governing a political community 
and navigating a ship, though it is by no means as unwarranted as many have claimed, is 
indeed misleading in one important respect. Since passengers normally board ships because 
they wish to get to an advertised destination (or to some set of ports of call), the analogy 
suggests that the political community, too, has some definite and completely attainable 
objective … There is no reason to suppose that political community has any aim or 
destination of the latter sort. Equally there is no reason to suppose that the members of a 
political community each have, or ought to have, any such aim or determinate set of aims 
which political community does or should seek to support. Committing oneself to a life-
plan is not at all like setting oneself to bake a cake. Nor is there only one reasonable life-
plan or determinate set of reasonable life-plans, which the state should seek to get its 
citizens to commit themselves to. Yet there is a common good of the political community, 
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and it is definite enough to exclude a considerable number of types of political arrangement, 
laws, etc.”26 
 
To explain the similarities between the ship and the political community, first of all, it is the same 
in both cases that there is an ensemble of conditions to be met for the sake of realizing a certain 
end. In order to go to an advertised destination, people must embark on the ship. In order to reach 
the destination safely and pleasantly, they must also maintain an ensemble of conditions on the 
ship, such as securing safe food and clean water and certain degree of non-interference among 
travelers. The maintenance of the ensemble of conditions constitutes an important public interest 
for all members on the ship. By the same token, in order to exercise one’s capacities and carry out 
one’s own life plans, one must enter into the social cooperation to gain relevant material and 
cultural resources. And in order to do it well, one must also work with others to facilitate a peaceful 
mode of coordination and provide sufficient resources necessarily needed for one’s self-
constitution.  
 
However, secondly, a vital difference between a ship and a political community must be noticed. 
Although a political community is like a ship by functioning as a necessary means for the end of 
the well-being of all members in it, there is no determinate destination, or “the” destination, that 
should be assigned by the political community to its members. While all members on the ship are 
going to the same destination, all members in the political community can have remarkably 
different ends, since they can have different life goals. As is shown argued in the last part of my 
work, one essential requirement of practical reasonableness is our active and free exercise of our 
                                               
26 Finnis (2011), p. 155. 
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capacities by freely choosing and forming a coherent life plan and participating into the basic 
goods in a dynamic fashion. The great values in the authenticity, integrity and responsibility are 
all important aspects of our worth as a distinct person. Hence the ultimate goal of our entering into 
the political community is not to lose our distinct personalities, but to promote their free 
development. So Finnis claims that the most serious injustice done by a Nazi regime does not 
merely lie in its assignment of the unjust and immoral end to its citizens, but rather lie in the fact 
that  “such regimes are in business for determinate results, not to help persons constitute 
themselves in community”27. Hence, the reason why we should embark on the ship of political 
community consists in our need to fully express and realize our own human nature. We humans as 
practical agents are necessarily motivated to engage in the activities of free self-constitution. Under 
favorable social and historical circumstances, we would by nature develop ourselves  “through the 
individual initiatives of choosing commitments (including commitments to friendship and other 
forms of association) and of realizing these commitments through personal inventiveness and 
effort in projects (many of which will, of course, be co-operative in execution and even communal 
in purpose)”28. Hence the political community should not be understood as a public authority that 
decide or choose on behalf of the individuals what kind of good life they must choose or what 
social groups they must attend, but rather provide the necessary conditions for the realization of 
her life project irrespective of its contents.  
 
Finnis uses the term of “the principle of subsidiarity” to explain the above function of the political 
community. He further emphasizes that the principle of subsidiarity is not restricted to a political 
community but extended to families and social associations, small or large, simple or complex. 
                                               
27 See Finnis (2011), p. 274, and also VI.5, VI.8, VII.3, VIII. 5-6. 
28 Finnis (2011), p. 146. 
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Family is a smallest social association, whereas social associations are larger than family. In terms 
of the various forms of clubs and associations, the purpose of their existence is not to dissolve 
families by  absorbing family members into the associations. When a person enters into an 
association, she is still a family member and family life might still be essential to her self-
understanding. The all-round development of one’s personality requires a richer scope of self-
constitution and wider interactions with other individuals, both in and outside of associations. And 
precisely due to the high intelligence of human beings and the width and depth of the human 
interaction, different associations, like individuals, might have conflicts of interests. These 
conflicts might be deep but reasonable, so some sort of adjudication must be provided to publicly 
demarcate the boundaries to which the conflicting goals of associations should be subject so as to 
resolve the issue of coordination.   
 
Thirdly, Finnis believes many people tend to underestimate the problem of coordination caused by 
the high intelligence of human beings. It has been argued that since individuals have different 
intelligence, dedication, skill, and commitment, when they form associations with people having 
a kindred spirit there would be a large variety of larger groups and associations that have difference 
and even conflicting goals.  But it is also significant to realize the fact that even within a same 
social group of  identical interests, dedicated groups members “will always be looking out for new 
and better ways of attaining the common good, of coordinating the action of members, of playing 
their own role”, and thus many new proposals would emerge so that “until a particular choice is 
made, nothing will be in fact be done” within that group. Therefore, we can say that “the greater 
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the intelligence and skill of a group’s members, and the greater their commitment and dedication 
to common purpose and common good”, the more urgent the problem of coordination would be29.  
 
The urgency of problem of coordination, on the other hand, can be better understood if we 
recognize Finnis’s emphasis on the requirement of equal respect for all persons. The natural 
tendency to freely self-constitute oneself is true to all human beings. That is, one of the basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness emphasizes the importance of respecting all persons as 
equal persons and rejects an arbitrary preference of some persons over others. Given the equal 
standing of all persons and the equal significant of their prospect of free self-constitution, an 
ensemble of social conditions should be maintained for all. However, such an egalitarian 
consideration of the equal prospect of all persons to realize their well-being does not mean that the 
goal of the political community should be a guarantee that all are happy, or that all must be 
provided with enough material resources to be adequately successful, irrespective of what their 
personal life plans are. Finnis’s first reason is easier to acknowledge: there is no good reason to 
think that a society should be driven by the goal of satisfying every citizen no matter how 
disturbing, annoying, harmful her life goal is. It should be universally acknowledged that “art with 
all its (often competing) forms and cannons really is better than trash, that culture really is better 
than ignorance, that reputation and privacy and property are aspects of or important means to 
human well-being, that friendship and respect for human personality really are threatened by 
hatred, group bias, and anarchic sexuality, that children really do benefit from a formation that 
defines path as well as illuminating horizons… and on the other hand, that servility, infantilism, 
and hypocrisy really are evils”30. Yet the second reason is more important: between the extreme 
                                               
29 Finnis (2011), p. 232. 
30 Finnis (2011), p. 220. 
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good and the extreme bad there is still a large variety of diversified but reasonable life projects. 
Given the limited material and social resources, it is unrealistic to expect that all needs of all 
persons can be fully realized at the same time. Under such a limited human condition, what can be 
legitimately expected by citizens must first be determined by the political community according 
to the requirement of the common good. All persons, therefore, should adjust their ambitions and 
life projects within the restraints set by the political community. 
 
I have used the above three explanations to illustrate the ship-state analogy to defend Finnis’s view 
on the means-to-end relation between community and the well-being of individuals cooperating in 
it. I want to show that the point of the political community is to help the free development of the 
personalities of its members by resolving the problem of coordination. To recapitulate, in virtue of 
its being an urgent problem inevitably generated by realistic human and social conditions, having 
a political community subject to law and justice according to the requirement of the common good 
is necessarily needed as a constitutive means to the end of human flourishing. On the other hand, 
in an ideal society, the political community would not be oppressive since the ensemble of material 
and social conditions would be well maintained to promote all persons’ self-constitution and 
mutual self-constitution. Both the Threat to Individuality Argument and the Beyond Justice 
Argument seem to be properly addressed.  
 
However, two concerns might still arise. One might insist that if disputes among family members 
do not need to appeal to external authorities but can be resolved within the family, then disputes 
between larger social associations can also be expected to be resolved within associations without 
appealing to the external political authorities too. To answer this concern, Finnis first makes a 
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distinction between the principles of adjudicating conflicts between larger associations and those 
of adjudicating ones between families members. To try to treat larger associations as smaller ones 
like families is to fail to take into consideration the fact about the high intelligence of human beings. 
While in smaller associations that are formed by people sharing a common goal, resolution of 
disputes might be achieved by finding an unanimity among all group members, this cannot be 
realistically expected in the huge political community. On the one hand, this is because in a modern 
large-scaled political community, most people are strangers who live far away from each other. So 
the process of decision-making in larger associations is “more remote than the initiative of most 
of those many members who will carry out the decisions”31. On the other hand, it is also due to the 
“open-ended” feature of political community: “for here we have the most complex common good, 
which (subject to the principle of subsidiarity) excludes no aspect of individual well-being and is 
potentially affected by every aspect of every life-plan”, and “its ends are never fully achieved and 
few of its co-ordination problems are solved once and for all”32. Without such a realization of the 
open-endedness of a political community, one would be imagining maintaining the order of a 
political community to be a “simple objective like that of keeping a path free from weeds”, which 
amounts to “an  utilitarian illusion”33. Finnis strongly objects to the utilitarian illusion by arguing 
that utilitarianism treats human goods as “adequately quantifiable” and the common good as “a 
once-for-all attainable objective, like making an omelet” 34. In a nutshell, there is no good reason 
to think that the problem of coordination in large-scaled open-ended political community can be 
easily resolved in the same way disputes in families and associations are resolved.  
 
                                               
31 Finnis (2011), p. 146. 
32 Finnis (2011), p. 233. 
33 Finnis (2011), p. 262. 
34 Finnis (2011), p. 193, 262. 
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A second concern about the worth of the political community is rooted in Finnis’s insistence on 
the realistic limitations of human conditions. One might contend that since there is no way under 
the existing human conditions to satisfy all persons’ needs, and compromises and adjudications 
must be made according to some public rules according to which all persons adjust their own 
actions, this exactly shows that the political community must be an oppressive one. Yet we can 
still imagine an ideal world where there are no conflicts of interests and limitation on material 
resources. In that society law and justice, which were once necessary evils, are no longer needed. 
With the transcendence of law and justice, the need for political authority also would  evaporate. 
Such a contrast between an utopian imagination of the future society and an existing society status 
quo strengthens the force of the Beyond Justice Argument in the sense that Finnis’s natural law 
understanding of law and justice is too restricted by the feasibility restraint. A better understanding 
of justice, however, should not be limited by human reality but open to the creative imagination 
of the ideal.  
 
There are two ways we can appeal to answer the second concern. First of all, I shall admit that 
theoretically speaking the utopian idealization of the future society can be logically coherent. Yet 
the problem is whether the idealization employed in political philosophy should go that far so as 
to transcend the realistic human conditions. It is not logically problematic to conceive human 
beings as saints or angels who are not recalcitrant and do not compete for material resources. The 
problem with such an utopian idealization, however, consists precisely in its utopian nature. If we 
are concerned with the political community made by and for the human beings like us, who are 
neither saints or angels, then we should restrict our attention to what is realistically feasible.  
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Secondly, under the presumption that we are not saints or angels, Finnis rejects the negative 
understanding of the requirement of the common good as only a punitive, oppressive and 
antagonistic instrument of social control. Some might insist that since it is not possible for all 
persons to realize their goals, the well-being of some persons must only be realized at the cost of 
other persons’ well-being. However, Finnis provides a positive understanding of the common good 
as an objective requirement, which is made from the perspective of an ideal-observer and is 
publicly visible to and examinable by all persons. He explains such an understanding by discussing 
the idea of friendship. If two persons are friends, they would be naturally motivated to think about 
the well-being of each other, rather than only about oneself. As Finnis claims, “in friendship one 
is not thinking and choosing ‘from one’s own point of view’, nor ‘from one’s friend’s point of 
view. Rather, one is acting from a third point of view. This is a unique perspective form which 
one’s own good and one’s friend’s good are equally ‘in view’ and ‘in play’”. Both of the two 
friends think from the point of view of an “impartially benevolent ‘ideal observer’, as a device for 
ensuring impartiality or fairness in practical reasoning”35. Hence a positive value is realized in 
endorsing the objective, third person point of view in two friends’ identification of the common 
interests between them. Before that common interest, each person’s self-interest or the personal 
needs would lose their own priority, but be subject to the reciprocal relation between the two. But 
it is too hasty to conclude that the common interests between friends would be easy to determine. 
Quite contrary, it is not easy due to the complicated and diversified human pursuits. Finnis 
emphasizes that we need various procedural principles to help determine what is the real common 
interests for all social members. Fairness and equality in the procedure of decision-making, 
freedom of cultural and political debate, and the virtue of not pretending to be infallible and not 
                                               
35 Finnis (2011), p. 143. 
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silencing further rational discussions or reconsideration of the already made decisions, are all 
constitutive parts of the requirement of the common good36.  
  
In short, it is not only wrong to regard the political community as a larger scale of family or local 
social association, but also problematic to understand the requirement of the common good in the 
negative light by lifting the feasibility restraints of human and social conditions. The function of a 
political community is not to provide its members with the “ends in themselves but as means of 
assistance, as ways of helping individuals to ‘help themselves’, or more precisely, to constitute 
themselves”37. One can only properly be called a free, authentic and responsible agent with 
practical reasonableness if one is able to freely self-constitute oneself by choosing a determine 
plan of life under the guidance of first principles of natural law. By participating in the basic goods 
that are embodied in one’s life plan, the nonfungible personality of oneself would be effectively 
constituted. One significant goal of the political community, therefore,  is to protect “the dignity 
of self-direction and freedom from certain forms of manipulation”38. Law and justice are concrete 
and specific applications of the above principles of natural law in determinate social, historical and 
empirical contexts. Hence, the Threat to Individuality Argument fails because the political 
community exists for the sake of respecting the unique personalities of all persons.  All persons, 
on the other hand, given their reasonable disagreements and limited social resources, should be 
subject to the requirement of the common good by thinking from an ideal-observer point of view 
when they have conflicts of interests, because civic friendship requires impartial benevolence for 
the sake of the well-being of both ourselves and our friends’. This proves the problem with the 
                                               
36 Finnis (2011), p. 220. 
37 Fnnis (2011), p. 169. 
38 Finnis (2011), p. 273. 
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Beyond Justice Argument. Relevant human and social limitations should not be easily negated but 
acknowledged as reasonable and realistic feasibility restraints on the idealization of political 
philosophy. In a word, the political community is a necessary and constitutive means for the 
realization of our own expression of our nature as persons in community. Such an expression 
should not be viewed in a negative light but rather be positively recognized as having important 
political values.  
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Chapter 3. Three Beyond Justice Arguments  
 
Although I have already discussed the Threat to Individuality Argument and two forms of Beyond 
Justice Arguments by elaborating the key notion of persons in community, these discussions are 
not sufficient. In this part, I will provide a more detailed treatment of the Beyond Justice Argument 
by distinguishing three forms of it. Although there might be some overlapping points to be made, 
I believe they are necessary for a systematic presentation of the natural law response to the beyond 
justice concern.  
 
What is common to all three forms is the belief that we need law and justice only because there 
are some unfavorable human and natural conditions that make them necessary. When these 
conditions no longer obtain in an ideal world, we should not need them any longer. First of all, one 
might observe that states are usually  oppressive and filled with groups bias and class ambition. In 
reality, many political authorities seek to promote law and order only because they want to stabilize 
their own rule and authority, making sure that the majority of disadvantaged people who lack 
economic and political power will not rebel. The principles of justice are correspondingly decided 
and legalized by class ambitions and group interests who have the social and economic resources 
to manipulate the claims of public interest. In an ideal world where there are no such oppressions 
and manipulations, we seem to have no need for those corrupted versions of law and justice. Call 
this form of Beyond Justice Argument “the Oppression Argument”.  
 
Secondly, without class domination and oppressive social relations, there can nonetheless be 
people who are selfish, irrational, and jealous. They might either openly violate the basic 
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requirements of law or act as free-riders to take advantage of other social members’ contribution 
to the common good. To these recalcitrant individuals we must set up some coercive and punitive 
institutions to push them to cooperate with the rest of the law-abiding citizens. Yet in an ideal 
world where there were no “recalcitrance of the selfish” or “the brutish many [with] unprincipled 
egocentricity”39, there would be no need for remedies for those human deficiencies. The benign 
function of law and justice in terms of their providing efficiency, peace and stability in social 
cooperation is not needed then. This argument can be called the Coercion Argument.  
 
Thirdly, in the absence of social oppression and recalcitrant behaviors, our society may still have 
competing claims on the material and social resources. We need law and justice because we need 
a public authority to set up the public and universal rules to adjudicate our disagreements the 
distribution of material resources. Such a pragmatic need for justice is caused by the unfortunate 
empirical conditions of our human world. In our existing non-ideal social world, there is a gap 
between the limited natural and material resources and the rich needs of human beings, which 
makes it impossible for all persons to meet their distinct needs for self-development, and, as a 
pragmatic necessity rather than human necessity, calls for the generation of a public authority to 
make public rules to fix the distributive issue. However, in an ideal world where both the ever 
growing productive power of human kind and the abundance of material resources became a reality, 
there would be no need for such an authority. In Marx’s word, in communism, all individuals’ 
needs can be met, and they would be free to engage in any activities as they like. Call this argument 
the Regulation Argument.  
 
                                               
39 Finnis (2011), p. 260. 
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Hence, three different forms of beyond justice reasons have been mentioned, i.e., the Oppression 
Argument, the Coercion Argument, and the Regulation Argument. Among the three arguments, I 
believe the Oppression Argument can be refuted first, if we understand the oppressive laws and 
unjust principles of distribution as reflecting an ideological understanding of law and justice. To 
explain, a distinction between the ideological, or illusory notion of justice and the non-ideological 
notion of justice should be made first.  Although some social members sincerely believe in the 
worth of  some laws and principles of justice, they could be badly wrong in holding such a belief. 
These principles might actually serve wrong purposes or violate the requirement of the common 
good, but such a fact is not correctly realized by people. While we can find the originating source 
of  beliefs and who some people come to believe them,  whether we can also find the normative 
justification for those beliefs, no matter how prevalent or firmly held in social convention, is a 
different matter. Such a distinction between the origin of a widely accepted, yet probably 
ideological, conception of justice and the normative justification for it amounts to distinction 
between the following two types of rejection of justice: the first is called a “restricted rejection” of 
justice in an ideological sense, and the second is a “global rejection” of any conceptions of justice 
no matter what. While the restricted rejection is based on the presumption that a non-ideological 
and legitimate conception of justice can be constructed to be an independent standard according 
to which we evaluate the principles of justice that are widely accepted in the society status quo,  
the global rejection asserts that there would be no such thing as an objective value called justice 
we can appeal to. 
 
In my view, the proponents of the global rejection have a heavy burden to explain how we can 
meaningfully describe certain social relations as oppressive. But if one endorses the restricted 
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rejection of justice, the above-mentioned burden of explanation can be removed. On the other hand, 
recognizing the room for finding a plausible, non-ideological understanding of justice does not 
entail that people must have infallible knowledge of those principles. On the contrary, there are 
indeed a large variety of different ways in which people are deluded, misled, concealed when they 
try to make correct judgment on the matter of justice. However, this is precisely the reason why 
we should only endorse the restricted rejection rather than the global rejection of justice. In a 
society that can be said to have pathology, we should provide a diagnosis of its pathology, which 
cannot be made without a presumption of a proper, non-ideological conception of  justice. The 
possibility of attacking an ideological conception of justice is conceptually dependent on a non-
ideological one. To use Rawls’s word, one important role of political philosophy is to show why 
a conception of justice is really immune to the charge of ideology. So far for the discussion on the 
first form of beyond justice argument.  
 
The remaining two forms of beyond justice arguments, i.e., the Coercion Argument and the 
Regulation Argument, raise bigger challenges to law and justice. Advocates of both arguments 
might admit the distinction between the global and the restriction rejection of justice, and accept 
an non-ideological conception of justice. Yet they might still insist that a non-ideological 
conception of justice remains a necessary evil in our current society, but should be no longer 
needed in an ideal society. I will show why these two arguments do not succeed by analyzing 
Finnis’s views on the three levels of the common good. And since all the three levels of the 
common good should be understood under the human conditions, to see the great value in the 
common good requires one to appropriately recognize the realistic human conditions. Conversely 
speaking, an appropriate recognition of the limitation set by the realistic human conditions in our 
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idealization about the form of coordination will help realize the fact that transcending justice is not 
a humanly desirable ambition. It is not humanly desirable because it is not humanly possible, for 
feasibility should restraint desirability.  
 
Before explaining Finnis’s analysis of the three levels of the common good, I shall first clarify the 
difference between the goods that can be commonly shared and the goods that cannot be commonly 
shared. For example, if I wanted to use this laptop to write my paper, others would not be able to 
use it. However, not everything is like the laptop. As David Braybrooke points out, a distinction 
between “limitative goods” and “public goods” should be made: there are some goods that one 
person’s enjoyment of them prevents another’s enjoyment, but there are also public goods that 
their benefits are such that consumption by one person does not impair or limit consumption by 
others, such as lighthouse, a broadcast of classical music, monetary stability and a safe 
environment40.  
 
According to the above distinction, one can conclude that the common goods refer to the goods 
that are not limitative but public. Now, Finnis distinguishes three levels of the common good in 
the following way: (i) the basic goods are common goods because they are good for any and every 
person; (ii) the basic goods are common goods because each of them can be participated by an 
inexhaustible number of persons in an inexhaustible variety of ways or on an inexhaustible variety 
of occasions; (iii) the good of a political community is a common good because it refers to “a set 
of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves the value(s), for 
the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in 
                                               
40 See  David Braybrooke, Natural Law Modernized (University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing 
Division, 2003), p. 59. 
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a community”41; this sense of the common good is frequently called “the general welfare” or “the 
public interest”42.  
 
A skeptic might argue against Finnis by insisting that the idea “public goods” must be hopelessly 
empty. (a) First of all, given the open-ended nature of a political community, it is impossible that 
in a political community all persons must necessarily want a same set of goods. While some in 
smaller groups might share common interests and want a same set of goods, it is impossible for all 
persons in a society to be like that. (b) Then, people wanting different sets of goods would probably 
need different sets of resources as necessary means for their ends. (c) But even if people have 
common goals and want same resources, they might not be aware of such a fact, but falsely believe 
that they don’t share the common interests in the public goods, which might be caused by their 
lack of enlightened visions of morality. (d) Finally, even if they have correct knowledge of what 
is their common interests, they might simply choose to disregard the claims of the common good 
due to their ill-intentioned motivations, such as wanting to harm others, attempting to be free riders, 
and taking advantage of their own bargaining positions to dominate others. Or, some individuals 
might want to dominate others to suit their own special psychologies like jealousy or desire for a 
feeling of superiority. For example, some developed countries might believe they have the right to 
dumping their electronic waste in other developing countries. In defending the legitimacy of such 
a right claim, they might appeal to the bargaining advantage without recognizing that other 
countries also need a clean environment. In a word, “people vary in their preferences for mixes of 
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42 Finnis (2011), p. 156. 
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public goods” due to a variety of reasons, which makes substantive agreement on the common 
good hard to achieve43.  
 
Among the above four concerns, (a) and (b) can both be resolved by just calling attention to the 
role of the political community as providing necessary conditions for the well-being of all 
individuals. To use a Rousseauian notion, the “General Will” is a will guided by the principle of 
subsidiarity, and its aim is not a determination of the final end or life plans of the citizens, but 
rather the provision of the commonly needed material and social resources for all citizens to 
effectively participate in the basic forms of the good, irrespective of the specific contents of their 
life plan. Since the common goods are not the basic goods that are constitutive parts of the final 
ends of citizens’ personal commitments but necessary means for the realization of those 
commitments, they can be viewed as a “shrinking subset” of all the goods that citizens want for 
themselves44.  
 
Next, both (c) and (d) can be answered by emphasizing the cognitivist feature of the theory of the 
common good. First, what is willed by the General Will should not be confused with the will of 
everyone. As Braybrooke points out, what is in the interest of all social members is to be 
determined by what “every prudent and well-informed person will want”, and that list should “rule 
out variations between people respecting their preferences for public goods as against private ones 
or respecting public goods compared with each other” 45. But in our actual society, it is often the 
case that a large majority of people hold a mistaken understanding of what should be the real 
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requirement of the common good, or what the idea of equal citizenship means. Yet it is the well-
informed perspective on the common good that constitutes an objective understanding of it, which 
provides the basis for criticizing some citizens for either having an ideological understanding of 
the common good or failing to be motivated to act according to the requirement of the common 
good.  
 
Three presumptions are endorsed by the above cognitivist view on the common good. First, it is 
presumed that the determination of the subset of the common good is possible. There are prudent 
and well-informed persons, at least under favorable conditions, who are able to determine the 
necessary material and social conditions that are commonly needed by all citizens to freely self-
constitute themselves. Secondly, although there are people who can be corrupted and have special 
psychologies such as being reluctant to recognize the objective list of the common goods and act 
in accordance with their requirement, it is still presumed that citizens can be  properly educated to 
recognize and follow them.  
 
Lastly, it is also presumed that citizens’ motivations can be hopefully reshaped, either by 
punishment, coercion or education, to be directed to aiming at the common goods. As a matter of 
fact, once we have the correct knowledge of the contents common goods as prudent and well-
informed people do, we can then move to the next stage of education. In fact, the function of 
education constitutes an important aspect of the value of law and justice. “Those who defy or 
contemn the law”, Finnis explains, “harm not only others but also themselves. They seize the 
advantage of self-preference, and perhaps of psychological satisfactions and/or loot, but all at the 
price of diminishing their personality, their participation in human good…. The punitive sanction 
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ought therefore to be adapted so that … it may work to restore reasonable personality in offenders, 
reforming them for the sake not only of others but of themselves: ‘to lead a good and useful life’”46. 
But the possibility of education and punishment is dependent on the cognitivist approach to the 
common good, for without the objective standard education and punishment would lose their point. 
So far I have shown why the cognitivist standpoint can answer both the epistemic and the 
motivational challenges raised in (c) and (d) respectively.  
 
But some still object that a more ideal future society does not need the common good, just like a 
heathy person do not need to take medicine. While it is true that medicine is a good thing, one 
might find it useless if one does not need it. Such a concern expresses the ambition to go beyond 
justice by emphasizing that political philosophy should not restrict itself to the status quo, but 
rather aim to go beyond the realistic limit. So these people might re-formulate all of the above four 
challenges from (a) to (d) in the following way: (a*) first, since people have different life goals 
and thereby wanting different resources to realize their goals, we should imagine an ideal society 
where all of their needs could be satisfactorily met. Each person’s individuality would be catered 
to by a provision of the goods that specifically correspond to her individuality. As a result,  (b*) 
secondly, there is no need to identify a shrinking subset of the common good for all, since all 
persons’ individuality would develop with adequate resources. (c*) Thirdly, if in an ideal world 
all social members are well-informed and reasonable, then there would be no need to further 
educate them to the idea of the common good. And (d*) finally, if all social members are properly 
motivated to freely realize their well-being in an authentic and responsible way, there would also 
                                               
46 Finnis (2011), p. 264; emphasis added. 
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be no need for education and correction. And there would be no need for normative direction or 
moral education in an ideal world.    
 
One main reason for Finnis to reject the above challenges, as I will show, consists in his insistence 
on the feasibility constraints on the degree of idealization of the human conditions. This points 
toward a particular understanding of political philosophy as an art of the realistic utopia, to use 
Rawls’s words. Radical utopian idealization of human society might be meaningful in its own light, 
but should not be treated as the most foundational basis on which law and justice are to be 
understood.  
 
To explain, first of all, most human beings are not saints but liable to free-riding and recalcitrant 
and even criminal behavior. So one important function of law is to punish the recalcitrant citizens 
and to coerce the uncooperative citizens to be law-abiding citizens. Yet the punitive function of 
law is also important in a second sense: they provide psychological assurance for the rest of the 
“law-abiding” citizens. They would then have the social guarantee that “they are not being 
abandoned to the mercies of criminals, that the lawless are not being left to the peaceful enjoyment 
of ill-gotten gains, and that to comply with the law is not to be a mere sucker”47. Therefore, the 
“bad man” view of law represented in the first punitive function of law is not sufficient. As a matter 
of fact, even in in criminal laws there are also other important positive goods, such as procedural 
justice, equal treatment under the law, protection of the public interest in safety and etc. Finnis 
points out some important features of a modern system of criminal laws that go beyond just 
punishing the bad people:  
                                               
47 Finnis (2011), p. 262. 
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(1) It recognizes the demands of the common good as “unambiguously and insistently 
preferred to selfish indifference or individualistic demands for license”48; 
 
(2) It recognizes the value of “individual autonomy”49, which is part of the practical 
reasonableness one needs to participate in the basic forms of goods for free and authentic 
self-constitution, and recognizes that value as a value for all persons;  
 
(3) It offers the common, and publicly visible lesson, or education, to all social members, 
teaching them “what the requirements of the law – the common path for pursuing the 
common good – actually are” in the form of “the public and (relatively!) drama of the 
apprehension, trial, and punishment of those who depart from that stipulated common 
way”50;  
 
(4) It recognizes the importance of the rule of law, by providing “due process of law” and 
“substantive fairness (desert, proportionality)”, such as principles of nulla poena sine lege, 
and the principles that “outlaw retroactive proscription of conduct” and “restrain the 
process of investigation, interrogation and trial (even at the expense of that terror which a 
Lenin knows is necessary for attaining definite social goals)”51.  
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(5) It recognizes an important aspect of human conditions that our exercise of self-will or 
free choice is not to be tolerated at the cost of one’s gaining unfair advantage over another 
but to be allowed “within the confines of the law”52.  
 
In a nutshell, a major function of legal sanctions is not merely about punishment, but to maintain 
or restore a rational order of proportionate equality and fairness between all members of a 
community. Yet there is a third important function of law that has not yet been covered by my 
previous discussion. Finnis argues that although in many cases laws are used mainly to provide  
“the ‘social hygiene’ of quarantine stations, asylums for the insane, and preventive detention”, 
such a function should not be understood as accomplishing “a simple objective like that of keeping 
a path free from weeds” or launching “a campaign of ‘social defense’ against a plague of locusts 
or sparrows”53. The function of punishment and sanction of law is only possible on the condition 
that there is already a public domain of law and justice to which each individual’s free choice and 
interest are subject. Law, therefore, determines what is the proper domain within which the free 
choice or private interest of every individual can be legally or justly pursued. The identification 
and punishment of  criminal behaviors is only one of the many aspects of the public domain.  
 
Hence, one great value of law is its bringing about the important social benefit of providing a 
whole legal system in which private citizens can practice their own self-directive capacities by 
interacting with others. To explain, on the one hand, people interact with each other by “making a 
contract or sale or purchase or conveyance or bequest, contracting a marriage, constituting a trust, 
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incorporating a company, issuing a summons, entering judgment” 54. It is law that brings definition, 
specificity, clarity, and thus predictability into human interactions. On the other hand, we should 
also recognize that legal rules and institutions are themselves regulated by legal rules. This 
indicates one important working postulate of legal thought that what has been once validly created 
remains valid at present and probably in the future, until it determines according to its own terms 
or to some valid act or rule of repeal. Such an attribution of authoritativeness to past acts provides 
“a stable point of reference unaffected by shifting interests and disputes and a way for people to 
determine the framework of their future”55. So not only in a world with “fraud  and abuse of power” 
must we have “the law of wrongs and of offences, criminal procedure and punishment”, in a society 
free from recalcitrance, negligence, human malice and folly we also have strong reasons to need 
law and justice as public tools to regulate the patterns of social cooperation. Even angels, as Finnis 
contends, would face the fact of reasonable pluralism and the problem of coordination, let alone 
human beings.  
 
I want to point out that all the above mentioned functions of law nonetheless have one important 
common feature: law provides psychological assurance for all social members. The determination 
of the public rules can make sure that no one have special and unfair advantages over another in 
the distribution of the burdens and benefits in their social world. Hence not only the protection of 
individuals from wanton crimes provides psychological mutual assurance, the a broader sense of 
protection from unfair bargaining situations also provides such a mutual assurance.  
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Given the analysis of a set of different functions and goals realized by law, we now can conclude 
that those who believe that we can go beyond justice due to our capacity to surpass the unfortunate 
social and human conditions have largely underestimated the problem of coordination. They 
suppose that the problem of coordination is only caused by bad people who are free-riders, jealous 
and greedy citizens, or simply wanton criminals. But this is not true. The problem of coordination 
can also be caused by well-intentioned motivation to gain superior bargaining positions, for 
responsible and sincere individuals might have deep disagreements on what is the most reasonable 
way of doing a certain thing. What complicates the issue, furthermore, is that we seem to have 
difficulties in judging whose claims about the share of material and social resources needed by 
them are legitimate and whose are not.  
 
For example, an Elon Musk parent who knew the beauty of launching rockets to space might 
believe that a good society should prioritize the teaching of scientific knowledge over the teaching 
of religious doctrines. So in order to realize this end that parent might want the society to prohibit 
parents homeschooling their children from only teaching religion but no science. But a Billy 
Graham who prioritizes the good of religious faith over the other goods might disagree with that 
proposal. Who is correct, then? Or, is it possible that both are correct and both ways of parenting 
should be allowed? Without a public and universally acknowledged principle of distributing 
educational resources, we would have no idea how to tell which of these two parents is proposing 
an unfair claim about his share and thus imposing an unfair treatment on the other parent. Yet it is 
particularly in such cases that an agreement on the common good and fair distribution should be 
forged to avoid arbitrary judgment about who unjustly interfere into other people’s fair share of 
the social resources. The more conscientious the competing parties are in insisting their personal 
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commitments, the more urgent the problem of coordination would turn out to be. Hence Finnis 
insightfully points out the following fact: 
 
“But the fact is that recalcitrance—refusal or failure to comply with authoritative 
stipulations for co-ordination of action for common good—can be rooted not only in 
obstinate self-centeredness, or in careless indifference to common goods and to stipulations 
made for their sake, but also in high-minded, conscientious opposition to the demands of 
this or that (or perhaps each and every) stipulation. Practical reasonableness—from the 
genuine authority of which conscience, in the modern sense of that term, gets the prestige 
it deserves—demands that conscientious terrorism, for example, be suppressed with as 
much conscientious vigor as other forms of criminality”56. 
 
Competing, and yet not necessarily conflicting, interests and uncertainties in social cooperation, 
therefore, is unavoidable in human cooperation. This is a plain fact given the high intelligence of 
human kind. Natural law tradition takes this fact seriously, for it recognizes the fact that there are 
limitless possible ways of participating in basic goods and limitless combinations of the basic 
goods. To deny such a fact about the plurality of human commitments is unreasonable, and to have 
a pity for such a plurality is to have a pity for the high intelligence of human beings. It is under 
such a presumption of the plurality of human commitments and the recognition of the urgency of 
the problem of coordination caused by such a plurality that Finnis praises law as “a sufficiently 
distinctive, self-contained, intelligible, and practically significant social arrangement which have 
a completely adequate rationale in a world of saints”57. The psychological assurance saints need is 
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not to protect themselves from the harm caused and ill-intentions harbored by others, since in the 
ideal world of saints there are no special psychologies and criminal behaviors. However, saints 
would still care about whether disputing claims made by them can be justly adjudicated, whether 
the ensemble of conditions for their equal chances of self-realization and equal standing as a person 
in community are justly maintained.   
 
To sum up, our need for law and justice is justified by a practical necessity given our human nature 
and human conditions. We are nonfungible persons in community. And our human conditions are 
characterized by two facts, i.e., the unsurpassable reasonable pluralism of our final ends, and the 
necessity of the need for social coordination among humans to realize their own final ends on the 
other. The Oppression Argument fails, because a properly formulated notion of the common good 
actually aims to help all individuals to self-help in their self-directive initiatives and free authentic 
self-constitution. According to the cognitivist and objective conception of the common good, 
ideological understanding of law and justice, and the corresponding oppressive social 
arrangements based on ideology are to be criticized. And people holding those ideological beliefs 
in justice are to be educated to a reasonable conception of justice. Next,  the Coercion Argument 
also fails, for our social world is not a world of angels or saints. Treating law and justice as a matter 
in an ideal world of saints unreasonably extends the scope of political and moral philosophy to a 
unrealistic utopia. Given realistic human conditions, coercion should be recognized as a practical 
requirement, the surpassing of which is both humanly impossible and humanly undesirable. Finally, 
given the high intelligence of human kind and the reasonable pluralism of the final ends or forms 
of self-constitution, law and justice are necessarily needed to regulate patterns of social 
cooperation. They can identify the public rules and public domains of human interaction. Both the 
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coercive and regulative functions of law and justice would combine to indicate their great values. 
One of the great values is their provision of the important psychological assurance to all social 
members in their sincere and stable cooperation with each other in a public domain.  
 
Hence none of the three arguments against justice under the title of “Beyond Justice Argument” 
are successful. Law and justice are constitutive means for the well-being of all social members, 
who are considered as nonfungible persons in community with equal standing and worth equal 
consideration. One important function of law and justice is to provide social resources that 
individuals need to realize their own personal commitments, rather than to determine on behalf of 
the individuals what these commitments should be. Not only do ;aw and justice shape the way all 
individuals understand themselves as an individual and as a social member, they are also practical 
means, or necessary social conditions, for the realization of well-being of individuals.   
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Chapter 4. The Problem of Ideology and the Formal Features of Law 
 
People usually claim that justice is ideology because it is used by the dominating social class to 
oppress others. This popular criticism has been discussed in the previous chapters. But sometime 
people also claim that justice is ideology because we don’t need it in a future ideal world, because 
in that world justice would have been surpassed. Now the second use of ideology can have the 
same meaning with the first one, if one means that in a future ideal society the understanding of 
justice would not be manipulated by class interests. But in other cases what people are really 
meaning by ideology is that justice is only a formalistic notion that does not guarantee substantive 
justice.  
 
I am here to single out the charge of ideology because it is highly relevant to my work on Marx. 
Anti-justice and anti-morality Marxists have been long focused on the ideology argument to reject 
the notion of justice. But different theorists have been focused on different aspects of the 
ideological charge of justice, and in many cases have created difficulties in coming up with a clear 
line of logic. For example, some Marxists’ ideological charge just repeats the Oppression 
Argument by contending that justice is determined by the dominating social class and thereby are 
oppressive. But some other Marxists argue that justice is ideology due to its formal or juristic 
nature. Principles like “treating like cases alike”, coherence, and other formal restraints of the Rule 
of Law are compatible with numerous kinds of substantive injustice. When this juristic feature is 
combined with other facts such as the social need to use law to regulate patterns of social 
interaction, it can lead to some harmful social consequences such as the systematic generation and 
reinforcement of the unjust laws in the name of Rule of Law. For example, although an equal 
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exchange in free market between two voluntary individuals meet legal rules and principles of 
justice as the existing capitalist society specifies, it actually reflects the oppressive relation 
between the two persons in the transaction. So the judgment that the exchange is a just one 
according to the existing laws is based on a juristic notion of justice. Hence, the criticism of 
capitalist production based on claims of justice is wrongheaded, and justice should be rejected as 
an ideological notion.  
 
Except for the above two different uses of ideology, thirdly, some other Marxists also insist that, 
given the relation of productive power to the relation of production, the former determining the 
form of the latter, law and justice themselves should be understood as part of the ideological 
construction in the society. What we should do is to create a new mode of social production 
accompanied by a new ideology. But there are two different understandings of the above view. On 
the one hand, some might contend that there is a distinction between good ideology and bad 
ideology, and that communist ideology is a good one that we should rely on to criticize the 
capitalist bad one. This view seems to challenge the idea that justice is an ideology to be thoroughly 
abandoned. On the other hand, however, some others might make a more radical claim that there 
is no good ideology after all. Ideology is just ideology and no ideology can be said to be good or 
bad. Justice is an ideology not because of its substantively distorted and illusory understanding of 
an otherwise enlightened form of justice, but because all moral and normative languages are 
ideology determined by economic structure. There would be no point in defending justice in any 
case, for this would be unscientific. Such a rejection of justice as economically determined notion 
can be viewed as being based on a reductivist or determinist view.  
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Hence we have seen that there can be different reasons for Marxists to charge the idea of justice 
for being an ideology. Some are interrelated in one argument, and thus not clearly distinguished 
from each other. So I think to use the umbrella charge of ideology to refute justice without a further 
clarification of the nuanced difference would unfortunately obscure our understanding of the issue. 
So in this part I want to illustrate the problem of ideology in a more systematic and coherent way.  
 
To begin with, as I have argued earlier, just as there should be a distinction between a restricted 
rejection of justice and a global rejection of justice, there should also be a distinction between a 
“narrow criticism of ideology” and a “global criticism of ideology”. It is true that sometimes unjust 
laws might be endorsed by social members as just, and in those cases those who are not well-
informed might fail to see the pathology of their society. A narrow criticism of ideology seeks to 
expose the social and historical reasons for the popularization of those ideological understandings, 
without denying the existence of some objective and independent notion of justice. But a global 
criticism of ideology means that no law or no principles of justice can be ever meaningful 
constructed. All normative and moral languages are just ideological.  
 
Is there any plausible justification for the global criticism of justice as ideology? I have argued in 
previous chapters that there would be a great explanatory burden for one who wants to criticize 
the existing social system as unjust while rejecting the legitimacy of the notion of justice. So here 
one might also think that there would be a great burden for one to endorse the global criticism of 
ideology. But here one might raise an challenging reason to justify the global claim:  in virtue of 
the formal and juristic feature of law and justice, they by nature cannot guarantee the substantive 
good and thus should be abandoned altogether as ideology.  
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Finnis rejects the above defense for the global view, charging it for failing to see the interrelation 
between the substantive and the formal features of law. These two features cannot be absolutely 
separated in many cases. In discussing Lon Fuller’s idea of the Rule of Law, Finnis emphasizes 
two important facts. First, the formal or juristic features of law’s regulation of its own creation is 
not purely “formal”58. Stability, clarity, reciprocity, fairness and respect, which are important 
aspects of the Rule of Law, are not “simply an efficient instrument which, like a sharp knife, may 
be good and necessary for morally good purpose but is equally serviceable for evil”59. While it is 
true that the system of legal rules derives its validity or authority from some past act of stipulation 
or settled usage, or convention, it is also permeated by principles of practical reasonableness and 
motivated by a concern for the common good. Coherence, for instance, “requires not merely an 
alert logic in statutory drafting, but also a judiciary authorized and willing to go beyond the 
formulae of intersecting or conflicting rules, to establish particular and if need to novel 
reconciliations, and to abide by those reconciliations when relevantly similar cases arise at 
different times before different tribunals”60. Also, the promulgation of law should be based on an 
open, reciprocal relationship with all persons in the community, and requires a professional class 
of lawyers who are competent to “advise all who want to know where they stand”61. A Nazi regime, 
Finnis explains, is exploitative for the rulers and rules only for their own interests without 
considering the interest of the rest of the community. Such a regime would normally violate the 
Rule of Law, since coherence, reciprocity, fairness and respect for persons are not purely formal 
but also substantive to a large extent by emphasizing the equal status of all participants in the 
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community and the quality of communication between the ruler and the ruled. “Adherence to the 
Rule of Law”, therefore, “is always liable to reduce the efficiency of an evil government, since it 
systematically restricts the government’s freedom of manoeuver”62.  
 
Secondly, the satisfaction of the formal requirements of law usually involve requirements of the 
qualities of institutions and process, which are inherently substantive requirements as well. For 
example, as history suggests, we need the institution of judicial authority and constitutional 
government, the separation of powers, and “the openness of court proceedings, the power of the 
courts to review the proceedings and actions not only of other courts but of most other classes of 
official, and the accessibility of the courts to all, including the poor”63 . These institutional 
arrangements both prevent the unjust schemes of arbitrary, partisan, or despotic rules, and facilitate 
the positive good of quality interaction and the trustworthiness between ruler and the ruled. To 
judge that this is a “government of laws and not of men” we should not refer to a government that  
has a constitution on paper but in reality fails to establish a constitutional government. Now should 
we refer to a government that is ruled by a tyrant but he is a tyrant who can do whatever he wills 
as a rule of law and then depart from the rule himself64. Most importantly, to say that the formal 
features of law and the Rule of Law are meant to be part of the requirements of justice and fairness, 
we actually recognize that a fundamental point of these requirements is the “dignity of self-
direction and freedom from certain forms of manipulation” 65. We should not think that the “a 
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65 Finnis (2011), p. 273. 
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written constitution is a suicide pact” unrestrained by any prohibitions and authorizations intending 
to overthrow it66.  
 
However, although it is true that the formal feature of legal logic is mixed with substantive 
requirements of justice and morality, it is also true that there are limits of the Rule of Law, and 
formally just laws can be substantively unjust: 
 
“In any age in which the ideal of law, legality, and the Rule of Law enjoys an ideological 
popularity (i.e. a favor not rooted in a steadily reasonable grasp of practical principles), 
conspirators against the common good will regularly seek to gain and hold power through 
an adherence to constitutional and legal forms which is not the less ‘scrupulous’ for being 
tactically motivated, insincere, and temporary. Thus, the Rule of Law does not guarantee 
every aspect of the common good, and sometimes it does not secure even the substance of 
the common good”67. 
 
Even the most complex creation of an complicated administrative and judicial structure cannot 
fully guarantee the realization of every and all aspect of the practical reasonableness and the 
common good. This is true because ordering a human society for the greater participation of its 
members in the basic goods is not like following a recipe for baking a cake. Our legal system, as 
Finnis repeatedly emphasizes, must face a variety of appropriate but competing choices of final 
ends of individuals, and also complete claims about the most reasonable means to ends. Yet it is 
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impossible for all of them to be realized all at once. Numerous “compromises”, or “adjustment[s] 
between commutative and distributive justice” have to be made in particular circumstances68. 
Some claims by individuals may “on occasion be outweighed and overridden (which is not the 
same as violated, amended, or repealed) by other important components of the common good, 
other principles of justice”, although some of the claims “may never be overridden or outweighed, 
corresponding to the absolute human rights”69. However, in many cases, even if the reasonable 
claims made by disputing parties can be “controlled by the complex of interacting ‘principles of 
law’”, in a largely open-ended political community, its legal authority would end up “without 
identifying any uniquely reasonable decision”70.  
 
Again, these difficulties in realizing all basic aspects of the common good in our legal institutions 
should be understood in the general understanding of the function of law as providing a good 
maintenance of an ensemble of conditions for all participants to help them self-help in free self-
constitution. Since individuals are nonfungible persons, the final goals endorsed by them and the 
particular forms of well-being of them are not comparable. And thereby we cannot add up each 
person’s degree of satisfaction of their end-state of their pursuits to come up with a sum of 
happiness. However correct or reasonable a person’s view from certain moral point of view held 
by that person, or the association to which that person belongs, it might not be allowed by certain 
legal rules or principles of justice in some historical conditions. If the public authority and legal 
institutions of the political community sets the rule that certain ways of life are not allowed, and if 
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this creates deep regrets for some individuals, they do not automatically gain unrestrained reasons 
to revolt or to judge the whole political community as an unjust one.  
 
Even if the legal prohibition of that person’s final ends might be unjust from an absolute point of 
view, this should be recognized as a human limitation with which all social members should 
reconcile. To deny the need of reconciliation is to aspire to go beyond human limitations. Not all 
prohibitions of certain ways of life are caused by corruptive manipulation of powers and biased 
moral thinking; many of them are caused due to epistemic limitation of human beings. In that sense, 
law and justice as they are instantiated in specific societies through historical legislative and 
political processes should be understood as imperfect instantiations of perfect idea of LAW and 
JUSTICE. 
 
As a matter of fact, in Finnis’s discussion of the limits of Rule of Law, he enumerates the six 
originating sources of injustice in law, and among them Finnis calls the first one an “Utilitarian 
Illusion” and refers to it as an ideology. He contends that in the background of an open-ended 
political community, it would be unrealistic, and a utilitarian ideology, to expect that our systems 
of law and principles of justice must be perfectly just and realize all aspects of the common good. 
This unrealistic expectation, as I would name it here, embodies the “Ideology of Perfect Justice 
from an Absolute Point of View”. 
 
One might think that there should be some clear ways of calculating the degree of all social 
members’ realization of self-constitution in this system of law. Then we can compare different 
systems of law by comparing the degrees of realization of all people’s realization of their final 
 66 
ends. But such an understanding of law, according to Finnis, is based on an utilitarian illusion that 
human goods is adequately quantifiable; it treats the pursuit of the common good as a “pursuit of 
a once-for-all attainable objective, liking making an omelet”71. This illusion would further generate 
another harmful thinking that our legal institutions and principles of justice should aim at coming 
up with rules that are absolutely just from an absolute point of view, which is a view that our 
existing human conditions cannot hopefully achieve. The unrealistic expectation of generating 
human laws as perfectly just not only in a procedural and formal sense, but also from a substantive 
moral point of view, therefore, is based on an ideological understanding of law, the ideology of 
understanding law as necessarily embodying perfect justice from an absolute point of view.  
 
Finally, except for the ideology of utilitarian illusion, or the ideology of perfect justice, Finnis also 
discusses five situations where substantive injustice can arise. In discussing the law of bankruptcy, 
for example, Finnis points that some people who could pay their just debts might choose to claim 
bankruptcy so as to have their debts cancelled. “No system of law can secure justice if its subjects, 
let alone its officials, are themselves careless of justice”72. Hence we must admit that a just law 
can be made the instrument of injustice. The kind of injustice involved here is not about the 
bankruptcy law itself, but is caused by some recalcitrant or free-riding behaviors. This is the first 
originating causes for the injustice in law. Secondly, there can be defects of partisan intention of 
legal authority. For example, there are cases of biased thinking and naked class ambitions that 
contaminate the legislative and political process. Thirdly, there can be abuse of power by assuming 
to oneself an excess of authority. Fourthly, there might be failures to follow the Rule of Law or to 
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respect the dignity of self-direction, and finally, the imposition of substantively distributive 
injustice on some persons or groups of persons73. These sources of injustice in law share the 
common mistake by violating some basic requirements of the practical reasonableness. Yet it is 
important to realize that it is hard to tell whether a specific violation of requirements of practical 
reasonableness is purely formal or purely substantive. In a nutshell, law can be unjust either from 
a formal or a substantive moral point of view.   
 
Yet there is one thing we should be alerted to, for the sake of understanding the value of Marxism,  
regarding the originating source of injustice of law. That is, it could be hard to identify the mistaken 
views held by people in a given society, and it could be even harder to educate them in some 
unfavorable social conditions. Plato’s metaphor of “cave” well illustrates such a difficulty. So I 
propose that there can be a third use of ideology in the notion of “ideological study”, which means 
that we should study the empirical and social generation of ideological understanding of justice. 
This use of ideology rejects the global criticism of ideology but endorses a narrow version of it, 
for it presumes the existence of a correct understanding of what is law and justice. It seeks to make 
a criticism of mistaken beliefs about justice. The criticism can include both an explanation of 
originating source of people’s mistaken belief from a psychological and subjective point of view, 
and an explanation of the social cause for the generation of those false beliefs. Finnis’s discussion 
of the originating sources of injustice should be regarded as only compatible with the narrow 
criticism of ideology rather than the global alternative. And, as I shall argue later in the part on 
Marx, a most plausible understanding of the value of Marxist ideology theory regards Marx as 
only using the “narrow criticism of ideology”. Other uses of ideology might also be found, or 
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omitted, in Marx’s work, but we should take a critical look at it. We should not make the same 
mistakes that Marx has made.  
 
To sum up my illustration of Finnis, there are three kinds of challenges for the idea of the common 
good, and law and justice as the normative and moral principle supposed to legitimately guide the 
social cooperation among citizens in a political community. The Threat to Individuality Argument 
says that the community might hinder the distinctive and unique development and self-expression 
of individuals. The Beyond Justice Argument has three expressions: The Oppression Argument, 
the Coercion Argument, and the Regulation Argument. They are all used to show that in an ideal 
future society the conditions under which we need justice can all be surpassed. And finally the 
Ideology Argument says we don’t not need justice because justice is ideology. With a close 
analysis of Finnis, I distinguish the following four uses of the notion of ideology: the Ideology of 
Utilitarian Illusion, the Ideology of Perfect Justice from an Absolute Point of View, the Narrow 
Criticism of Ideology Concealed in Social Structure, and the Global Criticism of Ideology. Yet 
none of these above challenges provides sufficient reasons for a pessimism about law and justice. 
They are necessary conditions for the realization of the well-being of human individuals as persons 
in community, and the practical necessity for our needs of them is bounded by human and social 
conditions. Surpassing justice is neither humanly possible nor humanly desirable. Recognizing 
such a practical necessity provides the grounding for understanding the work of political and moral 
philosophy as an art of realistic utopia.   
 
 
 
 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
A Marxian Conception of Justice and Natural Law 
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Chapter 5. The Problem of the Moral Dimension of Marxism  
 
My work aims to offer a Marxian theory of justice according to the natural law tradition. This 
implies that Marx has a notion of justice that is used as an objective standard according to which 
capitalist system is condemned as unjust. In terms of the natural law aspect of my contention, I 
also believe Marx endorses an understanding of individuals as nonfungible persons whose 
individuality is of great value, and he understands human society as a necessary conditions the 
realization of free self-expression of all individuals. Such an understanding of social conditions as 
means for the end of human flourishing, thirdly, further implies that the classical Marxist doctrine 
of the abolition of private ownership of the means of production should be understood as an 
institutional design required by the Marxian principles of justice.  
 
Yet the above contention has long been criticized by some Marxists as misunderstanding Marx. 
They claim that Marx rejects the notion of justice, and more generally, the notion of morality as 
ideological illusions. The disputes over whether Marx is committed to a positive notion of justice 
has kept looming large, and a large variety of anti-justice and anti-morality arguments have been 
raised to help Marxism do away with the ideas of justice and morality cherished in the traditional 
western political and moral philosophy. On the other hand, however, there are also a number of 
contemporary Marxists strongly object to the antimoralist standpoint. They seek to rescue a 
Marxian theory of justice by using the analytical methods and the academic resources in the studies 
of theory of justice by John Rawls, which has helped develop out of Marx’s texts an egalitarian 
liberal conception of justice. Such a Rawlsian interpretation of Marx meaningfully points out many 
similarities between the two great thinkers. The disputes over whether Marx has a notion of justice 
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is largely misguided, for Marx, like most mainstream political and moral philosophers in the 
nineteenth century, believes that in order for all individuals to have a life expressing their own 
individuality, a set of social conditions must be met. I agree with this judgment, and believe we 
can see the role of natural law tradition in connecting Rawls with Marx to defend this judgment. 
Hence my work would join the contemporary Rawlsian interpretation of Marx to defend a liberal 
egalitarian Marxian theory of justice. But I will do that by appealing to the Finnisn natural law 
theory and arguing that all three thinkers understand the function of the political community as a 
constitutive means for the realization of the distinct personalities of all persons in community.  
 
Before defending my natural law interpretation of Marx, I am going to give a general review of 
arguments provided in antimoralist Marxism first. To begin with, there seems to be a historical 
background of the waning influence of Marxism in contemporary world politics. Although during 
the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, many of the terrible conditions Marx documented 
in European capitalism have lessened due to the political victories by labor, the last quarter-century 
has witnessed a reversed trend. Conditions around the world are subject to an increasing 
polarization of wealth and power, and the belief in the demise of socialism as a perceived 
alternative to capitalist society widely spreads74. As Paul Blackledge observes, in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, a series of defeats suffered by the workers movement opened the door to 
neoliberalism, fostering both a general sense of social injustice and a progressively growing 
pessimism among the left about the possibility of socialist advance75. But an once widespread 
belief that Marxism died with the collapse of Soviet Communism was only partly true, and one of 
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the most important Marxist variant of the pessimistic trend was Analytical Marxism. Analytical 
Marxists attacked and abandoned the classical Marxist attempt to provide scientific accounts of 
the development of human history by analyzing the mode of production, and initiated a new project 
to reshape Marxism as a normative political theory with moral dimension76.  
 
Yet the attempt to save Marxism from mechanical materialism and economic determinism does 
not only belong to Analytical Marxism. There has been a general criticism of the Marxist rejection 
of morality. The stiff division between science and morality characteristic of mechanical 
materialism is notoriously inadequate for an explanation of social transformation and socialist 
revolution. And such an inadequacy grew even acuter when a number of Marx’s most important 
scientific predictions had been falsified by history. As Terry Eagleton argues, there is a clash 
between the means and ends of communism: the people in capitalism are “most crippled and 
depleted”, and yet “an aesthetic society will be the fruit of the most resolutely instrumental political 
action” and “the most resolute partisanship”77. How is socialist revolution possible if such a 
dichotomy of human psychology and its transformation are not explained by some ethical and 
moral theory about the desirability of socialism and its normative force on human agency? Such a 
worry of motivational deficit the question of moral desirability seem to go hand in hand to generate 
an urgent theoretical need for the retrieving and reconstructing of the moral core of Marxist theory. 
Antonio Negri, for example, suggests that we snatch Marxism back from its scientific status and 
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restore it to its utopian, or rather ethical, possibility78. Critchley criticizes the “silence or hostility 
to ethics that one finds in Marx” and links it to “Lenin’s vanguardism” and moral “nihilism”79.  
 
To answer the motivational challenge, Alasdair MacIntyre insists that a moral core must be 
rediscovered from the fragments of both Marx’s political theory and his theory of history. And he 
particularly argues that Aristotelianism is the best choice, for Marx treats the realization of 
solidarity is a fundamental human desire and reject the Kantian opposition between morality and 
human desires and needs 80 . Scott Meikle also argues that “Marx was an Aristotelian in 
metaphysics”81, for they both recognize not only the “two substantial natures in the historical 
process: the nature of society and the nature of humans”, and the social reality as involving only 
“one substance: man, or man-in-society”82.  
 
However, despite the coincidence between the emergence of Analytical Marxism and the general 
Marxist rediscovery of the ethical dimension, there is no necessary connection between retrieving 
the general moral dimension in Marxism and linking a Marxist political theory to egalitarian 
liberalism. The trajectory taken by Analytical Marxism is characterized by construing Marx’s 
socialist theory as a type of egalitarian liberal theory of justice. G. A. Cohen, one of the most 
prominent analytical Marxist, embraced “a form of utopian socialism that converges with 
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egalitarian liberalism”83. Some also remark that there is a “considerable overlap in the ethical 
views espoused by contemporary left-liberal moral and social philosophers within the analytic-
linguistic tradition and Analytic Marxists”; the “lines” drawn between the two are “fuzzy”, which 
indicates a common core, yet to be elucidated”84. However, not every Marxist interested in filling 
up the ethical lacuna endorses such a liberal project. Many other Marxists, classical or not, believe 
that analytical Marxists’ engagement with egalitarian liberalism is either a misunderstanding of 
Marx or an unfortunate “retreat” of Marxism85.  
 
So three different questions should be distinguished here. First, while it is not disputable that Marx 
condemns capitalism, it is disputable whether such a condemnation has a moral basis. Second,  if 
the answer is yes, then there is a second question about what kind of moral foundation we should 
think Marx endorses. Finally, given certain moral foundation, there could still be dispute over what 
are the most reasonable substantive normative principles, or “social ideal”, Marx should be 
regarded as endorsing in his criticism of capitalism. These three questions are independent from 
each other.  
 
Allen Wood, for example, positively constructs a Marxian criticism of capitalism based on the 
substantive charge of oppression, but denies that the such a charge is a moral charge or has some 
deeper moral foundation. Rather, he insists that Marx’s criticism of capitalism is an immoralist 
one. This immoralist social idea should not be conflated with all the previous claimed traditional 
notions like morality, justice, and equality, and human rights and freedom that are emphasized by 
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traditional political philosophy, for Marx has no sympathy with all of them. Paul Blackledge and 
MacIntyre, on the other hand, also believe in the need to find the ethical and moral aspect in Marx. 
But they propose their own Aristotelian Marxism and reject other forms of Marxism constructed 
under alternative modern moral philosophy as problematic. MacIntyre claims that only a “local 
forms of community within which civility and intellectual and moral life can be sustained through 
the new dark ages which are already upon us” is our rescue86, whereas modern moral philosophy 
“has problems of its own” in virtue of its replacing the “objective character” of classical world 
ethics with personal preferences and “interminable” disagreements immune to rational 
assessment 87 . While these two theorists both affirm the moral dimension in Marxism, their 
communitarian implications about the Marxian social idea are largely different from other 
proposals raised by other liberal, Rawlsian thinkers.  
 
Not only is MacIntyre’s communitarian Marxism far from being widely accepted, even among 
those who favor the egalitarian liberal version of Marxism, there is still room for disagreeing on 
the matter about what are the most reasonable understanding of the idea of equality and of the best 
principles of equal distribution. For example, some believe that from a Marxian point of view, 
Rawls’s difference principle still unjustly tolerates too many inequalities, whereas others believe 
that Marx would endorse a distributive principle similar to Rawls’s.   
 
However different these standpoints seem to be, one might think that both communitarian Marxists 
and liberal egalitarian Marxists are right that Marxism has a moral foundation and that the 
antimoralist understanding of Marx is unnatural. As Norman Geras points out, Marx condemns 
                                               
86Blackledge (2013), p. 171. 
87 Blackledge (2013), pp. 4-5. 
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capitalism, and therefore his theory has normative dimension, and the denial of this point is not 
worth taking seriously88. To strengthen Geras’s view, it is obvious that Marx endorses both the 
ideal of individuality (i.e., the all-round development of human capacities), and the virtue of 
solidarity. These two ideas were so prevalent in other mainstream political philosophers’ works in 
Marx’s time. Also, as many have admitted, the concern for the motivation and the timing of 
revolution remain pressing issues, and become exceedingly so in a post-revolutionary pessimistic 
time. This would give us stronger reasons to justify the moral desirability of socialism so as to 
facilitate people to revolt and change the world. So why has there been a longstanding academic 
trend to read Marxism as incompatible with moral dimension?  
 
One main source of difficulty in defending the moral foundation in Marx is actually caused by the 
apparent inconsistency in Marx’s own works. But this fact is further complicated by different 
attempts to handle his inconsistency. For the sake of building consistency, some Marxists have 
made complicated theoretical attempts to interpret Marx as an antimoralist and an anti-justice 
theorist. This attempt further gives rise to the worry about distorting Marx’s own view to suit our 
own understandings. The question about whether our interpretations are faithful or unfaithful 
constitute the problem of “responsible exegetical practice”: as Allen Wood points out, there is a 
risk of misrepresenting Marx’s view according to our own perspectives. This worry is legitimate, 
for the distinction between interpretations that can be based on the texts on the one hand, and the 
speculative construction of Marx’s moral theory on the other, “cannot always be drawn sharply”89.  
 
 
                                               
88 See Norman Geras (1985). “The Controversy about Marx and Justice”, in New Left Review 150, p. 33. 
89 See Allen Wood (1984), “Justice and Class Interests”, in Philosophia, 1984, p. 10. 
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Chapter 6. Reevaluation of the Antimoralist Arguments 
 
My method in this work in defending the liberal egalitarian interpretation of Marx is to first give 
an exhaustive summary of previous arguments against justice and morality by other Marxists, and 
then re-order them according to my Finnisian natural law framework so that a more systematic 
objection to those arguments is to be offered. The Finnisian framework can help us distinguish the 
substantive objections of Marxian theory of justice and the methodological ones. In this chapter I 
will focus on the former kind of objections, and the latter would be reserved to the third part of my 
work. To begin with, Allen Wood has provided at least twelve arguments against a Marxian theory 
of justice : 
 
(W1) Nonmoral Good Argument. Marx does not see anything morally wrong or unjust 
with exploitation and oppression in capitalism because he is not interested in the 
philosophically interesting ideas of morality such as “virtue, right, justice, fulfillment of 
duty, and the possession of morally meritorious qualities of characters”, but rather the 
nonmoral goods such as the basic needs of the working class, “pleasure and happiness”, 
“self-realization, security, physical health, comfort, community, freedom”, and “prosperity 
and other nonmoral goods”. It is these nonmoral goods that serve as the grounding for 
Marx’s criticism of social oppression and exploitation90. 
 
(W2) Materialism Argument, or Economic Base Argument. Marx does not regard wage 
labor in capitalism or the capitalist exploitation of surplus value is as unjust, but rather a 
                                               
90 See Wood (2004), p. 128-9, and 154. 
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“peculiar good fortune for the purchaser [of this commodity] but no wrong or injustice at 
all to the seller”; for Marx believes that capitalist exploitation is a necessary functionary of 
capitalist production, and that “right can never be higher than the economic formation of 
society and the cultural development conditioned by it”91. 
 
(W3) Abolition of Mode of Production Argument. Marx rejects the idea of distributive 
justice because capitalist exploitation can only be achieved by the abolition of the capitalist 
mode of production itself; in other words, Marx believes that under capitalism there is no 
realistic possibility to eliminate exploitation, whereas “under communism, on the other 
hand, it would be superfluous to demand that people be protected from capitalist 
exploitation92.  
 
 (W4) Illusory Belief Argument. Marx does not regarding capitalism as unjust but 
coercive and illusory, for Marx does not regard exploitation of surplus value as unjust, but 
rather emphasize that the belief as false, illusory, and ideological; while wage laborers 
believe that they are freer than slaves, serfs due to their free exchange of their own labor 
with capital, they have wrong and illusory understanding of themselves93 .   
 
(W5) Moralistic Preach Argument, or Idealism Argument. Marx rejects moral criticism 
because he thinks social criticism based on moral norms as a form of “historical idealism”, 
for people’s faithful adherence to the correct moral precepts cannot effectively make 
                                               
91 See Wood (2004), pp. 129; 134, 139, 250-1. 
92 See Wood (2004), p. 161, 263, 158. 
93 See Wood (2004), p. 140. 
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progressive social change; it is the productive forces or economic relations that determines 
it94. 
 
(W6) Irrationality Argument. Marx does not regard capitalism as unjust but irrational; a 
more rationally, democratically, socialistically organized form of production would be a 
better system95.  
 
(W7) Conservative Function of Morality Argument. Marx rejects justice and morality 
because he is Hegelian in this aspect, viewing “moral values as normally on the 
conservative side in revolutionary situations”96; for instance, the capitalist morality is a 
glorification of self-reliant individuality and the sanctity of private property97. 
 
(W8) Force of Evil Argument. Marx rejects morality and justice as the moral basis for 
capitalist criticism because of his Hegelian belief that “it is always the bad side which 
finally triumphs over the good side”, and that “evil is the form in which the driving force 
of historical development present itself”98.  
 
(W9) Justice as a Juristic Notion Argument. Marx rejects justice because justice is a 
juristic notion: “the justice of transactions which go on between agents of production rests 
                                               
94 See Wood (2004), p. 145. 
95 See Wood (2004), p. 129. 
96 See Wood (2004), pp. 151-2. 
97 See Wood (2004), p. 157. 
98 Wood also cites Engels, who claims in expounding Hegel that “it is precisely the bad passion of men, 
greed and love of dominion”. See Wood (2004), pp. 143-4. 
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on the fact that these transactions arise out of the production relations as their natural 
consequences”99; hence according to Marx, the judgment that ancient slavery was unjust is 
a wrong judgment due to the material or economic basis of morality.  
 
(W10) Justice as Allocative Principles Argument. Marx rejects the idea of distributive 
justice because redistribution of wealth through taxation on the rich grants to the poor does 
not change the power relation between the vulnerable and the powerful100.  
 
(W11) Limitation of Legal Regulation Argument. Marx rejects the law and justice 
because he is aware of the limitation of interference by law of minimum wage, restriction 
of the length of the working day and etc.; such claims made by Mill in terms of individuals’ 
“valid claim on society to be protected in your possession of something” is too limited in 
Marx’s view101. 
 
(W12) Morality as Individual Responsibility Argument. Marx does not condemn any 
individual persons’ bourgeois morality for the social fact of class oppression, because he 
denies that as individuals they are morally responsible for the exploitation from which they 
benefit; he has never urged Engels to give up his textile mills in Manchester102. 
 
                                               
99 See Wood (2004), p. 130. 
100 See Wood (2004), p. 262. 
101 See Wood (2004), p. 261. 
102 See Wood (2004), p. 155; Marx claims that it should be “personifications of economic categories”, rather 
than “individuals”, who is “responsible for the relations whose creatures they remain socially, however 
much they may rise above them subjectively”, cited from Wood (2004), p. 154. 
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Next, Norman Geras has summarized nine anti-justice arguments when he attempts to criticize the 
antimoralist standpoint:  
 
(G1) Marx’s Self-denial Argument. Marx actually says that capitalism is not unjust103. 
 
(G2) Ideology Argument. Marx refers to notions of fair distribution, “Justice, Liberty, 
Equality, and Fraternity” as “mythology”, “obsolete verbal rubbish” and “ideological 
nonsense”104 
 
(G3) Internalism Argument, or Functionalism Argument. Marx has a functional 
definition of justice, treating it as internal or relative to specific modes of production, and 
thereby rejecting a trans-historical notion of justice105. 
 
(G4) Relativism Argument. Marx believes “morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the 
rest of ideology” belong to the “superstructure of any social formation”, and thereby 
lacking any objective, trans-historical value106. 
 
(G5) Reformism Argument. Marx believes that appealing to justice is a reformist 
approach since it is merely a distributive value focusing narrowly on the distribution of 
income and the differentials within it, whereas what socialism requires is a thoroughgoing 
                                               
103 See Geras (1985), p. 35. 
104 ibid. See also Karl Marx, Capital I (Penguin Classics, 1993), pp. 178-9. 
105 Geras (1985), pp. 36-7. 
106 ibid. 
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revolution of the mode of production. In Marx’s words, we need “Abolition of the wage 
system!” rather than “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work!”107. 
(G6) Idealism Argument. Marx believes that actual transformation lies in the real 
historical revolutionary forces, rather than “projects of moral enlightenment and legal 
reform”; the latter is a form of “idealism” in the sense that one believe “historical process 
occurs through a change for the better in people’s moral and juridical ideas”108. 
 
(G7) Juristic Justice Argument. Marx believes that principle of justice are juridical 
principles imposed by the state on the members; yet the state and the whole institutional 
apparatus of law and sanction would wither away in communism109. 
 
(G8) Beyond Justice Argument. Marx believes that communism is beyond justice. The 
need principle that would be endorsed in a full-fledged period of communism is not a 
distributive principle endorsing any equal standards or egalitarian point of view under 
which people are subsumed; there would be circumstance of justice and there is only 
emphasis on “specific individuality”110. 
 
(G9) Nonmoral Good Argument. Marx is not committed to justice but other values such 
as freedom, self-realization, well-being and community, which are nonmoral goods rather 
than moral goods111.  
                                               
107 Geras (1985), p. 38. 
108 ibid.  
109 ibid. 
110 Geras (1985), p. 40. 
111 Geras (1985), p. 41. 
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Next, in 1990, Rodney Peffer, based on the previous discussions of the matter, continued to provide 
a more inclusive list of anti-justice and anti-morality arguments in his book, Marx, Morality and 
Social Justice. He distinguishes the anti-morality arguments from anti-justice arguments, and 
claims that many of the confusions made in the latter are closely related to the confusions made in 
the former. He first discusses six types of anti-morality arguments and I am listing them according 
to Peffer’s own ordering112:  
 
(P1) Althusser Argument, or Ideology As Theoretical Pretention Argument. Marx 
believes that ethics is ideology. Although worker’s movement might need motivational 
stimulation such as normative ideals or moral commitments expressed in Marx’s early 
humanism, we should only accept the practical function of it but rejects itself as “theoretical 
pretentions”. 
 
(P2) Nonmoral Good Argument. Marx rejects moral goods, and in general all types of 
humanitarian and moral ideologies, in favor of nonmoral goods such as potentialities, needs, 
security, self-realization, physical health, community and freedom; and Marx’s concern for 
those nonmoral goods are not based on objective, trans-historical, universal moral standard 
but on the basis of class interests113. 
 
(P3) Egoism Argument. Marx sees morality as an egocentric form of practical reasoning, 
a means by which an individual’s naturalistic inclinations are repressed by existing social 
norms so that the oppressed classes accept their oppressions; self-interest thus is the only 
                                               
112 See Peffer (1990), Chapter 4-8. 
113 See Peffer (1990), p.190, 181, 191. 
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motivation, exclusively, of the working class, whose practical reasoning is not universalist 
but only about changing oneself and satisfying their own basic needs like survival114. 
 
(P4) Moral Historicism Argument, or Economic Base Argument. Marx insists that 
whatever social structures have evolved or will evolve, the moral views of that society is 
morally justified, and thereby moral criticisms of the local status quo fails to see the 
determining effect of the mode of production on the social morality115. 
 
(P5) Ideology as False Consciousness Argument. Marx rejects ideology as false 
consciousness that cannot be part of a true theory of a correct world view; since morality 
is ideology, it should be repudiated116. 
 
(P6) Relativism Argument. Marx is a relativist that denies the objective moral 
standards117. 
 
After anti-justice arguments, he further examines eight anti-justice arguments, some of which are 
viewed by him as sharing the same type of confusions made in the anti-justice arguments :  
 
                                               
114 See Peffer (1990), pp.196-7, and 199-200, see also Andrew Collier, “The production of Moral 
Ideology”, in Radical Philosophy, 1974, No. 009, and Brian Leiter, “Why Marxism Still Does Not Need a 
Normative Theory”, in Analyse & Kritik ( 2015), Vol. 37, Iss. 1-2, pp. 23-50.  
115 See Peffer (1990), Chap. 5. 
116 Peffer (1990), p. 242. 
117 Peffer (1990), Chap. 7. 
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(P7) Justice as a Metaphysical Entity Argument. Marx rejects notions like “justice" and 
“eternal truth” as religious notions that are “metaphysically suspect”; instead he looks for 
materialistic foundation for social criticism118. 
 
(P8) Factual Disagreement Argument. Marx does not believe in the possibility of 
defining a proper conception of justice, even both bourgeois and socialists differ on their 
principles of justice119. 
 
(P9) Ideology as Conservative Morality Argument. Marx rejects justice and rights talk 
because he believes that all moral theories are ideological in terms of their necessary 
facilitating and strengthening the social status quo, which is most manifestly embodied by 
the bourgeois defense of the structure of capitalism as a “very Eden of the innate of rights 
of man”120.  
 
                                               
118 Marx makes the following claim: “what opinion should we have of a chemist, who, instead of studying 
the actual laws of the molecular changes in the composition and decomposition of matter, and on that 
foundation solving definite problems, claimed to regulate the composition and decomposition of matter by 
means of the ‘eternal ideas,’ of ‘naturalite” and “affinite”? Do we really know any more about “usury”, 
when we say it contradicts “justice eternelle,” “equite eternelle,” “mutuallite eternelle,” and other “vertites 
eternelles” than the fathers of the church did when they said it was incompatible with “grace eternele,” “foi 
eternelle,” and “la volante eternelle de Dieu”?”. Cited from Peffer (1990), pp. 321-2, and see Marx (1993), 
pp. 84-5.  
119 See Peffer (1990), p. 322. Also, Marx questions “What is a ‘fair distribution?... ‘Do not the bourgeois 
assert that the present-day distribution is ‘fair’?...Have not also the socialist sectarians the most varied  
notions about ‘fair’ distribution?”. See Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Penguin Classics, 1993), p. 385.  
120 See Peffer (1990), p. 323. Marx says that the bourgeois description of the surface (exchange) structure 
of capitalism is a very pernicious ideological defense of the bourgeois social status quo—“as a very Eden 
of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham”. See Marx (1993b), 
p. 176. 
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(P10) Moralistic Preach Argument. Marx rejects notions of right and fair distribution 
because he does not see the promulgation of them as effecting significant social change; 
only vulgar socialism treats distribution as independent of the mode of production, while 
the real change of distribution comes with the change of the material conditions of 
production121. 
 
(P11) Rights as Egoistic Claims Argument. Marx rejects rights talk because he believes 
they are only related to the conception of man as the “egoistic” individual, “as a member 
of civil society … separated from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly 
preoccupied with his private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice”122; 
human emancipation requires evolution of communist society where egoism is negated. 
 
(P12) Beyond Justice Argument. Marx rejects justice and rights as juridical notions 
because he “envisions a the higher stage of communism as a stateless and coerceless form 
of social cooperation” where the Humean conditions of justice are superseded123. 
 
(P13) Moral Historicism Argument, or Economic Base Argument. Marx rejects justice 
and rights because they are internal standards of social systems. Since “each mode of 
                                               
121 After attacking “ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and 
French Socialist”, Marx continues to claim in Gotha that “the material conditions of production are the co-
operative property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a distribution of the means of 
consumption different from the present one….Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of the 
democrats) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution 
as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on 
distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?” Cited from Peffer 
(1990), pp. 323-4. 
122 See Peffer (1990), p. 324. 
123 See Peffer (1990), p. 329. 
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production has its own mode of distribution and forms of equity…it is meaningless to pass 
judgment on it from some other point of view”. 
 
(P14) Class Interests Argument, or Economic Base Argument. Marx rejects justice 
because it is only a “vehicle or mask for the pursuit of class interest”124, which turns out to 
be those that “represent the economic needs of the prevailing mode of production”125. 
 
Readers must have noticed that the above different summaries of the antimoralist arguments have 
some redundant claims. Some of the arguments simply overlap with others, and some can be 
viewed as natural implications of the others. For example, in terms of Wood’s anti-justice 
arguments, first of all, (W4), (W9), (W10) and (W11) actually express the same criticism that some 
principles of justice do not change the power relation in society. Interference by law in the length 
of working hours, redistributions of wealth, and the legal protection of the non-coerced voluntary 
exchanges between social members in the free market are all compatible with the oppression and 
exploitation of the working poor. So one might say that these arguments are just different forms 
of one argument against justice, i.e., the charge of justice for being merely a formal juristic notion 
without substantive moral quality. Secondly, (W2), (W3) and (W5) are based on a common 
“historical materialist” presumption that what is actually endorsed in existing social relation 
legitimized by the society status quo is really legitimate or just from an objective point view. In 
other words, the factual social system justifies the normative principles factually endorsed in the 
system. One important presumption of such historical materialism is a rejection of objective 
evaluation of the system from some independent normative principle. 
                                               
124 Wood (1984), p. 27; see also Peffer (1990), p. 354. 
125 See Peffer (1990), p. 345. 
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The same kind of problem can nonetheless also be seen in Geras’ and Peffer’s summaries of other 
anti-justice arguments. (G2), (G3), (G4), and (G5) are based on the above mentioned basic 
presumption of historical materialism that rejects objective assessment from outside the system. 
And (G5), (G7) and (G8) are all focused on the juristic feature of law and justice, since what is 
formally just in an existing social legal system might be highly compatible with substantive 
injustice such as exploitation, oppression, social antagonism and etc. 
 
Finally, to some extent, several arguments so far raised can all be regarded as expressing the same 
idea that justice could be, and would be, surpassed in communism. Yet such a title of  
“beyond justice argument”, which I believe can be assigned to many of the above mentioned 
arguments, is too broad to alert us to the different reasons one might have to have such a conviction. 
For example, some claim that communism does not need justice (1) because they think in the end 
any normative notions are just internal, functional, and relative to a given social system or a 
determinate mode of economic production, and thereby lacking real normative force in an 
objective sense. But some others believe that communism does not need justice (2) because they 
think communism does not need distribution of social resources among competing claims, or (3) 
because they think communism would be a non-coercive society due to the change of mode of 
production and disappearance of class domination, or (4) because they think communism would 
satisfy the needs of everyone by fully considering the specific individuality of everyone and 
transcend the juristic form of equal consideration of people’s needs. These different reasons for 
beyond justice, therefore, should be distinguished from each other. While (1) is based on one of 
presumptions of historical materialism that justice is by nature a functional internal notion and 
thereby lacking any objective normative force, the rest of (2), (3) and (4) are not necessarily based 
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that presumption. Rather, they do not have to deny the legitimacy of the notion of justice in a pre-
communist society as an objective normative standard social members still need in order to remedy 
the social deficiencies. Strictly speaking, the functional and internalist claim about justice 
proposed in (1) cannot be properly called a beyond justice argument, for it amounts to saying that 
all societies have its corresponding internal ways of arranging social relations, from pre-capitalist 
societies via capitalist societies to socialist societies. Justice as a functional notion exists in all 
societies, and as long as the particular mode of production can be identified, the corresponding 
notion of justice can be identified.  
 
Given the problems mentioned above of previous discussions of antimoralist Marxist arguments I 
want to nonetheless emphasize two problems of those discussions so far done by previous Marxists. 
First of all, they have a problem of a lack of a systematic organization according to a unified 
framework to hold them together. Second, they do not question the underlining methodology or 
strategy used by the antimoralists who want to build consistency out of inconsistency in Marx. 
What is the point of having consistency after all? And are those antimoralist re-reconstructions of 
Marx’s texts truly convincing? To resolve the two problems, I am going to use Finnis’s natural 
law framework to  re-categorize those arguments for the sake of offering a more unified discussion 
that covers all most all the above mentioned ones. Then I will evaluate those arguments according 
to the natural law understanding of justice, revealing what are the merits and demerits of the quest 
for consistency.  
 
First, I am going to offer a shortened list of Finnisian reconstruction of the antimoralist arguments 
so far proposed by previous Marxists: 
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 (F1) No Oppression Argument. Since communism is classless and abolishes exploitative 
social relations, it will have no oppression; so it does not need justice.  
 
(F2) No Coercion Argument. Since communism has no recalcitrance, it does not have 
coercion; so it does not need justice. 
 
(F3) No Regulation Argument. Since communism has no conflicts of interests, there is 
no need to adjudicate between conflicting interests; so it does not need justice. 
 
(F4) Juristic and Formal Justice Argument. In communism the principle of formal 
justice would be replaced by the “needs principle”. The previous distributive principles are 
restricted to formal equality regarding political powers in terms of the equal rights to vote 
and freedom of conscience, equal distribution of incomes, regulations of working hours, 
and equal distribution according to contribution. Yet in communism the needs principle 
does not require equal distribution but unequal distribution according to the needs of every 
specific individuals.  
 
(F5) Historical Materialism Argument (Function Argument). Since the mode of 
production determines justice and morality, they are functional, internal and relativist 
standards depending on the existing material and economic conditions of a society.  
 
Next I want to analyze the notion of ideology. It is worth noting that both (4) and (5) can be called 
the charge of ideology. One might claim that morality is ideology because all claims about morality 
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are superstructure of a given mode of production. But this expression seems to repeat the charge 
in (F5). One might also claim that justice is ideology because the working class are made to falsely 
believe that their voluntary transactions with capitalists in a free market economy are just, and 
their mistaken belief is a socially constructed ideology. This seems to express (F4).  
 
Yet some may also claim that morality is ideology because it has the conservative function of 
facilitate the existing social convention, and they think Marx strongly believes in this judgment 
and even bases his belief in the Hegelian metaphysical explanation of history. This use of ideology 
is neither connected with (F4) or (F5), but rather regards the question about whether conservative 
morality exhaust all possible kinds of morality in a given social system. If there is more than one 
type of conservative morality popularized in society to offer some enlightened revision of the 
status quo, then it is highly suspicious that morality must by nature be an ideological illusion. Next, 
one might argue that all morality are just ideology because moral notions are mysterious 
metaphysical entities. This actually expresses the point made in (G2) and (P7), which is based on 
a particular understanding of historical materialism. It states that the use of abstract ideas in moral 
talk is a form of idealism, and since idealism should be rejected, moral talk should be rejected.  
 
Finally, as Geras points out in (W5), (G5), (G6) and (P10), morality could also be rejected as 
ideology because by purely appealing to moral talk one must fail to change the mode of production. 
Only the historical and material change, for instance the change of private ownership of the means 
of production, would be really effective in making real epochal change from capitalism into 
socialism. All the other attempts should be regarded as reformist, useless and even harmful.  
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Hence we can at least seen five different uses of ideology: (1) justice is ideology due to its 
functional or internalist feature; (2) justice is ideology because in communism justice would be 
transcended; (3) morality is ideology because it is only a conservative tool for social control; (4) 
morality is ideology because moral notions are abstract and thereby metaphysical entities; (5) 
morality is ideology because moral talk cannot change historical conditions. Despite the 
differences in the five uses of ideology, however, one thing in common is that they all completely 
deny the legitimacy of moral and political ideas, rather than just criticizes some problematic 
understanding of moral and political ideas according to some independent standards that are 
objectively true. Following my analysis of Finnis’s in the first part, I suggest we call distinguish 
the following two arguments about ideology, a global one and some restricted ones: 
 
(F6) Global Rejection of Morality as Ideology: All moral claims are ideological because 
they are either purely juristic and formal standards, or idealist metaphysical entities, or 
serving conservative functions, or determined by the mode of production, or incapable of 
facilitating real social change.  
 
(F7) Restricted Criticism of Morality as Ideological beliefs: Some claims about morality 
are ideological because, for example, they are actually not moral from a more enlightened 
point of view but falsely believed by the citizens to be moral.   
 
(F8) Restricted Criticism of Morality as Lacking Causal Power in Social Change: 
Some moral claims are ideology because they cannot facilitate social change as effectively 
as material change of the mode of production.   
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I believe that the above eight antimoralist arguments are more important than others. Although 
other arguments also make sense, they are too weak. For example, (W12) emphasizes that Marx 
is more focused on the structural evil of capitalism as a social system than on the personal 
responsibility of one capitalist. (W5) and (G5) both emphasize Marx’s awareness of the limited 
social impact of giving moral lectures to the working class. They understand Marx’s key point as  
trying to facilitate the real social change by collective actions by the workers, such as abolishing 
the existing capitalist mode of production. Moreover,  (W10) and (W11) both raise the important 
point that formal justice are not adequate for protecting the substantive equality between social 
members. Formal justice does not necessarily preclude an egoist’s selfish claims about what she 
deserves from the public resources. It is true that all of the above arguments are valid. Yet we can 
also see that they are not sufficient reasons why justice in general should be rejected. A properly 
formulated theory of justice should be a theory recognizing the truth in (W12), (W5) and (G5), 
and yet still viable enough to immunize it from the global charge if ideology. By the same token, 
recognizing the limitation of juristic or formal justice pointed out in (W10) and (W11) can help us 
construct a well-formulated conception of justice, which can be used to impose some substantive 
restrictions on an egoist to criticize her self-claimed entitlement to the material resources.  
 
Lastly, the same problem can be seen when we look into Wood’s famous Nonmoral Good 
Argument. He contends that capitalism is condemnable due to its imposed exploitation, which 
defines the idea of oppression in Marxist theory. However, since oppression is nonetheless not a 
moral term but rather a nonmoral term, according to him, capitalism is not morally wrong. Let’s 
first add the Nonmoral Good Argument as the ninth one, since it is quite independent of the rest 
of the arguments: 
 94 
 (F9) Nonmoral Good Argument: Marx is not committed to justice but other values such 
as freedom, self-realization, well-being and community, which are nonmoral goods rather 
than moral goods. 
 
It might be true that a well-defined notion of nonmoral good can help us construct a coherent anti-
morality Marxist point of view, but why must we embrace such a twisted use of the notion of 
morality? Does it really convincingly show that the traditionally valued idea of social justice 
should be excluded from our understanding of Marx?  
 
If we read Wood’s views carefully, however, we should notice an interesting remark. Despite his 
great effort to help people build a most sympathetic anti-justice reading of Marx, Wood 
nonetheless emphasizes that perhaps the most reasonable reaction to Marx’s views about morality 
is to “reject these analysis as excessively reductive, failing to capture everything we mean by 
justice and other moral properties” 126. Why he spends so much effort to defend an anti-morality 
Marxist view is that he is “also impressed by the combination of radical novelty with overall 
coherence found in Marx’s views about morality, and think it would be highly erroneous to dismiss 
them too quickly just because in the end we decide we cannot agree with them”127. Yet Wood 
himself admits that if “any far-reaching views about human well-being count as ‘moral views’’, 
then “in this sense I would not deny that Marx’s conception of human self-realization is a ‘moral’ 
conception” 128 . As a matter of fact, Wood identifies the “Aristotelian conception of self-
actualization, the development and exercise of our ‘human essential powers’” in Marx and shows 
                                               
126 Wood (2004), p. 160.  
127 ibid.  
128 Wood (2004), p. 12. 
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sympathetic attitudes to Engels’ remarks on “the actual human morality” in future society that 
substitutes for the false, ideological moralities of class society129. In terms of historical materialism, 
Wood even claims that “Marx and Engels may be expressing the mistaken belief that historical 
materialism alone suffices to justify their contemptuous rejection of a long and broad tradition of 
moral thinking”130. 
 
Wood’s sympathy with the Aristotelian notion of self-actualization is worth noting. He recognizes 
the strength of the “long and broad tradition of moral thinking” and the “far-reaching views of 
human well-being” in the Aristotelian sense. Such sympathy should be understood as his 
acknowledgement of the interpretive methodology that coherence should be regarded as a 
secondary standard when we try to understand an interesting and important theorist as Marx. Once 
we place the matter of compatibility between Marxism and morality in a larger background and 
ask the question about the value of Marxism, an alternative standard other than coherence should 
is needed. What is the point of denying justice, and morality in general, in understanding Marx’s 
social science? Is it a purely theoretical question regarding what is the most correct understanding 
of Marx’s own words, or is it a practical question regarding what we can learn from Marx’s 
capitalist criticism so as to change the existing social system? If we acknowledged that the 
motivational problem, the timing and desirability of revolution, were real and urgent issues for 
Marxism, then one would have overriding reasons to construct a Marxian moral and political 
theory.  
 
                                               
129 Wood (2004), p. 158. 
130 Wood (2004), p. 146. 
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Hence the second major problem with the previous summary of anti-justice arguments in Marx, as 
I see, is its lacking a more thoroughgoing methodological questioning of the value of Marxism. 
Reading Marx is not purely interpretive task, but also an evaluative one, or even a practically 
revolutionary one. Marxism, as a social science theory, want meant to be a practical science aiming 
at changing the world by Marx himself. This should also be endorsed by ourselves as interpreters.  
 
However, we would encounter a different type of antimoralist argument here, which is more 
difficult to handle but has been omitted in my previous Finnisian classification. This last argument 
is connected with on the scientific nature of Marxist social science. Some insists that even if a 
Marxian moral theory, or Marxian conception of justice, can be constructed, this moral part of 
Marxism should not be viewed as belonging to the Marxist social science, but only an external 
resource we would use when we want to evaluate the moral aspect of human actions. A descriptive 
theory of human history is a causal, explanatory and predictive theory that should not be subject 
to some moral evaluation internal to it. If we want to address the practical concern about the 
motivation for revolution, which is a reasonable concern by itself, we should not do so at the cost 
of sacrificing the scientific nature of Marxism. A Marxian moral theory might be established, yet 
it should not be regarded as a core aspect of Marxism. Hence we have the tenth argument as follows: 
 
(F10) Scientific Explanation Argument. Causal explanatory explanations offered by 
social science theories is incompatible with morality, for social science is an explanatory 
task, explaining what is predictively true without judging whether the predicted future 
events are morally good or not.   
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Whether (F10) is a plausible argument depends on whether one understands social science theory 
as a purely explanatory one or a both explanatory and evaluative one. For those who think that 
description of human history can be at the same time evaluative, there is nonetheless another 
distinction between the following two standpoints. To explain, some might think that, as MacIntyre 
does, Marx endorses an Aristotelian understanding of human agency, and his prediction of future 
society is based on a morally laden world view according to which a future society is a better one. 
But there can be two different views on the relation between the metaphysical understanding of 
human nature and the causal explanatory understanding of future tendency. On the one hand, some 
might endorse a strong teleological and naturalistic understanding of human history, believing that 
communism must be realized, or that there is something called the “iron law” of history, based on 
the teleological human nature, according to which communism must come. On the other hand, 
there is a much weaker thesis that human beings are only presumed to be able to be naturally 
motivated to realize their ends under favorable social and cultural conditions, without a strong 
presumption that they are necessarily so on the basis of a metaphysical necessity in human nature 
or in the structure of nature. Call the first strong thesis Teleological Necessity Argument, which 
argues for the moral dimension of Marxism in terms of the functional understanding of human 
beings. Then second weaker thesis, however, despite its endorsement of the teleological 
understanding of human nature, only endorses it as a presumption without asserting it as a 
metaphysical truth or as necessarily realized in human history. Rather, it only makes an empirical 
claim that given favorable social and human conditions, human agents who are properly educated 
to the teleological understanding of their own nature, would be naturally motivated to pursue the 
goods.  
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Now, depending on which version a moralist Marxist is arguing for, a strong thesis or a weaker 
thesis, there are two different versions of antimoralist arguments one might propose 
correspondingly:  
 
(F11) Rejecting Strong Teleological Necessity Argument. Explanations of human 
history should be a causal explanation, rather than a teleological explanation that uses the 
consequence as the causal explanation for its precedent and regards the world as necessarily 
determined by some suspicious metaphysical entity called human nature or human function.  
 
(F12) Rejecting Weak Teleology Argument: Even if one endorses a teleological 
understanding of human nature as a metaphysical presumption and use it as a guiding 
principle in the empirical and causal analysis of human history, such a presumption is 
unscientific and should be rejected. Causal explanations of human history should be purely 
empirical without presuming any sense of teleological understanding of human agency.  
 
So far I have summarized twelve antimoralist arguments. Before evaluating those arguments, I 
want to highlight the fact that there are two different types of arguments here. The first nine 
arguments from (F1) to (9) belong together in the sense that they are all substantive arguments 
concerning whether a theory of justice can be constructed from Marx texts, and what the 
substantive contents it should have. Yet the last three arguments from (F10) to (F12) belong to a 
second type in terms of the matter of methodology of social science theories. Therefore our 
treatment of these arguments should be divided into two parts. Such a distinction between two 
types of arguments, interestingly, corresponds to a distinction we can identify in Finnis’s natural 
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law jurisprudence too. What I have discussed in the first part on Finnis is about the substantive 
understanding of law, whereas the methodological aspect of his theory regarding the nature of 
social science theory of law would be left to the final part discussing the Marxist methodology of 
social science. So here in this chapter I will only criticize the first nine antimoralist arguments 
from Finnis’s point of view.  
 
Now recall the first nine antimoralist arguments:  
 
(F1) No Oppression Argument. Since communism is classless and abolishes exploitative 
social relations, it will have no oppression; so it does not need justice.  
 
(F2) No Coercion Argument. Since communism has no recalcitrance, it does not have 
coercion; so it does not need justice. 
 
(F3) No Regulation Argument. Since communism has no conflicts of interests, there is 
no need to adjudicate between conflicting interests; so it does not need justice. 
 
(F4) Formal Justice Argument. In communism the principle of formal justice would be 
replaced by the “needs principle”. The previous distributive principles are restricted to 
formal equality regarding political powers in terms of the equal rights to vote and freedom 
of conscience, equal distribution of incomes, regulations of working hours, and equal 
distribution according to contribution. Yet in communism the needs principle does not 
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require equal distribution but unequal distribution according to the needs of every specific 
individuals.  
 
(F5) Historical Materialism Argument (Function Argument). Since the mode of 
production determines justice and morality, they are functional, internal and relativist 
standards depending on the existing material and economic conditions of a society.  
 
(F6) Global Rejection of Morality as Ideology: All moral claims are ideological because 
they are either purely juristic and formal standards, or idealist metaphysical entities, or 
serving conservative functions, or determined by the mode of production, or incapable of 
facilitating real social change.  
 
(F7) Restricted Criticism of Morality as Ideological beliefs: Some claims about morality 
are ideological because, for example, they are actually not moral from a more enlightened 
point of view but falsely believed by the citizens to be moral.   
 
 (F8) Restricted Criticism of Morality as Lacking Causal Power in Social Change: 
Some moral claims are ideology because they cannot facilitate social change as effectively 
as material change of the mode of production. 
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(F9) Nonmoral Good Argument: Marx is not committed to justice but other values such 
as freedom, self-realization, well-being and community, which are nonmoral goods rather 
than moral goods131. 
 
Now, (F1), (F2) and (F3) are all to be refuted according to Finnis’s natural law point of view. The 
function of justice is more than sanctioning bad people and correcting the oppressive status quo, 
and its regulative function has great social benefits such as providing mutual assurance among 
citizens. The aspiration to go beyond justice is humanly impossible. Political philosophy should 
be restricted to the art of realistic utopia.  Next, (F4) does not succeed, for the formal features of 
justice is more than just the “formal equality”, such as an equal right to vote, an equal distribution 
of incomes, formal regulations of working hours. On the one hand, the juristic sense of equality is 
also deeply connected with some substantive regulations of the use of power and authority for the 
sake of respecting the common good. On the other hand, in an open-ended modern political 
community, the fact of reasonable pluralism urges us to recognizes not only the value of the 
procedural justice in adjudicating competing interests of citizens, but also the importance of having 
a public recognition of the legitimacy of those procedures and adjudications.  
 
(F5), then, seems to be more tricky, for it is partly a substantive argument but also partly a 
methodological one. One substantive objection to (F5) is that we can find in Marx an social ideal 
of communism in which all individuals are able to freely self-constitute themselves and mutually 
constitute one another in a common community. Such an social ideal is based on an understanding 
of individuals as distinct personality aiming at the good of free expression or self-realization for 
                                               
131 Geras (1985), p. 41. 
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both themselves and other fellow citizens. If that society has a corresponding mode of production, 
then we can say that both that society and that mode of production are more just, or morally better, 
than the previous ones. Hence functional and internalist understanding of justice does not mean 
that Marx rejects a communist conception of justice, which is an objectively valid moral standard 
he relies on in his capitalist criticism.  
 
But (F5) can also be viewed as a methodological argument, if we realize that there can be different 
versions of historical materialism, some of which can be compatible with a teleological 
understanding of human nature, but some of which is said to be incompatible with it. Hence 
refuting (F5) would involve an exploration of historical materialism. Moreover, in terms of the 
relation between historical materialism and Marx’s political economy, some interpret historical 
materialism as implying economic determinism, whereas others don’t. Obviously, not all versions 
are plausible. But which version is the most plausible one is largely dependent on how one 
understands the methodology of social science, and thereby a detailed discussion of (F5) would be 
provided later. Briefly put, I believe the most plausible understanding of Marx’s historical 
materialism is the one that is compatible with, or could be understood in the light of Finnis’s natural 
law methodology of social science. This means, first of all, that Marx can be regarded as endorsing  
an ideal-type description of the economic phenomenon, which treats the focal cases of human 
productive activities as human social actions that aim at the basic goods and follow the basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness. The economic activities and modes of production in 
capitalism, therefore, can be interpreted as marginal cases that violate those principles. Hence 
Marx’s economic theory is both evaluative and descriptive, just like Finnis’s jurisprudence. 
Secondly, Marx believes in the hopeful prospect of changing the existing watered-down cases of 
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human production into an ideal one. And the creation of such a future society is made possible by 
the collective actions of human beings who would be driven to change the mode of production by 
the class consciousness under favorable historical and social circumstances. And finally, both his 
theory of anthropology and theory of political economy are meant to provide such a practical 
guidance of human practice in terms of educating the citizens to the focal cases of production and 
facilitating them to revolutionize their social relations to realize the focal cases of human 
production. Both the last two points show Marx’s affinity to Finnis in the sense that both theorists’ 
social science theories are not only serve the theoretical purpose but also the liberating purpose. 
More would be said in the last section of my work.  
 
(F6), (F7), and (F8), then, can be evaluated together. According to Finnis, since law and justice 
are both constitutive means for the realization of the well-being of individuals and the thriving of 
their community, the global rejection of LAW and Justice altogether should be wrong. Hence (F6) 
is implausible. What is meaningful, on the contrary, is a restricted ideological criticism of the 
wrong understandings of justice. (F7) correctly sees that citizens would come to accept mistaken 
beliefs in justice, and this would help us reveal the fact that the social, legal, institutional 
arrangements are the causes of their holding the false beliefs. And (F8) is also correct in the sense 
that claims about morality by itself cannot change the world. However, both arguments are only 
correct in the sense that they have correctly diagnosed the problems of some moral claim. They do 
not justify the overall rejection of morality in itself.   
 
Finally, as I have argued earlier, (F9) is only plausible if we accept such a notion of nonmoral good 
for the sake of consistency in Marx. But such an acceptance lacks a good theoretical motivation. 
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If the idea of well-being of human beings is a human good, which can be so naturally understood 
according to traditional moral philosophy as a moral good, then there is no reason why we must 
give up such a traditional understanding.  
 
Last but not least, it must be pointed out that my evaluation of these arguments is not for the sake 
of understanding Marx for an exegetical purpose, simply wanting to make a consistent Marx out 
of his inconsistent texts. Nor does my evaluation aim at proving the truth of Marxism. A 
responsible exegetical practice should not exhaust our reading of Marx. If the purpose of reading 
Marx is to understand the social reality and change the world into a better one, we should first 
realize what a better world needs. This interpretive principle should guide us as a first principle, 
and the quest for consistency should be rendered as a secondary one. If going beyond law and 
justice is neither humanly impossible nor humanly desirable, then we should apply such an 
understanding into our reading of Marx. Hence we should recognize that Marx’s dismissive 
remarks about law and justice to some extent are oversimplified or shortsighted. There is no good 
reason, according to the natural law theory, to abandon law and justice. The well-being of all 
individuals and the thriving of the political community require that law and justice be publicly 
defined, applied and educated to all citizens.  
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Chapter 7. A Rawlsian Interpretation of Marx  
 
Although I have shown that justice is an important common good for all the individuals and the 
community, I have not answered the substantive question regarding the content of justice. 
Although people might endorse a concept of justice, they might have different or even conflicting 
conceptions of justice. It is also the case when it comes to the question what the Marxian 
conception of justice we should construct. While there are comparatively fewer disagreements 
over whether Marx has an Aristotelian tone in his moral theory or whether there is a moral 
dimension in Marxism, there are many objections to understanding Marx’s principles of justice in 
the light of Rawlsian theory of justice or egalitarian liberalism in general. MacIntyre strongly 
rejects modern moral philosophy in favor of communitarianism. The idea of “liberal” is also deeply 
troubling in some other theorists’ view. For example, Slavoj Zizek believes that liberals are those 
who think there should be no alternatives to capitalism because “any struggle for an alternative to 
contemporary capitalism will lead to a new Gulag”132. Paul Blackledge also insists that Marx is 
not “liberal”, for being liberal is being an atomized individual. He claims that  “the modern liberal 
assumptions, best articulated by Kant”, treat social members as “supposedly universal atomized 
individuals”133,  and charges Kant for naturalizing “the modern experience of the atomized egoist” 
and “egoistic individualism”134.  
 
                                               
132 See Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates 
(Verso, 2002), p. 168.  
133 See Blackledge (2013), p. 3. 
134 See Blackledge (2013), p. 15. 
 106 
However, such criticisms of liberalism are attacking a strawman. The criticized forms of liberalism 
do not represent Rawlsian liberalism and Kantian liberalism. In terms of Rawls, since A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls has already emphasized that citizens are persons who are subject to the requirements 
of the common good of the body politics. He clearly denies the so-called private persons whose 
claims about liberty and freedom are immune to the principles of justice and the good of the 
political community. Justice functions as a requirement of the common good that shapes the 
reasonable scope of what an individual can legitimately expect. Secondly, Rawls also emphasizes 
the distinct personality of every citizen and the worth of one’s personal commitments. Justice 
should not be understood as a deprivation of the distinct personality of individuals. This reflects 
Finnis’s ship analogy of the function of the state. The principles of justice, as the concrete 
requirements of the common good of the whole political community in specific social and 
historical circumstances, should not be understood as principles of designating specific final ends 
or determinate ways of living to all citizens, but rather an ensemble of necessary conditions all 
citizens need for the expression of their own individuality, irrespective of what their final ends are. 
When these two points are combined together, we will be able to see the Finnisian point in Rawls’s 
claim that “what is just draws the limit, and the good makes the point”135. Finally, such an 
understanding of individuals as distinct persons in community is further used by Rawls as the 
theoretical foundation for his constructivist theory of justice, which is compatible with Finnis’s 
understanding of social contract theory as a heuristic approach to theory of justice136.  
 
                                               
135 See Rawls (2001), p. 144. 
136 See Finnis (2011), p. 108.  
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To explain the above contentions, I will first state the two Rawlsian principles of justice, and then 
explain how they are constructed in a way compatible with Finnis’s natural law theory137. To begin 
with, according to Rawls, the “two principles apply to the basic structure of society and govern the 
assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages”138. 
Specifically, the first principle is the Principle of Equal Liberty. It applies to those aspects of the 
social system that define and secure the equal basic liberties. Those liberties include the political 
liberties such as “the right to vote and to hold public office”, and “freedom of speech and assembly; 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which includes freedom from 
psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the 
right to hold personal property and the freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the 
concept of the rule of law”139. Yet the right to own certain kinds of property, such as the ownership 
                                               
137 Since the projects of Finnis and Rawls were done for different purposes, it might be controversial to 
claim that Rawls’s conception of justice is just an outgrowth of Finnis’s natural law theory, or vice versa. 
The matter of the public justification for the principles of justice, for example, constitutes an essential part 
of Rawls’s theory, whereas Finnis does not particularly discusses it. The late Rawls contends that the 
principles of justice should be publicly justifiable to all social members who have deep doctrinal 
disagreements. Such a public justification does not aim at reaching an agreement on the truth of a certain 
objective conception of justice but rather emphasizes a reasonable overlapping consensus on it by all 
citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines. Their allegiance to such a conception of justice is not 
based on the truth but rather reasonableness of it, and the conception of justice is treated as a free-
standing “political” conception independent of citizens’ own comprehensive doctrines. Citizens would 
have their own ways to generate allegiance to it within the scope of their own doctrines for the sake of 
maintaining a public domain of social cooperation without losing their own specific ways of living. 
Finnis, however, appeals to a list of basic goods that is claimed to be objectively true and self-evidently so 
to all human beings. The Rawlsian distinction between a justification of a conception of justice from a 
political point of view and the alternative justification from the nonpolitical and comprehensive doctrines 
is not to be found in Finnis. Given the above difference, therefore, I shall avoid making a substantive 
claim about the deep relation between the two thinkers but only seek to single out a number of views on 
justice shared by them. For the matter of public justification and political turn, see Gerald Gaus, “The 
Turn to Political Liberalism”, in Jan Mandle and David Reidy, eds., A Companion to Rawls (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2014), Chap. 13.  
138 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
p. 53.  
139 See Rawls (1999), p. 53. 
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of the means of production and the freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez-
faire, are not basic and thereby not protected by the priority of the first principle140. 
 
The second principle applies to the aspects that specify and establish social and economic 
inequalities, i.e. to “the distribution of income and wealth and to the design of organizations that 
make use of differences in authority and responsibility”141. It requires both that positions of 
authority and responsibility be accessible to all, and that socioeconomic inequalities must be to 
everyone’s advantage and especially for the benefit of the least advantaged.  
 
There is nonetheless a lexical order of the two principles of justice. The first has a priority over 
the second, which means that the “infringements of the basic equal liberties protected by the first 
principle cannot be justified, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages”142. 
If one is willing to forego certain political rights to gain some significant economic returns, such 
a kind of exchange would be ruled out by the two principles of justice: “being arranged in serial 
order they do not permit exchanges between basic liberties and economic and social gains except 
under extenuating circumstances”143, like “it is essential to change the conditions of civilization so 
that in due course these liberties can be enjoyed”144.  
 
But why do the parties in the original position select the above principles of justice other than their 
alternatives? What is the their reasoning? And who determines the way they think? To answer 
                                               
140 See Rawls (1999), p. 54.  
141 See Rawls (1999), p. 54. 
142 See Rawls (1999), p. 53-4. 
143 See Rawls (1999), p. 55. 
144 See Rawls (1999), p. 132. 
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these question we should emphasize the representational function or heuristic function of the 
original position. As is mentioned earlier, Rawls distinguishes three perspectives. The first 
perspective is the citizens who are represented by the parties in the original position, the second is 
the perspective of the parties who are representative of the citizens. And the third perspective is 
the one of us as readers, including you and me who live in the real society outside the constructive 
procedure. It is the third perspective that determines the reasoning of the parties and the 
fundamental interests of the citizens that the parties should be aiming to protect. In Rawls’s view, 
the purpose of clarifying the presumptions endorsed by the third perspective is to help “make vivid 
to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of 
justice”145. In other words, the original position that employs these restrictions in its own settings 
is an “expository device” for us to understanding the reason why the two principles of justice 
should be favored to other alternatives146.  
 
To explain, according to the third external perspective, the parties representing the citizens aim to 
protect the exercise of their two fundamental capacities and three highest ordered interests. First, 
all citizens are regarded as having two fundamental capacities of being both reasonable and rational. 
They are reasonable in the sense that they have a sense of justice and act according to the 
requirement of justice even if at the cost of their own interests, and they are rational in the sense 
that they have the capacity for form a coherent life plan according to one’s conception of the good. 
Next, there are three highest ordered interests of all citizens: the first two correspond to the interest 
in developing their capacity for reasonableness and for rationality respectively, and the third one 
corresponds to an interest in living a determined form of life according to their own conceptions 
                                               
145 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 16. 
146 Rawls (1999), p. 19. 
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of the good. Lastly, all citizens are regarded as equally sharing the fundamental capacities and 
having the three highest ordered interests. The setting up of the original position and the use of the 
veil of ignorance, therefore, are treated as heuristic tools for explaining to readers like you and me 
about how the parties come to an agreement on what is the best way to protect those interests of 
the citizens they represent. 
 
The Rawlsian understanding of the highest ordered interests of citizens and their two fundamental 
capacities, as I will argue, corresponds to Finnis’s natural law understanding of individuals as 
nonfungible persons in community. We can see the correspondence in the following three aspects. 
First, Rawls’s emphasis on the nonfungibility of personality of all individuals can be seen both in 
his early work Theory of Justice and later work Political Liberalism. To say that all citizens are 
equal in sharing the two fundamental capacities is not to say that they are all the same or identical 
with each other. In TJ, Rawls criticizes that one of the major mistakes of utilitarianism is its failing 
to capture the separateness and distinctness of personality: utilitarian emphasis on the 
maximization of happiness is charged for its “mistak[ing] impersonality for impartiality”147. In PL, 
Rawls contends that one of the highest interests is our having a determinate conception of the good, 
and living a life according to one’s own personal commitments: our personal commitment defines 
who we are, and losing that would make us think life has no point148. Our personal life is highly 
valued by Rawls as a constitutive part of our person, and therefore “no matter how much welfare 
it can generate by depriving a citizen’s personal life, this would have be to viewed as a violation 
of justice”149.  
                                               
147 Rawls (1999), p. 167, 25. 
148 Rawls (2005), p. 28. 
149 Rawls (2001), pp. 103-4. 
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Secondly, to say that we all have a distinct personality by living a life according to one’s own 
determinate conception of the good is not to say we must be an egoist or self-centered. Distinctness 
is not selfishness. And criticism of egoism need not be exclusively based on a moral ideal of a 
saint. Within the range of scope between being a pure egoist and being a pure altruistic saint one 
has much freedom to decide what kind of life she wants for herself. On the other hand, however, 
nor does an emphasis on distinctness of personality necessarily imply that the free development of 
individuals should not be immune to any restrictions imposed by other individuals and social rules. 
A steadfast anarchist might contend that the public authorities like the state and government must 
oppress individual freedom and we’d better do away with these political institutions so as to get 
rid of any interference into individual freedom.  
 
Both the above charges of self-centered egoism and the charge of unrestrained individualism 
misunderstands the point of individual freedom.  According to Rawls, the moral questions 
understood in a much narrower sense about what is selfish or altruistic cannot be meaningfully 
discussed without an already existing public recognition of what is the appropriate public domain 
of freedom and liberties. What is assessed as a selfish interest from certain moral point of view 
might not be judged as selfish but legitimate and reasonable expectation from the view point of 
justice. Hence we should first appeal to a set of principles of justice to decide what count as 
legitimate personal interests and illegitimate ones, and then the questions regarding what is selfish 
and what is others-regarding would be addressed in the next stage as secondary issues.  
 
The above separation of the two stages, therefore, does not suggest that our distinct personality 
would necessarily lead to selfish moral character or unrestrained practice of individual liberties, 
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but rather only presume that the one constitutive aspect of our distinct personality lies in our 
capacity for a sense of justice and acting according to the requirement of justice. As Rawls 
emphasizes, “although justice as fairness begins by taking the persons in the original position as 
individuals … this is no obstacle to explicating the higher-order moral sentiments that serve to 
bind a community of persons together”150. When discussing Hegel’s criticism of liberalism, Rawls 
also emphasizes that while justice as fairness proceeds from a suitably individualistic basis, since 
the original position is conceived as fair between free and equal moral persons, such an 
individualistic idea of the person is also “a moral conception that provides an appropriate place for 
social values”151. Rawls explicitly rejects such an understanding of an individual as a private 
person: “if there is something called the private that is immune to justice, there is no such a 
thing”152. Citizens’ personal life commitments are to be limited by the scope allowed by the 
principles of justice153.  
 
As David Reidy argues, the theme of “persons in community” is central to Rawls’s whole projects 
since his early phase154. In his undergraduate thesis, Rawls claims that “the problem of politics is 
not the reconciliation of the individual and the social, for personality and community are mutually 
interdependent”155. Then what would be called by later Rawls as “the reasonable” had already been 
proposed in Rawls’s graduate paper, “A Brief Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ethical 
                                               
150 Rawls (1999), p. 167. 
151 Rawls (2005), p. 286. 
152 Rawls (2001), p. 166. 
153 Rawls (2005), pp. 30-1. 
154  See David Reidy, “From Philosophical Theory to Democratic Theory: Early Postcards from an 
Intellectual Journey”, in Jan Mandle and David Reidy, eds., A Companion to Rawls (Wiley-Balckwell, 
2014), p. 10. 
155 See Reidy (2014), p. 23. It is true that at that time Rawls insists that the self-realization of persona in 
community is impossible without God’s grace. But the religious aspect is clearly removed from later Rawls 
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Theory”. In that paper he identifies one kind of practical reason of human beings in terms of their 
forming “noncontroversially competent judgments regarding one’s relation as a person with other 
persons in social life”156. These early concerns about the citizens’ self-realization as persons in 
community casts “significant shadows over his later work in political philosophy”157. The familiar 
charge of liberalism for its regarding social members as atomistic individuals does not fit with the 
Rawlsian version of liberalism. 
 
The last aspect in which we might see the similarity between natural law tradition and Rawls’s 
principles of justice lies in the idea of the common good. This aspect is closely related to the above 
idea of persons in community in the sense that the common good is both good for the individual 
citizen and good for the whole body politics in which all citizens cooperate with each other. Rawls 
points out that there are six notions of the good in his conception of justice as fairness, and one of 
them is the good of political community, i.e., “the political good of a well-ordered society”158. 
Such a good is a good for all citizens cooperating in a social system, and realizing such a good in 
their social activities both fits with one of their fundamental capacities and shapes the distinct 
personality of citizens by demarcating the reasonable boundaries of their personal commitments.  
 
                                               
156 Reidy (2014), p. 14. 
157 See Reidy (2014), p. 10. In commenting Rawls’s 1946’s treatment of the problem of “radical evil” of 
human nature, Reidy claims that “notwithstanding his recollection late in life of having abandoned his faith 
during or very shortly after the way, the evidence suggests that Rawls’s prewar theistic commitments were 
slowly altered and abandoned over a period of some 10 years following the end of war. In 1954, Rawls 
taught a course in Christian Ethics at Cornell. He was then still thinking very seriously about Christianity 
and was still in the process of finding this way to the ‘nontheistic’ orientation on which he would eventually 
settle by the late 1950s or early 1960s. ” see page 29. 
158 See Rawls (2001), pp. 141-4. 
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Yet there are two issues about the common good worth noting here. First, although the common 
good limits the legitimate expectations by the citizens, it does not directly determine on behalf of 
the citizens what kind of personal life choice one should make. To say that all citizens have to 
capacity for a sense of justice and care about the self-constitution of other citizens does not mean 
that they should directly interfere into other citizens’ choices of personal commitments. Each has 
his or her own conception of the good, and living a determinate life according to that conception 
is essential to one’s development of personality.  
 
In TJ, Rawls distinguishes two parts of “self-respect”, which is one of the five primary goods. The 
first part of self-respect includes a person’s sense of his own value and his “secure conviction that 
his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out”. The second part refers to one’s 
“confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions”. Both 
aspects are significant. The first part is particularly important in the sense that once our personal 
life plans are judged as of little value in the social world or forbidden by other people as of little 
value, self-doubt would ensue, and “all desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we sink 
into apathy and cynicism” 159. But in order for the individuals to flourish, we should also provide 
the material and cultural assistance. This is linked with the second aspect of self-respect, since 
confidence in one’s ability to carry out one’s life plans relies on a set of social and material 
conditions. The provision of those materials is the requirement of the principle of subsidiarity. But 
it is nonetheless still very important to recognize that the purpose of providing material assistance 
is to help citizens self-constitute, irrespective of what their life plans are as long as they do not 
violate the principles of justice.  
                                               
159 Rawls (1999), p. 386. 
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As Finnis emphasizes, it is helpful to think of community not as “a community” or “an association”, 
but rather “an ongoing state of affairs, a sharing of life or of action or of interest, an associating or 
coming-together”, or in short “a matter of relationship and interaction”160. The most complete 
community, i.e., the body politics, then, should be understood as a coming-together of all social 
members who act together to maintain the good conditions of the community for the sake of 
everyone’s free self-constitution. Such a point can also be found in Rawls since he contends that 
in the original position the parties are mutually disinterested. What is publicly and commonly good 
for all citizens is not the final ends they choose for themselves. In fact one might actually have no 
idea of another citizen’s life plan, or even be strongly opposed to that plan. Later Rawls in 
Restatement uses the analogy of competition in a game to illustrate the same idea. While the 
competing players are concerned with winning the game over the other, and thereby having 
conflict of interests, the real point of playing the game is not to beat the competitors, but rather to 
have a good show, or a “good play of the game” so that every player can freely exercise his 
capacities and talents161.  
 
Next, the second issue about the common good worth noting is Rawls’s emphasis on the egalitarian 
feature of the personality of all citizens . All citizens are equally worth respecting and none of 
them should be positioned in such a place where one’s self-respect is disadvantaged. This means 
not only that no citizens should have their conceptions of the good unfairly dismissed or negated 
by others, but also that the comparatively worse positioned citizens should be compensated for, in 
terms of providing them with more material and social resources, so as to regain an effective sense 
of self-respect as others have. But it is important to see that although compensation is provided in 
                                               
160 See Finnis (2011), p. 135. 
161 Finnis (2011), p. 140. 
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the form of material and social resources, what people are really compensated are social bases for 
self-respect. And the reason why social basis of self-respect should be compensated for the worst 
disadvantaged citizens consists in the fact that all citizens are equal persons. Therefore, 
compensation for the disadvantage citizens should not be understood as merely for the sake of the 
disadvantaged citizens, but also for the sake of all citizens’ good. This is a requirement of the 
common good, rather than just a requirement of the worst off citizens. The self-respect of other 
people in the same social world where we ourselves live matters to us because we and others are 
both persons who are equal beings sharing two fundamental capacities and three highest interests.  
 
To sum up, first of all, according to Rawls, the social nature of the human relation is an intrinsic 
part of the nature of human beings. Yet the social nature of a person should not be viewed as in 
opposition to the distinct personal aspect of the individual too. Individuality and community are 
two integrated parts that cannot be separated from each other. Yet, secondly, to realize the effective 
self-constitution, citizens must need some material and social recourses. The principle of 
subsidiarity requires that those recourses be provided for citizens to assist them to carry out their 
own life plans according to their conceptions of the good. And the specific ways to distribute those 
resources constitute the concrete principles of justice. Thirdly, since some citizens might be 
positioned in a disadvantaged way so that their confidence and ability to carry out their own life 
plans would be much lower than others, compensations by distributing more material and social 
resources to the disadvantaged should be provide so that they can gain, or restore, their confidence 
and self-respect. Such a mode of distribution is egalitarian not in the sense that citizens should 
receive equal share of stocks as an end-state. Distribution of those stocks are be unequal, and how 
many stocks they receive or how unequal it should be is dependent on how many they need for 
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restoring their equal standing as a person in community. Finally, the principles of justice would 
determine the legitimate expectation citizens can reasonably have. All citizens should subject 
themselves to justice. The so called atomized individuals who are immune to the requirement of 
the common good of the political community is rejected by Rawls.  
 
Hence we should see that the worry about reading Marx in the light of liberal egalitarian tradition 
in the name of egoism and individualism is based on some misunderstanding of that tradition. One 
of the core Marxist contentions that in an ideal communist association “the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development of al” captures both Rawls’s and Finnis’s 
understandings of individuals as distinct persons in community. And Marx’s classical claim about 
distributive principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” also 
captures the natural law thought that the real subject of equal distribution is all citizens’ distinct 
individuality.  
 
With the above understanding, let’s recall the two principles of justice by Rawls and see if we 
should think Marx would endorse them. First, the Principle of Equal Liberty says that citizens have 
equal basic political liberties such as “the right to vote and to hold public office”, and “freedom of 
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person, which 
includes freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and dismemberment 
(integrity of the person); the right to hold personal property and the freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law”162. Would Marx, or should he, reject this 
                                               
162 Rawls (1999), p. 53 
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principle? We can find a substantive number of texts proving that Marx endorses those political 
liberties.  
 
Next, the second principle applies to the aspects that specify and establish social and economic 
inequalities. The first part of the second principle is the Equal Opportunity Principle, which says 
that both positions of authority and responsibility be accessible to all under conditions of equality 
of opportunity. But the equal opportunity should not be just a formal one, but rather refer to a more 
accurate notion of the “fair equality of opportunity”.  This not only means that careers should be 
open to all talents, but also that those with the same talents and ability and intention to use the 
talents should have the same prospect of success irrespective of their economic origin, race, gender 
and other contingent social and personal factors. Would Marx object to the idea of fair equality of 
opportunity? Given Marx’s criticism of human rights as merely formal rights in his early writings, 
he must agree with Rawls on that.  
 
The second part of the second principle is the Difference Principle, which says that the most 
morally desirable reason for allowing for social and economic inequalities is that they would make 
the worst-off citizens’ life prospect better. While many Marxists criticize the difference principle 
as not egalitarian enough, I want to emphasize three points about it with which Marx also agree. 
First and most importantly, for Rawls, the real concern of difference principle is not about social 
and economic equality per se but about the reciprocal relation between citizens who are equally 
worthy of the free development of their personality. Marx share with this thought. He rejects a 
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“crude” form of socialism that only aims at equal distribution of income and wages163, but instead 
contends for the equal prospect of free development of all individuals. Secondly, what is 
compensated by the difference principle is not liberty per se, but the worth of liberty. While citizens 
have equal basic liberties, the worth of liberty is not the same for all. Since difference people have 
different capacities for making use of the material and social resources, their prospects of success 
are unequal. For Marx, it is also important to focus on the worth of liberty, and Rawls’s emphasis 
on it is used to remedy the defect of formal justice criticized by socialists. Hence there should be 
no disagreement between the two theorists on that matter. Lastly, in the Rawlsian ideal of 
reciprocity, there is a general sense of civic friendship among all citizens. In his early scriptures, 
Marx’s emphasis on species nature corresponds to the such a Rawlsian idea. Marx claims that one 
important good of human beings is their producing and creating for another human being164.   
 
Last but not least, some Marxists claim that Marx is not a liberal because he rejects the private 
ownership of the means of production. They claim that liberal thinkers have largely failed to realize 
that one essential feature in communism is the abolition of the private ownership of the means of 
production. But such a criticism of “liberalism” cannot be correctly applied to Rawls. For, first, 
Rawls argues that the basic liberties involved in the first principle do not include the ownership of 
the means of production, or the kind of freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of 
                                               
163 Marx criticizes the crude form of communism in his 1844 Paris Manuscript. He claims that “[In crude 
communism] the domination of material property looms so large that it aims to destroy everything which 
is incapable of being possessed by everyone as private property. It wishes to eliminated talent, etc. by 
force. Immediate physical possession seems to it the unique goal of life and existence. The role of worker 
is not abolished but is extended to all men. The relation of private property remains the relation of the 
community to the world of things”. Retrieved from 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm 
164 See Daniel Brudney, “Young Marx and Mature Rawls”, in Jan Mandle and David Reidy, eds., A 
Companion to Rawls (Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), Chapter 6.  
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laissez-faire165. More importantly, Rawls is explicitly open to a liberal socialist regime where the 
public ownership of the means of production is endorsed and the worker-managed firm is 
practiced166.  
 
It is usually claimed that Rawlsian Marxists fails to acknowledge the classical Marxist tenets on 
the abolition of private property. While such a criticism is not textually true in Rawls, there is yet 
a deeper problem with this view. Those who rejects the Rawlsian interpretation of Marx based on 
the strong conviction in the abolition of private property overemphasizes the matter of ownership 
of the means of production, without correctly seeing it as a practical requirement depending on the 
empirical and historical social conditions. The two principles of justice might imply an abolition 
of the private ownership, but it might not. What mode of ownership should be endorsed is a 
question about institutional design, which is a question falling in the domain of background justice 
and relying on relevant empirical knowledge on economic rules and social conditions. As to the 
design of basic social structure, Rawls makes an important distinction between public ownership 
of productive resources and public regulation or redistribution of social resource, which is 
troublingly lacked in Marx. As a matter of fact, since the late 1980s, a number of proposals for a 
market socialism have been raised to complement Rawls’s general idea of property-owning 
democracy. These projects all call for giving workers effective democratic control of the 
productive enterprises, but they are all proposed under the presumption that an effective 
constitutional framework of liberal democracy and a market economy should be working in the 
background without demanding a political revolution167. But the idea of “free market”, on the one 
                                               
165 Rawls (1999), p. 54.  
166 For Rawls’s detailed discussion about dispersed private ownership of the means of production, see Rawls 
(2001), pp. 135-40. 
167 See Joshua Cohen, "Democratic Equality," in Ethics 99, No. 4 (Jul., 1989), pp. 725-751. 
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hand, is restricted to the domain of resource allocation rather than extend to political domains to 
cover basic liberties or other important political liberties. On the other hand, it is to be 
supplemented with the redistribution of large social and economic inequalities to fit the Rawlsian 
idea of fair equality of opportunities168.  
 
Overall speaking, despite the possible difference between Marx and Rawls on their views on the 
difference principle, they nonetheless can be viewed as having many important consensus. A 
Marxian conception of justice can be reasonably constructed in the light of Rawls’s two principles 
of justice. Thus so far I have dealt with the first nine antimoralist arguments, and  specifically 
argued for a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian interpretation of Marx. I believe both Marx and Rawls 
can be  understood in the light of natural law tradition in virtue of their endorsing the idea of 
individuals as persons in community. All individuals are distinct personalities, and their free 
development of their individuality is the purpose of a political community. But on the other hand, 
the thriving of a political community is also a common good for all individuals, and no one should 
be understood as a purely private being immune to the requirement of the common good. In that 
sense, the principles of justice are concrete principles necessarily needed both for the sake of the 
well-being of individuals and the thriving of the political community. While Marx makes 
inconsistent remarks about justice, we should take a critical look at his dismissive ones and 
construct a proper Marxian conception of justice out of his texts.  
 
                                               
168 For detailed discussion about the role of free market, see Freeman Samuel Scheffler (2003). “What is 
Egalitarianism?”, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (1): 5-39, and “Illiberal Libertarians: Why 
Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View”, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 105-151, 
Samuel Freeman (2011), “Capitalism in the Classical and High Liberal Tradition”, in Social Philosophy 
and Policy. Vol. 28 (2), pp. 19-55, and Elizabeth S. Anderson (1999). “What is the Point of Equality”, in 
Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 2.  
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Chapter 8. Legal Positivism and Natural Law Jurisprudence 
 
As I have mentioned in the earlier chapters, there is nonetheless a second type of antimoralist 
argument concerning the methodology of social science theories. Recall the following three 
methodological objections first:  
 
(F10) Scientific Explanation Argument. Causal explanatory explanations offered by 
social science theories are incompatible with morality, for social science is an explanatory 
task, explaining what is predictively true without judging whether the predicted future 
events are morally good or not.   
 
(F11) Rejecting Strong Teleological Necessity Argument. An explanation of human 
history should be a causal one, rather than a teleological one that uses the consequence as 
the causal explanation for its precedent and regards the world as necessarily determined by 
some suspicious metaphysical entity called human nature or human function169.  
 
(F12) Rejecting Weak Teleology Argument: Even if one endorses a teleological 
understanding of human nature as only a metaphysical “presumption” and use it as a 
guiding principle in the empirical and causal analysis of human history, such a presumption 
is unscientific and should be rejected. Causal explanations of human history should be 
purely empirical without presuming any sense of teleological understanding of human 
agency.  
                                               
169 See Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 107-117. 
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All the three arguments share the same conclusion that social science should be free from moral 
evaluation but purely descriptive and empirical. Yet they have different reasons for the conclusion. 
(F10) rejects morality based on the reason that explanatory theory cannot be at the same time 
evaluative. (F11) rejects morality based on the reason that notions of human nature and human 
function are metaphysical ideas. (F12) rejects morality based on the reason that a teleological 
understanding of human nature, even if it is not a deep metaphysical truth but a guiding 
presumption, is incompatible with social science.  
 
To complete my defense of a Marxian conception of justice, I am now going to criticize the 
common conclusion shared by (F10, (F11) and (F12). I shall show that social science theories can 
be both explanatory and evaluative, or that having a moral dimension does not necessarily make 
social science unscientific. Natural law tradition has influenced social science studies for a long 
time. What is unique in Finnis’s theory of law is the rational foundation for the causal explanatory 
description of legal phenomenon. By basing the descriptions of legal phenomenon on the first 
principles of natural law, namely a set of basic goods and requirements of practical reasonableness, 
law and morality are combined and inseparable in theory. In that sense Finnis rejects the is/ought 
or explanatory/evaluative divide. Such a natural law approach to social science, as it happens in 
the debate in Marxism, has been strongly opposed by legal positivists who insists on the divide 
between what law is and what law should be. My critical evaluation of both the positivist and 
natural law theories deal with the relation between empirical description and moral evaluation will 
be based on a discussion of an independent methodological scheme. And I hope that scheme can 
help us see why Finnis’s natural law methodology is better. Once we can see the desirability of the 
 125 
natural law methodology, then we would have reasons to favor a Finnisian interpretation of 
Marxian social science.  
 
To start with, early legal positivists before Hart appeal to the notions like volition and power to 
explain what is law. Bentham defined law in terms of “an assemblage of signs declarative of a 
volition conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state”, and Austin’s key words were demand, 
political superior and habits of obedience. These definitions were charged by Hans Kelsen for its 
failure to see law as a special social technique whose function consists in making sure people do 
things that should be done. This technique is particularly associated with its power to punish those 
who do not obey the rules they are supposed to obey. Therefore, a proper definition of law should 
include the above feature, treating law as norms for the applications of sanction for the sake of 
making sure people follow the rules they should follow. What’s more, such a definition is believed 
to be the best one because it tends to cover all the legal phenomenon from the ancient tribes to the 
modern constitutional regime and thereby is a universal description of law.  
 
However, Hart challenges all the previous positivist views. He points out that although Kelsen is 
right to regard law as a special social technique, he understands that technique too narrow as only 
providing norms of the application of sanction.  Hart contends that law, as a special social 
technique, is extended from sanctioning the disobedient and predicting the future events into a 
more general function of prescribing what should be done for social members from a particular 
legal point of view.  There are different types of social controls that cannot be understood as just 
sub-forms of sanction or punishment. Many legal rules are about how to make legal rules, so there 
is a distinction in legal rules between the primary rule of recognition and the secondary rule of 
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recognition. Only very primitive and small communities can have a very simple social structure as 
one of “primary rules of obligation” rooted in customs or some general attitude of the social group 
without a need for legislature, courts or officials of any kind. Yet such a simple form of social 
control must grow defective and require supplementation in various ways. When doubts about 
what rules are and how to apply the rules in concrete and controversial circumstances arise, there 
will be an urgent need for “procedure for settling the doubts, either by reference to an authoritative 
texts or to an official whose declarations on this point are authoritative”170. The establishment of 
such procedures is necessary for addressing the defect of uncertainty of the simple social structure 
of primary rules. Considering that there are other defects of such a simple society, we need 
different types of procedures to remedy them too. Such a remedy is considered as “a step from the 
pre-legal into the legal world”, whose nature is to identify forms of secondary rule, that is, “a rule 
for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation”171. These secondary rules include 
“rules of recognition, change and adjudication”172.  
 
However, in continuing to criticize the previous positivist views on law, Hart also points out that 
the prescriptive function of law further generates a special normative attitude by the rule followers, 
and that normative feature of our rule following behavior is essential to our understanding of law. 
To say that we are rule followers is not only to say that our actions can be stably predicted 
according to the content of the rules, but also that our future actions are normatively expected if 
we treat law as providing reasons for action. A legal rule provides a legal reason for acting in such 
and such a way, so our rule following behaviors are not merely actions based on mechanic or 
                                               
170 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 92. 
171 Hart (1994), pp. 94-5. 
172 Hart (1994), p. 98. 
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predictive mode of movement but rather being based on our normative, or internal attitudes toward 
these rules. According to Hart, jurisprudence should grasp the fact that we have an internal attitude 
toward law. In other words, ideas of legislation, jurisdiction, legal validity and legal power should 
not be understood as purely “scientific” or “fact-stating” predictive ideas; “the law-making 
operations of the legislator, the adjudication of a court, the exercise of private or official powers 
and other ‘acts-in-the-law’” are all rule following behaviors conducted by legal agents who have 
a normative attitudes toward law, understanding their own actions as following or accepting the 
legal reasons from an internal, first-personal point of view173.  
 
Yet the insistence on the internal point of view or the normative attitude toward law does not mean 
a necessary relation between law and justice or morality. Hart contends for the separation of law 
from the morals, claiming that legal rules should not be conflated with moral rules and that the 
normative force provided by law is not a moral kind, but just a legal kind174. While it is true that 
sometimes there can be a link between these two, a correct definition of law should still be clearly 
distinguished from morality. There are two reasons. First, whether a legal system exists is a factual 
question, which is answered by checking the following two minimum conditions: are there a large 
majority of obeying ordinary citizens acting in accordance with the legal rules, irrespective of why 
they obey the rules (they can obey laws from any motive such as self-interests, or long-term 
calculation etc.)? And, are there a sufficient number of officials accepting the rules of recognition, 
of change and adjudication, as public, common standards for their making legal decisions and 
“appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses” according to these public 
                                               
173 Hart (1994), pp. 84-5, 89. 
174 See H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” , in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
71, No. 4, pp. 593-629.  
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standards175? In such a division of labor, it is fine for the ordinary citizens to have a relatively 
passive attitude by just acquiescing in the legal rules or even obeying them for trivial reasons 
without forming critical assessments of the laws. It might be true that ordinary citizens often have 
good reasons to obey laws. For example in almost any human society there are minimum contents 
of natural law such as the protection for persons, property and promises for the sake of peaceful 
cooperative activities, and citizens often obey these rules for good reasons176. Yet it is nonetheless 
possible that they might live in a sick society where laws are oppressive to them. But in that case 
they might also obey the existing legal rules, and their law-abiding behaviors would make them 
“deplorably sheeplike”, and even bring them to an “end in the slaughter-house”. But irrespective 
of living in a good society or an oppressive society, we should  not deny both societies the title of 
a legal system177. Since moral laws and immoral laws are both laws, and they are both normatively 
efficacious, we should not define law in terms of its moral character.  
 
The second reason for the separation of law and morals offered by Hart is related to the matter of 
ultimate justification of legal validity. Hart admits that people would usually seek to find further 
justification for the legitimacy of a legal rule by appealing to the morality or justice of its content. 
But this is misguided, for what makes a primary legal rule legitimate is the second rule of 
recognition that confers the legitimate legal force on it. In our modern legal system, the rule of 
recognition is more complex. The sources of law can be some authoritative text like a written or 
unwritten constitution, a customary practice, an enactment by a legislature, and some past judicial 
precedents. The internal aspect of law means only that as long as those kinds of rules of recognition 
                                               
175 Hart (1994), pp. 114-6. 
176 Hart (1994), pp. 193-9. 
177 Hart (1994), p. 117. 
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are accepted and used by the officials and citizens, they are valid rules of that legal system. Hart 
admits that it is always possible for one to go further to ask for the criteria of validity of the 
relatively subordinate rules of recognition, and finally we will reach to the point of figuring out an 
ultimate rule that provides the criteria for the assessment of the validity of all other rules. For 
example, we ask the regressive questions about the criteria of validity of a legal rule and reach the 
conclusion that the ultimate rule of recognition is  a rule that is customarily practiced by legislature, 
officials, or private citizens. This should be the end of the inquiry. But some might continue to 
question about the legitimacy of custom: why should we accept the legal rules that are made by 
such and such officials or customs? These people, in Hart’s view, are tempted to raise the further 
question about the desirability of such a ultimate rule or of the whole legal system. But the 
questions about the worth of legal system or the desirability of the existence of certain custom are 
no longer an internal statement of law. They become external evaluative questions explored by an 
observer outside of the legal practice. Statements of value should not be wrongly thought of as 
statements of legal validity178.  
 
The above Hartian positivist approach to law, however, is criticized by natural law theorists who 
believes in the necessary link between law and morality. Lon Fuller, for example, contends that 
there are eight standards necessarily linked to the procedure of making law, which provides the 
moral foundation or rational foundation for it. For a principle to be acceptable as a law, it must 
satisfy these standards, rather than simply be observed to be regularly followed by social members 
who do not have to have a normative attitude toward law. These standards constitute the inner 
morality of law (or, the virtue of legality). While Finnis agrees with Fuller’s criticism, he goes 
                                               
178 Hart (1994), p. 108. 
 130 
further to criticize Fuller’s idea of inner morality as insufficient too. The inner morality of law is 
still too formalistic to grasp the substantive good that is inherent in law. I will then explain Finnis’s 
own natural law theory of law.  
 
First, Finnis contends that a proper definition of law should endorse the methodology of focal case 
description, or ideal-type description, a standard according to which a marginal case of law can be 
identified. But the focal cases of law should include both the formalistic feature of law and the 
substantive aspect of it. In terms of the latter, a theory of law should recognize the practical reason 
of human beings, and treat both citizens and legal officials as agents who would by nature follow  
the first principles of natural law, aiming at the basic good, following the basic requirement of 
practical reasonableness and obeying law and justice as a requirement of the comoon good. Once 
those focal cases are so identified, we will then be able to identify the watered-down cases, or the 
marginal cases of law that violate those principles. By both describing the focal cases and the 
marginal cases, therefore, we are at the same time evaluating concrete laws as either morally good 
or morally bad according to the first principles of natural law.  
 
One might find the above dual feature of jurisprudence a strange one. But this should not surprise 
us if we realize how common, as our daily language shows, that explanatory account can be 
evaluative at the same time. Medical notions like “pathology” and “function” both have that dual 
feature. So do the moral notions like “honesty” and “flourishing”. But why do positivists forcefully 
deny such a necessary link between law and morality, claiming that “it does not follow from it that 
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the criteria of legal validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if not 
explicitly, a reference to morality or justice”179?  
 
The first reason for positivists to deny the evaluative aspect of description is that in many cases 
there is equal normative force and equal legal validity for both just and unjust laws. In our society,  
many legal rules that are routinely followed by a majority of social members are not just according 
to some enlightened moral point of view. To say “unjust law are no laws”, therefore, conflates the 
legal validity of laws with the moral quality of them. Such  conflation is dangerous, moreover, for 
citizens might find it easy to disobey laws as long as they think they are not moral from certain 
point of view. Hence such a  conflation between legal and moral obligation should be avoided to 
make sure laws are generally obeyed and social stability is maintained. Secondly, positivists 
believe that we must admit the fact that the making of laws is mainly only restricted by formalistic 
principles. For example, the requirement of “Natural Justice” only refers to the procedural 
principles of impartiality, publicity and the justice in the application of law, which are formal 
restrictions that are not sufficient for eliminating the most odious laws180. But recognizing the 
conceptual independence of law from justice and morality does not, and need not prevent us from 
recognizing the importance of changing and improving the moral quality of law. In his insightful 
criticisms of the inner morality of law, Hart claims that it is vital to “reveal a sobering truth: the 
step from the simple form of society, where primary rules of obligation are the only means of 
social control, into the legal world with its centrally organized legislature, courts, officials, and 
sanctions brings its solid gains at a certain cost…[The] cost is the risk that the centrally organized 
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power may well be used for the oppression of numbers with whose support it can dispense, in a 
way that the simpler regime of primary rules could not”181. If separating in theory the moral quality 
of law on the one hand, and the existence and application of law on the other, is well compatible 
with our criticizing bad laws, and even beneficial for reminding people of the fact that laws can be 
easily manipulated by power, then there seems to be strong reasons for us to reject the natural law 
treatment of law as inherently linked to morality.  
 
However, the above two reasons are criticized by Finnis as based on misunderstanding of natural 
law jurisprudence. He emphasizes that in fact natural law theorists have never simply claimed that 
“unjust laws are no laws”, or that “every law has moral worth”182, or that we have no duty to obey 
unjust laws. Moreover, natural law theorists have never been that simple-minded to think that all 
laws are necessarily morally right. On the contrary, they recognize the fact that there are various 
types of injustice in law, and they seek to identify the  different sources, or causes, of injustice in 
law. On the matter of unjust laws and our duty to those laws, what they do is to distinguish between 
a narrowly defined legal obligation to obey particular laws in particular circumstances  on the one 
hand, and a broadly defined moral obligation to obey LAW as a whole system for the sake of the 
common good of human beings on the other. The necessary link between legal obligation and 
moral obligation consists in the latter broader sense, whereas in particular circumstance there is no 
such necessary legal obligation. In some cases we would find no good reasons to  obey unjust laws, 
but in other cases we might find strong reasons to obey them. Questions regarding when and how 
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such a demand for obeying unjust laws are not just randomly decided, but constitute important 
issue depending on practical considerations183.  
 
Yet there could be a third reason why a legal positivist objects to the natural law link between law 
and morality. That is, natural law theory has a suspicious metaphysical assertion on the teleological 
nature of human beings and unjustifiable presumes some determinate eternal law reflecting the 
whole structure of the nature. These assertions and presumptions, according to Hart, are too 
“grandiose” for modern people to accept184. Such a deeply doubtful look at the metaphysical 
feature of natural law theory is closely tied to a Humean rejection of teleological understanding of 
human behavior. Humeans believe that there is an unbridgeable gap between is and ought. What 
human beings seem to be naturally inclined to do is one thing, but what are the principles of 
practical reason that human beings should take as guiding rules is the other. In Hart’s words, “the 
difference is that on the teleological view, the events regularly befalling things are not thought of 
merely as occurring regularly, and the questions whether they do occur regularly and whether they 
should occur or whether it is good that they occur are not regarded as separate questions”185. Since 
observed empirical regularity does not entail rationality or reasonableness, natural law theorists 
wrongly derive the latter from the former. What we moderns can accept, therefore, is only a “very 
attenuated version of Natural Law” focusing on human beings’ basic desires for survival. This is 
because such a desire is “widely reflected in whole structures of our thought and language” and its 
truth is empirically verifiable186. 
 
                                               
183 Discussions about legal obligations to unjust laws, see Finnis (2011), Chap. XII. 
184 Hart (1994), p. 192-3. 
185 Hart (1994), p. 190. 
186 Hart (1994), pp. 192-3 
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Lastly, related to the above positivist criticism of the teleological presumption of human nature, a 
positivist might argue that what is the correct answer to questions about basic goods and well-
being of human beings cannot be easily answered. Lacking a universally recognized answer, such 
ideas must be too vague and uncertain to serve as a reliable guidance in legislation. Enlightened 
moral perspectives can conflict each other, and people disagree with each other what is best for 
themselves and the society. If so, then there would emerge another dangerous social consequence 
of unfair treatment of individual freedom. That is, the conviction that there is some unchanged and 
determinate natural law to guide everyone’s deliberation and life choices can impose unfair 
restrictions on one’s freedom. Moral legislations based on a specific moral perspective, therefore, 
might be an evil due to its deprivation of an individual’s freedom to exercise one’s creative talents 
and try diverse ways of life experiments187. In a word, natural law theory does not fit well with the 
diversity of human morality in our modern times.  
 
The above two reasons for rejecting natural law theory are related in the sense that they both raise 
concerns about the metaphysical presumption of human nature as aiming at the good as an end of 
their actions. While the third objection emphasizes the difficulty in justifying the truth of these 
presumptions, the fourth emphasizes the harmful social consequence following from the lack of 
justification. However, neither of the above two objections are tenable. Consider the problem of 
last objection first. Finnis points out that natural law tradition has long been focused on the 
diversity of human life. It is actually an essential part of natural law theory that human morality is 
a highly diversified landscape due to the limitless variety of reasonable ways of life choices and 
personal commitments188. The principles of practical reason only provide a list of basic forms of 
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188 Finnis (1994), p. 29, 127.  
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goods and abstract guiding principles for individuals to rely on when they deliberate about what 
they should do and should not. If we understanding the notion morality in a narrow way, treating 
it as a kind of life style or personal choice in certain social and cultural circumstance, then we can 
say that the first principles of natural law are not moral principles in that sense, but rather “pre-
moral”, rational foundation for the generation of moral principles in certain social and cultural 
contexts and the deliberative guidance for our moral choices in concrete circumstances189. 
 
Moreover, the fourth positivist objection seems to be self-conflicted when they claim both that 
survival is the only universally recognized goal of human beings and that legislation should allow 
the free experiment of individual morality. Not only is the minimum content of natural law 
reflected in legislation, other pursuit of individuals are also included, such as forming social groups 
with people having kindred spirit, protesting the unjust social conditions in a manner consistent 
with the requirement of the public interests and under the rule of law, and etc. This means that the 
Humean criticism that only desires for survival is widely observed in human society and thereby 
empirically verifiable is problematic. It is actually empirically wrong to hold that human beings 
only universally pursue survival, since we pursue a wide range of things, and our broad interests 
in a variety of different life projects are empirically verifiable too. The objection that natural law 
jurisprudence could threaten our understanding of social world as a diverse and open-ended one is 
not tenable.   
 
What, then, seems to constitute the real metaphysical worry about natural law theory lies in the 
third objection. It is challenged that natural law theory makes an illicit inference from fact to norm, 
                                               
189 The distinction between “the rational” and “the moral”, or between “the basic good” and “the moral 
good”,  see Finnis (1994), p. 25, 42, 72, 100. 
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or from empirical regularity to practical reasonableness. Yet Finnis explicitly rejects such a charge 
by emphasizing the self-evident, non-derivable nature of the first principles of natural law. These 
principles need not be based on any further metaphysical justification or explanation. They are not 
“inferred” from anything, but self-evident, underived principles that every practically reasonable 
individual would admit upon reflection under favorable circumstances. Moreover, under favorable 
circumstances reasonable human beings would be naturally driven to follow these principles190. It 
is true that  if some empirical conditions of human beings and human societies changed radically, 
it would be impossible for us to follow these principles and it would even be hard for us to tell 
what human societies and our legal phenomenon would be like. Yet natural law theorists are not 
concerned with those circumstances, for their concerns are within certain empirical limitations 
given by the nature of human beings and human societies. Finally, for those insisting on asking 
the justificatory grounds for these truth of the first principles of natural law, such a justificatory 
concern is treated by Finnis as a theoretical question whose importance is secondary to the practical 
concern. From the perspective of practical reason, by contrast to theoretical reason, the principles 
of practical reason are considered as necessary metaphysical presumptions and need no further 
demonstration 191 . Finnis’s affirmation of these principles is metaphysically light, without 
appealing to the traditional or Aristotelian conception of essence, or any other religious or 
metaphysically thick doctrines about human nature. So a modern mind would not find it too 
“grandiose” to accept.  
 
To sum up, Finnis provides his responses to all the four positivist objections. Natural law theory 
not only recognizes the risk of legalism of law by clearly distinguishing legal obligation from 
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moral obligation, but also embraces the modern de-metaphysical temperament of social science. 
Moreover, the first principles of natural law inherently acknowledge the diversity of human 
morality. All these features are shared by legal positivists, and we can conclude that on those 
matters there is actually the differences between Hart and Finnis is much smaller than some think. 
The major difference, therefore, lies in whether criticism of law should be an internal one that is 
provided from within jurisprudence itself like the natural law theory suggests, or an external one 
that is provide from an independent moral theory from which jurisprudence is autonomous.  To 
explore this issue is the task of next chapter.  
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Chapter 9. The Finnisian First Person Methodology 
 
In order to provide a general method of evaluating different theories of law, I am now going to 
provide an analysis of the idea of autonomy:  
 
(A1) Disciplinary Autonomy. Each branch of social science theory is mutually 
autonomous and has no interrelation with each other. Jurisprudence and political science 
are independent of each other not only in the sense that they are two different branches of 
disciplines but also in the sense that there is no overlapping data studied by both. Theorists 
should only focus on the subject matter belonging to their own domain.  
 
(A2) Restricted Autonomy from Internal Moral Assessment. Social Science is an 
autonomous field that only uses causal explanation to analyze the patterns of movement 
and behaviors. Moral assessment of the patterns of behaviors is not internal to its own 
theory, but is provided by other theorists like moral philosophers, enlightened social 
activists and religious practitioners and etc. While social scientists might be sensitive to 
those outside criticisms, they should not conflate their own causal explanatory task with 
the moral assessment.  
 
(A3) Absolute Autonomy from Any Moral Assessment. Not only is social science 
description of human behavior purely explanatory and predictive, they are not subject to 
any external moral assessments. Social scientists reject any third-personal criticisms of the 
patterns of movement and behaviors. 
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 (A4) Empirical Autonomy from Metaphysical Necessity. Social science theory uses 
causal explanations to analyze the patterns of movements or behaviors, but rejects any deep 
presumptions about necessary realization of telos and the strong essentialist understanding 
of human agents.  
 
Now, in terms of the attitudes toward the four types of autonomy, a Hartian positivist does not 
endorse (A1). It is easy to see why disciplinary autonomy is implausible. To explain legal 
phenomenon and figure out the source of legal validity, we are inevitably required to observe the 
historical practice and social conventions to identify what is the highest legal authority and what 
customary rules are widely accepted by the social members. This requires empirical analysis of 
different aspects of human interactions, which might involve the cultural, economic and other 
domains of social practices. Next, a Hartian would also endorses (A2), i.e., restricted autonomy 
from internal moral assessment. According to the positivist view, the task of social scientists is to 
describe, to make predictions based on the previously observed patterns of behaviors, and to infer 
causal links to explain those patterns. These descriptions and predictions can be judged as correct 
or wrong, and they are subject to empirical check. Whether the future states of affairs are morally 
desirable or not, however, is a question answered not by social scientists themselves from an 
internal point of view, but by other theorists or from external perspectives, such as a more 
enlightened moral point of view or a religious point of view belonging to  other disciplines. As 
Hart himself contends, it is actually important to separate the two kinds of statement, the factual 
and the evaluative, for this would make us aware of the fact that laws can be, and probably can 
often be, oppressive from an enlightened moral point of view.  
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Yet the above awareness of having a critical attitude toward existing laws suggests a rejection of 
(A3), i..e, absolute autonomy from any moral assessment. While social scientists are not entitled 
to make an internal judgment about whether their descriptions are morally good or not, they are 
also not entitle to make a general judgment that no external moral criticism can even be made on 
the descriptive theories they make. Lastly, we can see that Hart endorses (A4), i.e., explanatory 
autonomy from metaphysical necessity, since he rejects any metaphysical presumptions of human 
nature and exclude them from social science as grandiose and hard to accept by the moderns. 
 
Based on the above analysis of four types of autonomy and Hart’s attitudes on it, therefore, we can 
now conclude the following Hartian positivist stance on the relation between social science and 
morality:  
 
Hartian Positivist Method: Social science, as a descriptive and causally explanatory 
theory, is incompatible with moral assessment as an internal part of it. Yet external, third 
personal evaluation can be, or might be encouraged to be raised to make independent moral 
criticism of the social phenomenon described in the theory. On the other hand, social 
science explanations should be not regarded as being based on strong metaphysical 
presumptions about teleological necessity or determinism, but rather be restricted to the 
empirical methods of observing the patterns of behaviors and checking and revising the 
scientific models used in the explanations of the subject matter.  
 
I believe this attitudes reflects a plausible understanding of the limited scope of social science 
theories. Empirical observations and causal explanations of social phenomenon cannot give us a 
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strong necessary prediction of the future events. Although the metaphysical thesis on determinism 
might be true and social scientists work under the presumption of determinism, the empirical 
scientific method of social science does not allow social scientists to make a strong claim about 
the necessity of the realization of some historical goals or of human essence. Some predictions 
about the future tendencies could be proposed, or some revisions should be made if counter-
evidence emerges. Social scientists are not entitled to demonstrate the truth of the metaphysical 
necessity in terms of the necessary realization of some human plans. This is a philosophical claim 
beyond the domain of social scientist analysis. Such a restriction is well taken by Finnis, who 
explicitly prioritize practical reason to practical reason by limiting the first principles of natural 
law as a self-evident principle that needs no demonstration for a practically reasonable person, 
under favorable empirical conditions. We start with the “presumption” that we “are” practically 
reasonable persons, says Finnis. In that sense Finnis, like Hart, endorses (A4), i.e., empirical 
autonomy from metaphysical necessity.  
 
In terms of the rest kinds of autonomy mentioned earlier, both a Hartian and a Finnisian would 
agree that we can make moral criticism of social phenomenon. The main difference is just about 
whether such a criticism can be made from within social science theory itself or must be made 
from an external point of view. While Finnis contends for an internal point of view of social 
scientists and make moral assessment of its subject matter internal to the descriptive theory, Hart 
objects that only a third person point of view external to the descriptive theory can be appealed to 
when one evaluates the subject matter. So both Hart and Finnis reject (A3), i.e., absolute autonomy 
from any moral assessment, whereas Finnis also further rejects (A2), i.e., the restricted autonomy 
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from the internal assessment. So now we can conclude the methodology employed by Finnis as 
follows:  
 
Finnisian Natural Law Method: Social science as a descriptive and causally explanatory 
theory is compatible with moral assessment as an internal part in itself. It endorses a first 
personal evaluation in itself when it describes the subject matter. But social science 
explanations should neither be regarded as being based on strong metaphysical 
presumptions about teleological necessity or determinism, nor be narrowly restricted to the 
empirical methods of observing the patterns of behaviors and checking and revising the 
scientific models used in the explanations of the subject matter. In endorsing the first 
personal evaluation, the theorist herself must endorse a first person perspective of practical 
reasonableness, and thus some weak metaphysical presumptions about human nature, to 
offer the theoretical guidance to the empirical analysis of social phenomenon. Teleology 
in the strong sense of realizing metaphysical necessity in human history is substituted for 
by a weak metaphysical presumption of human telos as aiming at the good, which needs 
no further theoretical justification.  
 
By introducing the first person perspective to provide certain standard of practical reasonableness, 
a social scientist cannot avoid also introducing some presumptions of human telos and human 
nature. However, although the “theoretical guidance” is much weaker than the one offered by the 
metaphysical assertion about the necessary coming of certain future events, one might nonetheless 
still wonder if we should involve such a theoretical guidance into social science. Would it be better 
if we choose a purely descriptive and third person approach to social science?  
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Finnis’s answer is negative. He offered two reasons to explain why we should not choose such  a 
positivist method. First, actually the positivist separation of the moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence is not consistently held by themselves. In real historical legal practice we are 
inevitably citing the reasons more or less connected with the principles of ethics and political 
philosophy. For example, the claims made by legal positivists about the function of formal features 
of legal order as maintaining social order to remedy the social defect of uncertainty, and about the 
justification of lawyers’ treating certain principles of justice as principles of legality, are both 
unintelligible unless we understand them as aspects of practical reasonableness and constitutive of 
the promotion of the common good of a whole community. Finnis claims that: 
 
“One will not understand either the ‘logic’ or the ‘sociology’ of one’s own or anyone else’s 
legal system unless one is aware (not merely in the abstract but in detail) how both the 
arguments in the courts, and the formulation of norms by ‘theoretical’ jurists, are affected, 
indeed permeated, by the vocabulary, the syntax, and the principles of the ‘ethics’ and 
‘political philosophy’ of that community, or of its elite or professional caste. In turn, one 
will not well understand the ethics or political philosophy of that community or caste unless 
one has reflected on the basic aspects of human well-being and the methodological 
requirements of practical reasonableness….[A] jurisprudence which aspires to be more 
than the lexicography of a particular culture cannot solve its theoretical problems of 
definition or concept-formation unless it draws upon at least some of the considerations of 
values and principles of practical reasonableness which are the subject-matter of ‘ethics’ 
(or ‘political philosophy’). Since there can be no sharp distinction between the ‘two 
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discipline’ at that basic level, it is not clear why the distinction, if such there be, should be 
thought so very important at other levels” (357-8). 
 
The second reason is a stronger one. Finnis goes further to emphasize the practical concern of 
jurisprudence, or broadly speaking, the practical function of social science in terms of its directing 
human agents and their social activities to realize the requirements of practical reasonableness. 
The type of social science explanations offered in natural law tradition, Finnis argues, is not to just 
describe some “ordinary concept of law”, for an ordinary concept is “unfocused”: by allowing us 
to understand all the varied contexts of legal phenomenon and all the varied types of legal agents, 
no matter a sophisticated legal systems in professional lawyers’ talk, elementary legal systems 
reported by the anthropologists, and tyrants’ and bandits’ talk about the orders and the customs of 
their syndicate, such an ordinary concept only reports what we have all been well understanding 
non-controversially192.  
 
A proper theoretical purpose of jurisprudence, therefore, should not be simply to “explain a 
concept, but to develop a concept which would explain the various phenomena referred to (in an 
unfocused way) by ‘ordinary’ talk about law – and explain them by showing how they answer 
(fully or partially) to the standing requirements of practical reasonableness relevant to this broad 
area of human concern and interaction” (278-9). Explanation of a social phenomenon has a 
practical function of guiding human practice to following the principles of practical reasonableness. 
The positing of law is an act “which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; and 
those moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim, convention, or mere 
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‘decision’”193. Those objective requirements would not only explain the reason why the basic 
social structure of a body politics work in such ways that separation of powers and other economic 
and legal institutions are established and maintained, but also offer evaluative criticisms of the 
deviating cases and even facilitate revolutionary requirements on social members. So Finnis argues: 
 
“[W]hat truly characterize the tradition is that it is not content merely to observe the 
historical or sociological fact that ‘morality’ thus affects ‘law’, but instead seeks to 
determine what the requirements of practical reasonableness really are, so as to afford a 
rational basis for the activities of legislators, judges, and citizens” (p. 290). 
 
A Hartian positivist might have no objection to the ambition of natural law tradition in offering 
practical guidance, yet she might insist that it aims too high at the cost of “rul[ing] out as non-laws 
which failed to meet, or meet fully, one or other of the elements of the definition”194. Would the 
laws that lack rational basis and legislators who manipulate their powers fail to be considered as a 
relevant explanandum in Finnis’s explanation of law? If it is the case that a theory cannot include 
all relevant and ordinary phenomenon, then we should have reasons to reject it due to its lack of 
explanatory power.  
 
However, the distinction between the focal cases and marginal cases can exactly remove such a 
worry. The focal cases of law are multi-faceted. They all aspects of the practical reasonableness, 
and thus the marginal cases of law are defined as marginal ones due to their failing to embody one 
or several aspects of the practical reasonableness. To explain, the complicated long definition of 
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law provide by Finnis is the following: law is defined as a social phenomenon primarily referring 
to “rules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority 
(itself identified and standardly, constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a ‘complete’ 
community, and buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of 
adjudicative institutions”, and “this ensemble of rules and institutions [are] directed to reasonably 
resolving any of the community’s co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, 
or overriding co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of norms) for the 
common good of that community, according to a manner and form itself adapted to that common 
good by features of specificity, minimization of arbitrariness, and maintenance of a quality of 
reciprocity between the subjects of the law both amongst themselves and in their relations with the 
lawful authorities”195. This multi-faced definition does not exclude any ordinary legal phenomenon 
from its explanatory scope, but only serve as a standard according to which we judge what aspect 
of practical reasonableness is violated by a marginal case of law.  A law that does not well address 
some aspect of the common good for the community is a defective piece of law, and there can be 
various ways of having a bad law. A legislative authority that does not fully respect the reciprocal 
relationship between the subjects of the law is a defective authority. So is a law whose substantive 
contents discriminate certain social members.  
 
The above method of defining the focal cases of law is also called by Finnis an “ideal-type” 
description of law. It both covers the focal cases and the marginal case when it explains the relevant 
social phenomenon. Moreover, it both positively evaluates the focal cases and negatively evaluates 
the marginal cases. As is mentioned earlier, such an ideal-type method is widely used in other 
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disciplines.  When a doctor uses the notion of pathology, illness, and disease to explain an X-ray 
photo to a patient, both the patient and us readers, who are external observers, seem to have no 
problem with her use of those notions. Describing a symptom is at the same time making a 
normative judgment about states of affairs in the medical practice, and there is no need to further 
reflect upon the question whether using evaluative notions is legitimate or not.  
 
More importantly, it might be universally acknowledged that a doctor should always be prepared 
to cure the disease of a patient, if this is a doctor with  normal psychology and work under favorable 
social conditions. Also, it seems naturally so that the patient should have already been motivated 
to cure her own diseases. There seems to be no reasons for the doctor to intellectualize the whole 
point of her medical practice and the need for the patient to take her illness seriously. It might be 
true that definition of disease would change, and with further development of medical science our 
current knowledge system can make different judgment about what a best treatment should be 
endorsed, but this does not mean that the medical practice must be purely descriptive without any 
evaluative dimension.  
 
The same reasoning can be applied to our understanding of natural law methodology of social 
science too. First, when a social scientist explain the social phenomenon according to an ideal type 
description of the phenomenon, she is both describing, and diagnosing, the health conditions of 
society.  defines what is the healthy condition and what is the pathological condition. In offering 
a description of social practice, she also makes corresponding normative criticism of it. Moreover, 
she also tacitly presumes that readers and practical agents like us would be naturally motivated to 
learn from the diagnosis and criticisms to meet the ideal descriptions of the relevant subject matter. 
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Secondly, just like in medical science definition of health might change with new empirical 
discoveries, social science also needs solid empirical evidence and discoveries. Moral philosophy 
and empirical social scientific studies should be viewed as having a “dialectical” relation and 
mutually dependent on each other196.  
 
To sum up the comparison of Hart and Finnis, they both endorse the de-metaphysical treatment of 
social science. Also, they both agree that social scientific explanations should be empirical and 
causal ones. Moreover, in actual theoretical practices, they both reject the disciplinary autonomy 
by including explanations of moral and political phenomenon as part of jurisprudence, and thereby 
treating the autonomy of disciplines as no more than a conceptual or pedagogical ideal. Last but 
not least, they both reject the understanding of social science as absolutely autonomous from any 
moral assessment. Their disagreement, therefore, seems to mainly lie in whether the moral 
dimension is internal or external to social science theories. In other words, their disagreement 
eventually boils down to one on the issue about the practical function of social science. While a 
Finnisian natural law believes that a first person point of view should be endorsed, a Hartian 
positivist believes that a third person point of view should be endorsed.  
 
Hence here are the two modes of description endorsed by Hartian and Finnisian methodologies of 
social science respectively:  
 
(D1) Hartian Third Person Positivist Description: Social science descriptions should 
endorse a third person perspective, avoiding involvement of principles of practical 
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reasonableness or metaphysical presumptions about human nature presumed as a rational 
basis for social practice. While other non-social scientists can, and could be invited to, 
make moral criticisms of social practice from an external moral and political principles, 
social scientists themselves only provide explanatory descriptions in terms of making 
empirical observations and causal predictions. Hence social science by itself does not have 
the practical function of guiding human social interactions.  
 
(D2) The Finnisian First Person Natural Law Description: Social science descriptions 
should endorse a first person perspective, which refers to a weak metaphysical 
presumptions of the practical reasonableness of human agents as the rational foundation 
for their social practice, rather than a strong metaphysical assertion about the historical 
necessity of realization of telos. These presumptions are treated as first principles that need 
no further demonstration, serving its the practical function of guiding the social practice to 
approximate the ideal-type description of it on the basis of those first principles. Hence 
social science theories are both explanatory in terms of making empirical observation and 
causal predictions and evaluative in terms of offering moral criticism and practical 
guidance.   
 
However, a social scientist, either a Hartian or a Finnisian one, should not deny the need to do 
moral and political philosophy at a different level. Although social scientists themselves do not 
necessarily need to clarify their metaphysical groundings for the principles of practical reason in 
order to offer an  causal explanatory account of the subject matter, those metaphysical questions 
by themselves are still valid questions. Finnis claims that when one says that it is “too late”, one 
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is actually relying on a metaphysical nature of time as being irreversible197. Hence there is a 
separate discipline of metaphysics that specializes in the nature of time, which is not necessarily 
included in our daily use of the term.  
 
As to Finnis, although the explanatory aspect of social science description is compatible with a 
moral dimension, it does not have to be at the same time further based on a strong metaphysical 
thesis on the nature of human beings and the whole structure of the universe. It might tacitly 
presumes some metaphysical premises, but can fly metaphysically light by remaining silent about 
the truth or falsity of the premises. Unless some strong evidence shows that practical agents are 
radically different from the kind of agents described as practically reasonable, either due to some 
change of human nature or some unfavorable empirical and social conditions, social scientists need 
not be concerned with a further need to demonstrate of truth of first principles of natural law. It is 
enough, for the sake of social practice, that those presumptions serve as the rational foundation for 
the social scientist to explain the pathology of some social practice.  
 
Yet even if one agrees with Finnis on the practical function of social science, she might disagree 
with his de-metaphysical inclination. One might worry, first of all, that such an inclination might 
make the rational foundation for social science explanation shaky. Also, the theoretical reason and 
practical reason should be regarded as equally important. Although they provide different levels 
of explanations, a complete system of explanations of the factual, the normative and the 
metaphysical should be all sought for. Hence some might propose a mode of description that 
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involves a deeper justification for the metaphysical knowledge of human nature. Call such a mode 
of description as follows: 
 
(D3) Deep Metaphysical First Person Natural Law Description: Social science 
descriptions should endorse a first person perspective, which affirms a set of metaphysical 
stipulations about the practical reasonableness of human agents as the rational foundation 
for their social practice. These stipulations have the practical function of guiding the social 
practice to approximate the ideal-type description of it, and thus social science description 
is both explanatory in terms of making empirical observation and causal predictions and 
evaluative in terms of offering moral criticism and practical guidance. But their practical 
function does not prevent social scientist from seeking to further justify their truth and 
include that justification in social science itself. Rather, these stipulations could also be, 
and should be, further demonstrated as true claims inside social science, rather than be 
merely suspended as necessary presumptions for the sake of practical need. 
 
The above analysis of three modes of social science explanation, i.e., (D1), (D2) and (D3), is 
relevant to our evaluation of Marxism, for we can ask which is the one that best reflects Marxist 
social science.  
 
One popular classical interpretation of Marx, as is known to all, endorses (D1), i.e., a positivist 
mode of social science description. Marxism must be a purely descriptive and predictive theory 
without a normative dimension. But some other might think Marx should be regarded as using 
(D3). For example, Jon Elster claims, although in a critical attitude, that Marx’s theory of human 
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history is deeply Hegelian, for his explanation presumes the necessary realization of the human 
telos and use the future events as the causal explanation for the existing social phenomenon198. 
This judgment of Marx’s mode of social science description, we should admit, does have solid 
textual basis, for Marx talks about the iron law of human history and the necessary coming of 
communist society as the end of human history. Finally, some other theorists suggest that Marxists 
should endorse (D2). Kai Nielson, for example, agrees that Marxism has two aspects, one 
normative and the other empirical, but it should treat the normative theory “metaphysically light” 
just as Rawls does199. Such an emphasis on the primacy of practical reason over theoretical reason 
is endorsed by both Rawls and Marx. They are both hopeful writers believing in the realistic 
possibility of making a more just and more desirable social world. 
 
According to my view, (D3) is the most reasonable standpoint. According to both Finnis and Rawls, 
a deeply metaphysically inclined social scientist endorses an unnecessarily strong stance on the 
theoretical reason. Despite the fact that an extension of logic from the justification of the first-
order substantive principles, via the justification of the rational foundation of those principles, to 
the highest abstract metaphysical stipulations is a natural tendency rooted in human reason, such 
an extension is a necessarily needed for the sake of social practice. The final justification for the 
metaphysical stipulations about human nature and human history can be suspended, therefore, if 
the purpose of social science is to guide that practically reasonable human agents to function under 
favorable historical and empirical conditions. A fuller justification of the Finnisian and Rawlsian 
de-metaphysical temperament on the matter of practical reason cannot be offered here, and my 
                                               
198 See Elster (1985), p. 15, 29, 109.  
199 See Kai Nielson, “Analytical Marxism: A Form of Critical Theory”, in Erkenntnis 1993, Vol. 39 (1), p. 
12. 
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goal here is limited to showing that although all of the three modes of social science explanations 
are reasonable, the Finnisian natural law mode is the most attractive one.  
 
To sum up,  the Finnisian First Person Natural Law Description is the most plausible mode of 
description in the light of which we should understand Marx’s social science theory. It is both 
descriptive and evaluative, providing an internal critical perspective on the described social 
phenomenon. Although that internal perspective is substantively decided by the first principles of 
natural law, which constitutes the rational foundation for our understanding of our social practice, 
it does not have to be based on deep metaphysical assertions about human telos or human end. 
These principles are only presumed to be the pre-moral foundation for the description of social 
phenomenon, and serving as a practical guidance directing the theorists and readers into the 
practice of social liberation. Yet social liberation also needs empirical studies, which are the main 
contributions provided by Marx’s rich analysis of the economic activities and legal structures of 
modern world.  Such a Finnisian understanding of Marxism, therefore, truly represents the spirit 
of Marxism: while the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the real point is to change it.  
 
In terms of my criticism of antimoralist arguments, next recall the last three methodological 
objections. (F10), i.e., Scientific Explanation Argument,  rejects morality based on the reason that 
explanatory theory cannot be at the same time evaluative. This is wrong from the Finnisian point 
of view, since the ideal-type description methodology means that identifying focal cases according 
to the principles of natural law would make us able to both describe the marginal cases as non-
ideal ones and negatively evaluate it as violating the principles. (F11), Rejecting Strong 
Teleological Necessity Argument, rejects morality based on the reason that notions of human 
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nature and human function are metaphysical ideas. This reason is not sufficient because moral 
ideas endorsed in social science do not necessarily presume any metaphysical understanding of 
them, but can be highly autonomous from any metaphysical thesis. Even a Hartian positivist must 
presume some minimum moral ideas such as the good of survival and social stability, but 
presuming these notions does not generate any unnecessary metaphysical burdens. Finally, (F12), 
i.e., Rejecting Weak Teleology Argument, rejects morality based on the reason that a teleological 
understanding of human nature, even if it is not a deep metaphysical truth but a guiding 
presumption, is incompatible with social science. This seems to reflect a Hartian positivist stance 
explained by (D1). Although this understanding of Marxism may have solid textual basis, it does 
not fit well with the overall spirit of Marxism. The spirit of Marxism is best expressed in the 
Finnisian natural law framework. If there is something called Marxist methodology in the name of 
“historical materialism”, I believe, the Finnisian First Personal Natural Law Description should be 
the best explanation of that name.  
 
To sum up, although the Hartian positivist reading of Marx can also have its solid textual support, 
I believe overall speaking the natural law reading of him best reflects the practical function of 
social science that is highly valued by Marx. The “scientific turn” made by mature Marx should 
not prevent us from recognizing the valuable moral dimension throughout his works. The rich 
social historical data discovered by Marx and analyzed in his later works are valuable precisely 
because they are guided by the practical reason, or by the practical goal of changing the social 
world into a better one. So I propose we follow Finnis in adopting the mode of first person ideal-
type description, identifying the focal cases of human production according to the first principles 
of natural law. Such a multi-layered definition of human production, on the one hand, like Finnis’s 
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definition of law, involves the a list of basic human goods and basic requirements of practical 
reasonableness as the end of human production. And the marginal cases of human production are 
cases violating those principles in different ways to different degrees, and thus describing those 
cases as marginal amounts to criticizing them in a negative light. On the other hand, giving an 
ideal-type description of human production does not prevent, but rather encourages us, both the 
theorists and the readers, to do further empirical studies to find the causes for the deviation and the 
remedy for it.  The apparent tension, therefore, between treating epochal change in human history 
as following the iron law and treating historical change as a result of collective human practice by 
active human agents with moral consciousness, therefore, need not trouble us, if we understand 
that “iron law” in a weakened way in which it is only stipulated as a necessary presumption that 
human productive activities would naturally aim at both the well-being of individuals and the 
common good of the community as long as favorable social and human conditions were provided. 
That necessary presumption plays an important practical role in social science, making it 
intrinsically liberating and a revolutionary guidance in our understanding of human production 
and human history.  
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